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Abstract  
The recent global financial crisis (2007-2009) might seem like a distant 
memory, however the impact and implications of the Basel 3 Accord1, (the 
brain-child of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the 
G20) lives on; at least for the entire phase-in period (1 January 2013 to 1 
January 2023). 
Even though Ghana and Kenya like some other African countries were 
affected by the global financial crisis (although not to the same extent as 
some European countries), both countries as well as most African countries 
were conspicuously absent during the negotiations phase of Basel 3, perhaps 
with the exception of South Africa. Notwithstanding this under-representation 
by African countries, Basel 3 is expected to have a degree of impact and 
implications for large commercial banks in Ghana and Kenya and the African 
continent at large. 
In view of this, an analysis of the impact and implications of the capital 
adequacy provisions of Basel 3 on large commercial banks in Ghana and 
Kenya would be incomplete without first highlighting the relevance of Basel 3 
to African countries. 
The capital adequacy provisions of Basel 3 requires banks to ensure that they 
possess enough capital which must be of sufficient quality to address banking 
risks and to absorb substantial bank losses – a requirement already being met 
by banks in South Africa, a member of the G20. 
With South Africa having already begun the implementation of Basel 3, it is 
only a matter of time before other African countries follow suit. Nonetheless 
and regardless of whether Ghana and Kenya implement Basel 3 or not, there 
will be implications for all, not least the large commercial banks within these 2 
jurisdictions. 
This thesis thus investigates the implications of the capital adequacy 
provisions of Basel 3 on large commercial banks in Ghana and Kenya. 
                                                 
1
 Hereinafter simply referred to as Basel 3. 
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Introduction 
Notwithstanding the compliance statistics provided by the Sub-Saharan 
African countries with respect to the Basel 2 Accord2 and the level of 
pessimism shared by some where the likely adoption of Basel 3 by African 
Countries and compliance with it thereof is concerned, it is a grave 
misconception when legal analysts and scholars3 suggest that Basel 3 will not 
apply to African countries. It is submitted that such misconceptions are ill-
conceived and ought to be ignored. 
One of the rationales4 for Basel 3 at the time of its endorsement by the G20 
and the BCBS5 was that never again should the ordinary taxpayer be made to 
bail-out6 banks which had become too big to fail. Thus the objective of Basel 3 
is aimed towards the strengthening of the global banking industry’s ability to 
‘absorb shocks’ emanating from both financial and economic stress, thereby 
reducing the transmission of the effects of a banking crisis from the financial 
sector to the real economy7. 
The meaning of capital adequacy8 may still be subject to slight variations in 
the banking law statutes of countries which set out to incorporate Basel 2 and 
Basel 3 in their national laws. This is due to the different interpretations and 
classifications accorded by the incorporating country to the components9 of 
the capital adequacy ratio. Thus, whilst attempts at a global regulatory and 
                                                 
2
 Hereinafter simply referred to as Basel 2. 
3
 Such as Iwa Salami. See I Salami, ‘International Financial standards and the application of 
Basel 3 in Emerging and Frontier Markets’, Law and Financial Markets Review (2012) Volume 
6 336, 339. 
4
 Another rationale, was that no firm should be deemed too large or too systemically important 
to fail – http://www.g20.org.documents2010//11seoulsummit_declaration.pdf 
5
 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was formed in 1994, as a result of 
the collapse of Herstaff (A bank based in Cologne, Germany). 
6
 http://www.g20.org.documents2010//11/seoulsummit_declaration.pdf 
7
 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Basel 3: A global framework for more resilient 
banks and banking systems’ [2010] (Revised June 2011) Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS). 
8
 Capital adequacy is the minimal capital that banks and other financial intermediaries are 
required to maintain at any given point in time. See ‘IOSCO Guidance to Emerging Market 
Regulators Regarding Capital Adequacy Requirements for Financial Intermediaries’ p4 2006. 
9
 Such as the classification of assets and the nature and extent of their exposure to risk. The 
types of assets and the risk methodology used are taken into account when computing capital 
adequacy, or ‘the capital adequacy ratio’. 
xvi 
supervisory framework continue, the harmonisation of national banking 
practices with global best practice continues to be elusive and tricky in some 
jurisdictions. 
A careful analysis of the statement by Arnout Wellink10 suggests that the 
BCBS intends to ultimately ‘roll-out’ Basel 3 world-wide. Sceptics of this point 
of view might suggest that Arnout Wellink was only stating his own personal 
opinions and not that of the BCBS at large, a situation which the author 
considers ‘far-fetched’ and highly imaginative, considering he made the 
statement in South Africa11 in his distinguished capacity as Chairman of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, President of the Netherlands Bank. 
It is thus certainly the case that both Ghana and Kenya and perhaps other 
African countries within the Continent, will view the current upheaval in the 
global banking industry with some level of uncertainty as to the likely future 
impact and implications of Basel 3 on their respective national banking 
systems. 
In view of this, the question of whether Basel 3 achieves its objectives is a 
subjective one for which the jury is still out. Nonetheless, one phenomenon 
that can almost certainly be guaranteed is that the wheel of global banking 
regulation will constantly be in motion as it is unlikely that the recent global 
banking crisis would ever be the last to occur; certainly not in a lifetime. 
The remaining part of this thesis has been set out as follows. Chapter 1 
discusses the cause(s) of the global financial crisis, Chapter 2 describes how 
the global financial crisis found its way to Africa through transmission 
mechanisms, its impact (particularly on banks) and the various responses by 
Ghana and Kenya as well as South Africa and Nigeria by way of comparison. 
Chapter 3 discusses the role of international banking regulation in enhancing 
global financial stability. Chapter 4 discusses bank capital regulation and 
capital adequacy, highlighting the latter’s evolutionary transition under Basel 1 
to Basel 2. Chapter 5 introduces the Basel 3 global banking accord with 
                                                 
10
  Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: President, the Netherlands 
Bank. 
11
 On 27
th
 January 2011 at a High level meeting in Cape Town, South Africa on ‘The 
Emerging Framework to Strengthen Banking Regulation and Financial Stability’ for Africa. 
xvii 
greater focus on the new capital adequacy provisions contained therein. 
Chapter 6 provides an in-depth analysis of the Questionnaire which is set out 
in two parts (Part A & Part B) and Chapter 7 discusses the implications of 
capital adequacy under Basel 3, on large respondent commercial banks in 
Ghana and Kenya followed by a concluding paragraph. 
xviii 
 
Aim & Methodology 
In this thesis, the author will seek to assess and analyse the present and 
future implications of the Basel 3 capital adequacy provisions on large 
commercial banks in Ghana and Kenya12. In doing so, the author seeks to 
address the following questions: 
 Is the international convergence of Capital Adequacy regulations 
desirable? 
 Will Basel 3 be relevant for large commercial banks in Ghana and 
Kenya? 
 What are the likely implications of Basel 3 on large commercial banks 
in Ghana and Kenya? 
To achieve this aim, the ‘broader’ or new definition of Capital as provided 
under Basel 3 will be examined.  Also, the provisions introduced by Basel 3 
that directly impact on the amount of capital banks will need to set aside 
towards the risks they encounter through banking activities will also be 
critically examined and its likely impact on commercial banks in Ghana and 
Kenya assessed. 
It is important to remember, that there may be differences13 in the mode of 
application of capital adequacy requirements by banks in Africa, particularly in 
Ghana especially where the capital adequacy requirement under Basel 2 is 
concerned. Such differences will be taken into consideration throughout this 
thesis. 
                                                 
12
 The choice of Ghana and Kenya stems from the fact that they are both Frontier African 
countries that have a sound and robust banking structure. Frontier countries are ‘countries 
which have capital markets that are smaller and less liquid than those in the more advanced 
and emerging countries’ – Standard & Poor, 2000. Examples of other frontier countries are 
Nigeria, Tanzania, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Tunisia. Also, Ghana and Kenya have 
already begun the implementation of Basel 2 (ie the predecessor of Basel 3). 
13
 Differences arising from inconsistencies in the application of Basel 2 as a result of 
ineffective banking supervision. 
xix 
As a result of a lack of a level playing field14 in the application of the capital 
adequacy requirement under Basel 2, the rationale behind Basel 3 will be 
addressed, particularly where it is likely to have both a direct and indirect 
effect on banking activities and regulations, as well as banking supervision in 
both Ghana and Kenya. Also, the provisions of Basel 3 in relation to capital 
adequacy will be examined and an insight sought to establish whether there 
could ever be uniformity and or consistency in its application globally, 
because the intended outcome of a globally applicable guideline will not 
materialise, if it is unable to achieve its desired effect globally. 
If history is anything to go by, it is the author’s firm belief, that within a decade 
or more, Basel 3 will become a requirement that all countries world-wide will 
have to meet.  
Methodology 
An empirical legal research consisting of a quantitative methods approach 
was employed, thus forming the backbone of this thesis. This form of legal 
research method was to ensure that data collated would be both hard and 
reliable. 
Thus this research was conducted by approaching high ranking individuals15 
from banking institutions and asking them to complete a questionnaire16 that 
addressed the core issues which ultimately could provide answers to the 
questions this thesis poses. 
The questionnaire was structured in a way to solicit a combination of short 
straight answers and also present an opportunity for respondents to provide 
answers in a summarised paragraph form. A combination of questions 
requiring a ‘Yes’; ‘No’ or ‘Don’t know’ type answers and also open-response 
type questions where respondents were encouraged to provide an 
                                                 
14
 While countries that have adopted Basel 2 do have banks that satisfy the minimum capital 
requirement, there is no ‘real maximum capital requirement figure’ and Basel 2 compliant 
banks tend to have varying capital adequacy levels, beyond the minimum capital requirement.  
This may perhaps be due to the fact that banks tend to possess different types of assets 
which have various levels of risk or riskiness attached to them.  This ultimately affects the loss 
provision calculation for capital that the bank will have to set aside. 
15
 These were individuals responsible for bank policy within the participant banks in the 
jurisdiction of Ghana and Kenya. 
16
 See Appendix 6 on page 260 of this thesis. 
xx 
explanation for their choice of answer(s). This approach was to enable the 
completion of the questionnaire to be as time-efficient as possible. 
Primary legal resources were also used together with articles and publications 
from institutions like the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) and Bank for International Settlements (BIS) etc. 
The views of some legal scholars from banking and finance law journals have 
also been analysed by the author in this thesis. 
A historical method and a comparative legal method approach was also 
adopted to provide a degree of insight into the various forms of financial crisis 
that have taken place in the history of these two African countries selected for 
this thesis. This approach in the author’s opinion may shed some light on the 
role and the preparedness of a selected country’s banking system, (or the 
lack of it) towards the level of impact of the global financial crisis in that 
particular country. 
There is an acknowledgement that Ghana and Kenya entered and exited the 
financial crisis at different stages. Thus, any comparisons and distinctions that 
would be highlighted would be limited to when the crisis was transmitted to 
each jurisdiction, the resilience of each jurisdiction’s banking system to 
financial crisis and the extent to which the existing Basel 2 bank regulatory 
framework is being implemented through their respective national laws. 
Also, in this thesis, references have been made to the Financial Sector 
Assessment Programme (FSAP) Reports prepared by Ghana, Kenya, South 
Africa and Nigeria17, in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank. 
The FSAP was developed18 as a tool which enables financial systems of 
countries to be assessed, thereby determining the financial stability of that 
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 Although this thesis largely focuses on the various respondent banks from Ghana and 
Kenya, a wider comparative analysis of capital adequacy levels pre-global financial crisis is 
undertaken for all four African jurisdictions primarily because they are all considered to be 
frontier countries, they have relatively well developed financial/banking systems, and above 
all were affected in different ways by the global financial crisis. 
18
 The birth of the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) was necessitated 
following the financial crisis in the 1990s. 
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country and assisting in the identification of any shortcomings within the 
financial system of that country which could then be rectified. For an FSAP to 
be undertaken by the IMF or World Bank on any country, the request for it 
must come from the country concerned, as this would make it less intrusive 
for the requesting country and also ensure that there is active participation by 
the authorities thus making them responsible for the data and figures provided 
to the IMF and/or World Bank. 
The logic for the reliance on data from the FSAP Reports in this thesis is quite 
simple. Contained within these Reports are certain figures and data that 
provide a great deal of insight into the performance of banks within that 
jurisdiction prior to the crisis. These figures and data are actually referred to 
as Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs) and may be defined as the link 
between ‘monetary macroeconomic statistics and micro-prudential data’19 in 
the provision of data enabling the health of the financial sector to be 
assessed. 
Thus statistical data provided by the FSI Framework20 is generally obtained 
from the rating system called CAMELS21 which is frequently adopted by 
supervisory bodies in the assessment of the soundness of banks.  
For the purpose of this thesis, only four of the core22 FSIs would be referred to 
from time to time, namely Regulatory Tier 1 (Capital Adequacy under Basel 1, 
2 and 3), Non-Performing Loans (NPLs), Return on Assets ratio (ROA) and 
Return on Equity ratio (ROE). This is because these four financial soundness 
indicators are the most commonly referred to when investigating the financial 
performance of banks in general and of these four, three23 have been 
recognised as capital adequacy indicators. Return on assets (ROA) is widely 
used as an indicator of a bank’s profitability and Return on equity (ROE) is an 
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 A B Schmelz, ‘Broadening Financial Indicators in the Special Data Dissemination Standard’ 
[2010], 10 IMF. 
20
 ibid 33. Nearly 40 FSIs have been acknowledged by the IMF Board of which 25 of them are 
linked to deposit-taking institutions with about 12 of them belonging to the Core FSI group. 
21
 The acronym CAMELS, refers to capital adequacy, asset quality, management soundness, 
earnings, liquidity and sensitivity to market risk. 
22
 Schmelz (n19). 
23
 ibid. Namely Regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk weighted assets, Tier 1 capital to assets as 
known under Basel 2 and Non-performing loans (NPLs) net of provisions to capital. 
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important measure through which shareholders and stakeholders can assess 
the performance of banks. 
A common limitation of Financial Soundness Indicators (FSIs) may be the 
potential inaccuracies in data collated and the argument that the different24 
methodologies adopted in the acquisition and collation of data from varying 
sources, makes a comparison of the data virtually impossible. This argument 
may be countered by the author’s suggestion that the collation of data relating 
to FSIs is usually a collaborative effort by the IMF and/or World Bank and the 
country concerned, and as such any potential high costs involved may be 
underwritten by funds provided by either the IMF or the World Bank. 
Although, the potential high cost involved in acquiring data may act as a 
disincentive to the country/bank involved in the provision of accurate data, it 
must be emphasised that FSAP continues to enjoy worldwide recognition25 as 
a vital system used in the measurement of the performance of banks which is 
then used as a yardstick in determining financial stability within a particular 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, it has been suggested26 that future FSAPs may 
provide a different analytical approach in the determination of bank stability 
through measurement of financial sector indicators by taking into account the 
ever-increasing cross-border transactions and integration of different financial 
systems.  
Questionnaire Methodology 
The questionnaire was sent out for completion to 18 large commercial banks 
in Ghana and 10 large commercial banks in Kenya. Out of 18 potential 
participant banks from Ghana, only 16 banks completed the questionnaire – a 
response rate of approximately 89%. Out of 10 potential participant banks in 
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 The differences in methodology used in obtaining data, may be attributed to accounting and 
supervisory practices. Although this may be a contributory factor, this view may arguably no 
longer be deemed valid as a result of global attempts by the IFRS Accounting Body (ies)  to 
have uniform accountancy practices globally. Although the availability of data used in the 
measurement of financial data may not be forthcoming in every jurisdiction, the increasing 
nature in the transparency of inter-bank dealings, together with an increase in collaboration 
amongst banks and between banks and supervisory bodies (relating to corporate governance 
matters) may help reduce such instances of lack of data. 
25
 J Vinale and Brook, ‘The Financial Assessment Programme After 10 years: Experience and 
Reforms for the Next Decade’ [2009] p8 IMF. 
26
 ibid. 
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Kenya, only 6 banks completed their questionnaire – a response rate of 60%. 
Thus there was an overall response rate of approximately 79% when 
considering both jurisdictions. 
The questionnaire comprised of 25 questions. In adherence to legislation in 
relation to data protection and for commercial confidentiality reasons, the 
names of the individuals who completed the questionnaires have been 
deliberately kept anonymous and the responses provided have not been 
linked or attributed to any particular individual or bank. This is in fulfilment of 
the author’s initial and continuing obligation to treat all information and data 
provided with utmost confidentiality. 
Another purpose for this empirical research approach was to enable the 
author provide an insight into the views held by industry participants from both 
jurisdictions on the likely implications of Capital Adequacy under Basel 3 for 
large commercial banking institutions in both Ghana and Kenya.  
In keeping with tradition associated with most research methodologies, there 
were a number of limitations in the quality of data, however such limitations 
have been adjudged to be of low significance in relation to the level of impact 
on the results of this research as well as the conclusions drawn from previous 
historical data used. 
Limitations 
• Although the information provided within the questionnaire have been 
authenticated by the respondents stamping the questionnaires with an 
official stamp of the bank they represent, the author cannot guarantee 
that the responses provided in the questionnaires were either ever 
accurate in the first instance, accurate at the date when it was received 
by the researcher or indeed whether it would continue to be accurate in 
the future; 
• Also, whilst the author trusts the knowledge and competence of the 
respondents, it cannot be verified or guaranteed that the information 
provided represents or reflects the general position and direction of the 
bank in terms of policy or on the contrary represents their own personal 
xxiv 
opinions which has nothing to do with the official policy of the bank they 
represent; 
• Where information has been provided by respondents from foreign 
banks in Ghana and Kenya, it cannot be guaranteed that the views or 
opinions of these respondents reflects the general position of the 
foreign bank in its home jurisdiction or on the contrary represents the 
personal views or opinions of the respondents; 
• An over-arching limitation of the overall methodology employed was in 
regards to the issue of regulatory arbitrage27. This is because, 
regardless of the efforts of global regulatory bodies28 towards the 
harmonisation of regulatory and supervisory processes in global 
banking, the lack of a level playing field continues to be an unwanted 
feature in the global banking industry. Due to the global impact of the 
recent financial crisis, almost all countries suffered a ‘hit’ on either their 
real economies, the financial sectors of their economies or even both 
regardless of whether they had implemented Basel 2 or not. 
This undoubtedly raises the possibility of the proposition that even though 
Ghana and Kenya had either fully or partially adopted Basel 2 in their national 
banking laws prior to the global financial crisis, both countries were still not 
‘prepared’ for the force of the financial ‘tsunami’ that hit them. A crucial point 
to bear in mind, is that the fact that these countries might not have been 
‘prepared’ does not mean that their level of preparedness or perhaps lack of it 
could be compared to the level of preparedness of countries that had not 
implemented Basel 2, but were still affected by the financial crisis, such as the 
USA29. 
Thus as a result of regulatory arbitrage, the extent to which any given country 
could withstand a global financial crisis cannot in the author’s opinion be 
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 The interpretation of Basel 2 or 3 may vary from one jurisdiction to another, and it is an 
unfortunate situation which is often reflected in the provisions within national banking laws 
that gives effect to the Basel provisions. 
28
 Such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
etc. 
29
 This may be contrasted with Australia which had adopted Basel II and was not affected by 
the global financial crisis. 
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solely determined by whether or not the country concerned had adopted any 
particular global regulatory framework, but rather in the consistency in 
application or failing that, the preparedness of national regulators and 
supervisors to adopt a more prudential approach in the discharge of their 
duties which should include the readiness to go above and beyond the 
provisions of any global regulatory framework in order to ensure financial 
stability. 
• Finally a limitation which the author had absolutely no control over, was 
that the modes of transmission of the financial crisis in both countries 
were different thus creating the possibility of the potential argument 
that a particular form of transmission of the crisis could have caused an 
increase in the effects of the crisis than another mode of transmission. 
To address this limitation, an attempt has been made in this thesis to also 
apply a comparative legal approach where a comparison is made to South 
Africa and Nigeria. 
It must be emphasised, that such an approach will not strictly lend itself to 
comparative legal scholarship, particularly ‘theoretical comparison’ which 
focuses on the similarities and differences among legal systems30. The 
comparisons and distinctions that would be drawn would be limited to the 
development and extent of Basel 2 bank capital adequacy that each 
participating country has already adopted in their respective national laws. 
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 R Hyland, ‘Comparative Law’, in D Patterson (ed), A Comparison to Philosophy of Law and 
Legal Theory (Blackwell, 1999). 
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Sample Selection31 
In this thesis, two large global international banks32 as well as large local, 
regional or Pan-African33 commercial banks were selected. To determine the 
sizes of the respondent banks from both jurisdictions, three factors were 
considered: 
 The total number of assets the bank in question has; 
 The size of the bank by way of market capitalisation; and 
 The size of a bank in terms of the number of employees the bank has. 
While the determination of bank size using employee numbers was easily and 
quickly discounted as not an appropriate method, it was also concluded that 
the concept of using market capitalisation as a determinant of bank size would 
be unreliable and questionable particularly in a period of economic turmoil 
such as during the global financial crisis and also currently in a period of 
banking regulatory upheaval where the profitability of banks was likely to be 
affected. 
Thus the choice of respondent commercial banks in this thesis was based on 
an assessment of bank capital, an approach which the author believes 
provides ‘a more accurate reflection of the total assets’ within that ‘particular 
banking system’ at any given time which ultimately includes cash and 
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 Refer to tables 1.1 and 1.2 in Appendix 1. 
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 Barclays Bank and Standard Chartered Bank. Although there are a number of other large 
foreign international banks in Africa, the choice of these two large global banks is due to the 
fact that they both have a presence in Ghana and Kenya. A global bank may be defined as 
those large banks that conduct banking operations in at least four of the world’s six 
Continents. See ‘Bruised but not broken: can the global bank fight back? – Growth priorities 
and competitive pressures in the global banking industry’ p41 KPMG June 2011. Although 
there are other large global banks such as Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
Mae) in the U.S.A., BNP Paribas in France, Deutsche Bank AG in Germany and HSBC 
Holdings in the UK, these have been excluded from the survey because they are not 
sufficiently represented in African Countries with the exception of Barclays and Standard 
Chartered. 
33
 Defined as ‘Banking Groups domiciled in Africa with subsidiaries in several countries’, See 
B V Christensen, ‘Financial integration in Africa: Implications for monetary policy and financial 
stability’ [2014] BIS Paper 76 11,16. (Accessed electronically in April 2014). 
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balances held on its behalf at the central bank, inter-bank deposits, loans, 
securities and other assets34. 
Finally, it was ensured that the jurisdictions (within which the respondent 
banks reside) had already adopted Basel 2, or at least had expressed an 
unwavering desire to do so and also have a strong banking regulatory 
structure in place, with central banks that were effective in the performance of 
their regulatory and supervisory roles. 
The rationale for this mixed sample selection35 is due to the fact that there 
isn’t a huge presence of large global international banks in African countries 
and that there is also the likelihood that Basel 3 will in future affect all banks 
(irrespective of whether the bank is locally systemic or globally systemic) 
through incorporation into national laws by governments of the jurisdictions in 
which they reside. 
Number of Participant Respondent Banks 
 Total number of participant commercial banks – 22 Banks. 
 Of this number, 16 are large commercial banks located in Ghana, and 
the remaining 6 are large commercial banks located in Kenya. 
Total number of respondent commercial banks from Ghana – 16 [i.e. 6 
local banks and 10 international/foreign banks]. 
Local Commercial Banks 
Bank of Ghana – Central Bank 
Ghana Commercial Bank 
Unibank Ghana Ltd 
HFC Bank 
Fidelity Bank 
The Royal Bank Limited 
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 See KPMG, ‘Bruised but not broken: can the global bank fight back? – Growth priorities 
and competitive pressures in the global banking industry’ (2011). 
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 A combination of Global banks, Pan-African or Regional banks and large local banks. The 
respondents from these participant banks were of high managerial ranking i.e. Bank 
Managers, Credit and Risk Analysts of managerial level. 
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International/Foreign Banks 
Barclays Bank – Head office in the United Kingdom 
Standard Chartered Bank – Head office in the United Kingdom 
Ecobank (A Regional/Pan-African bank) – Headquartered in Togo 
SG-SSB Limited – Formerly Social Security Bank (Acquired by 
SociétéGenerale Banking Group of France) 
Stanbic Bank – South African Bank 
Access Bank – Subsidiary of Access Bank in Nigeria 
Zenith Bank – Nigerian Bank 
Guaranty Trust Bank – Subsidiary of GT Bank in Nigeria (Obtained its 
Universal Licence in 2006) 
United Bank for Africa (Gh Ltd) – Previously called Standard Trust Bank 
Ghana (A Regional/Pan-African bank present in 19 African Countries) 
Bank of Africa – A Regional/Pan-African bank and head-quartered in Bamako, 
Mali and present in 14 African countries 
Global Banks  
Barclays Bank36 and Standard Chartered Bank37. 
Total number of respondent commercial banks from Kenya – 6 
Local Commercial Banks 
Bank of Baroda 
Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) 
Fina Bank 
International/Foreign Banks 
Ecobank (A Regional/Pan African Bank) – Headquartered in Togo 
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 In December 2010, Barclays bank ranked 5
th
 in the list of the 10 largest banks in the world 
by way of total assets.  See KPMG (n34) 21. 
37
 Standard Chartered Bank which does not fall into the group of the top 10 largest banks in 
the world was still chosen for this survey due to its substantial presence in Africa and the fact 
that it is a fairly large bank in comparison to regional banks in Africa. 
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Bank of Africa (A Regional/Pan African Bank) – Headquartered in Bamako, 
Mali and present in 14 African countries 
Standard Chartered Bank of Kenya (A subsidiary of Standard Chartered Bank 
in the United Kingdom). 
Summary of Research Findings 
The aim of the questionnaire was to elicit relevant information from the large 
respondent commercial banks in both Ghana and Kenya which was then 
subsequently analysed and hopefully provides the answers to the research 
questions this thesis poses. 
Research Question 1: Is the International convergence of Capital Adequacy 
regulations desirable? 
Although Archya in his paper38 finds that the international convergence of 
capital adequacy regulations is desirable, his findings were arguably of a 
general nature and was not particularly reflective of African Countries. It is 
important to obtain the views of African banks on this issue, even more so 
where they often tend to be affected by the Basel regulations, negotiations of 
which they never play a starring role.  
This research question was answered by all representatives of the 22 banks. 
Out of 16 banks from Ghana that answered this question, all 16 banks agreed 
that the international convergence of capital adequacy regulations was 
desirable. 
Again, out of 6 banks from Kenya that answered this question, all 6 banks 
agreed that the international convergence of capital adequacy regulations was 
desirable. 
Thus, with all the respondent banks answering this research question in the 
affirmative, it was interesting to note the variety of reasons provided. Without 
reference to any particular bank or jurisdiction, one of the reasons cited for the 
desirability in the convergence of international capital adequacy regulations 
was: 
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 V Acharya, ‘Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?’ 
(2003) Journal of Finance Volume LVIII No 6, 2745. 
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‘it reduced the impact of insolvency in the banking sector due to lack of 
sufficient capital adequacy and liquidity’. 
Research Question 2: Will Basel 3 be relevant for large commercial banks in 
Ghana and Kenya?  
Notwithstanding Nout Wellink’s opinion that Basel 3 would be relevant for 
African countries ‘regardless of the level, state of development and complexity 
of their banks’ and regardless of the fact that South Africa has already 
commenced implementation of Basel 3 (on 1 January 2013), the author is of 
the opinion that the answers provided by the industry participants themselves 
i.e. the banks would provide a better insight into their present and future 
attitudes to Basel 3 adoption irrespective of whether their respective central 
banks makes it a requirement for all commercial banks within these two 
jurisdictions to comply with the Basel 3 provisions or not. 
From the responses obtained, it was clear that most of the respondent banks 
recognise and agree that Basel 3 will be relevant for African banks. Thus of 
the 16 respondent commercial banks in Ghana, 11 stated that Basel 3 would 
be relevant for their banks i.e. a representation of approximately 69%. Of 
these 11 banks, the number of banks indicating a level of agreement of a 
scale39 of 5 with respect to the relevance of Basel 3 to banks in Ghana was 7. 
This suggests that approximately 64% of respondent banks in Ghana were 
absolutely convinced that Basel 3 would be relevant to their banks. Also, 3 
banks in Ghana chose a scale factor of 4 and 1 bank, a scale factor of 3. 
For those banks that agreed that Basel 3 would be relevant for African banks 
but chose a scale of 4 perhaps implies a lesser degree of uncertainty in 
comparison to the banks that chose a scale of 3. For those banks that chose 
a scale of 2 and below, it was assumed that they believed Basel 3 would not 
be relevant for African banks. Also 1 bank said they did not know if Basel 3 
would be relevant for their bank and another bank strongly disagreed on the 
issue. 
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 Refer to table 1.3 in Appendix 1 on page 243 and question 20 of Questionnaire in Appendix 
6. 
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Of the 6 respondent commercial banks from Kenya, 5 stated that Basel 3 
would be relevant for banks in Africa, (i.e. 1 chose a scale factor of 5, 3 chose 
a scale factor of 4 and 1 chose a scale factor of 3) whereas only 1 respondent 
admitted that they did not know if Basel 3 would be relevant. Thus the 
percentage of respondent banks from Kenya that believed that Basel 3 would 
be relevant represents approximately 83%. 
Thus out of a total number of 22 respondent banks i.e Ghana and Kenya 
combined, 16 banks believe Basel 3 is relevant (i.e. respondents choosing a 
scale of 5 to 3), 3 are highly sceptical about the relevance of Basel 3 (i.e. 
respondents choosing a scale of 1 or 2), 2 respondents indicated they did not 
know and 1 respondent explicitly stated that Basel 3 was irrelevant. 
Of the remaining 6 respondent banks out of a total of 22 respondent banks 
that either did not agree to the relevance of Basel 3; or stated that they did not 
know if Basel 3 would be relevant or stated No, all had various levels of Basel 
3 awareness before completing the questionnaire. 
It is worth pointing out, that it would be rather difficult in the author’s opinion 
for a bank having a low awareness level of Basel 3 to effectively provide an 
accurate assessment of the degree of relevance of Basel 3 to African 
countries in general. 
Research Question 3: What are the likely implications of Basel 3 on large 
commercial banks in Ghana and Kenya?  
The majority of the respondent banks recognised that Basel 3 would have 
implications on their banks regardless of whether they implemented Basel 3 
or not. Chapter 7 provides a very detailed assessment of the implications of 
Basel 3 on large commercial banks in Ghana and Kenya. 
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CHAPTER 1  
CAUSES OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
1.1 Introduction 
The occurrence of banking crises is arguably no longer an uncommon 
phenomenon, bearing in mind the different types and magnitude of financial 
crises that have occurred around the world during the past 20 years. 
Inspite of this view, the sheer size and scale of this recent global financial 
crisis40 sets it apart from previous crises and has been described as arguably 
the worst form41 of financial crisis since the Great Depression.42 Even though 
Ghana43 and Kenya44 have each experienced financial crises in the past, it is 
submitted that none of those crises could compare to the impact the global 
financial crisis has had in both jurisdictions. Notwithstanding the plethora of 
academic literature and publications on the causes of the global financial 
crisis, its discussion here is still relevant in order to put into context how this 
financial crisis, which originated in the U.S.A, spread through Europe and 
eventually made its way to Africa and in particular Ghana and Kenya. 
1.2 The U.S Sub-prime Mortgage Market 
The period from early 2000 till just before the crisis hit in 2007, was 
characterised by strong economic growth and high credit availability in the 
United States of America. This led to excessive ‘borrowing and lending’45 
which was not limited to the U.S.A46. 
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 The global financial crisis begun in the U.S.A in 2007 and lasted approximately two years, 
ending in 2009. However, its impact and effect are still present in many countries today. 
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 L Beale, ‘In the Wake of Financial Crisis’ (2010), Current Developments in Monetary and 
Financial Law, Volume 5, IMF p3. (Accessed electronically). 
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 Occurred in the U.S.A from 1923-1933. 
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 Ghana’s previous financial crisis was from 1982-1983. – See L Laeven and F Valencia, 
 ‘Systemic Banking Crises Database’ [2012] IMF Working Paper WP/12/163. 
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 Kenya’s previous banking crises were in 1986-1989, 1992-1994 and also in 1998.  (See A 
Kithinji and N M Waweru, ‘Merger Restructuring and Financial Performances of Commercial 
Banks in Kenya’ (2007) Economic Management and Financial Markets Journal Vol 2(4), 9-39. 
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 D W Arner, ‘The Global Credit Crisis of 2008: Causes and Consequences’, (2009) The 
International Lawyer Volume 43, 92. 
46
 ibid. 
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Douglas Arner suggests that this phenomenon was widespread and affected 
most markets and asset type47. In response to this phenomenal economic 
growth in the U.S.A and also in an attempt to solve the social problem of 
unaffordability of houses, particularly by people of poor credit rating, certain 
policies were introduced by the authorities to make housing affordable to all. 
Maziar Peihani in his paper48 suggests that the term ‘sub-prime’, quite apart 
from being used to describe borrowers possessing a low credit score or 
‘quality’, was also used in describing the lender from whom the loan 
originated. 
Thus, because loans originating from these lenders were primarily aimed at 
poor credit rated borrowers and were characterised by high interest rates, 
such lenders could be described as sub-prime lenders. 
Heidi M. Schooner and Michael W. Taylor suggest49 that the process of sub-
prime lending was aimed at:  
‘borrowers who failed to meet the criteria in terms of income, credit 
history or down payment demanded by conventional lenders, 
particularly for home mortgages’50. 
Attention must also be drawn to the fact that the underwriting institutions also 
played a crucial role in facilitating the mortgage approval for a huge number of 
these sub-prime borrowers51. Not only did they circumvent their own system of 
checks and balances in guaranteeing the loans, they also failed to see that 
some of the sub-prime borrowers had no realistic capacity to afford these 
mortgages52. 
Although the sub-prime mortgage lending scheme was extremely risky, as it 
became vulnerable to the possibility of multiple defaults by sub-prime 
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 M Peihani, ‘The Global Financial Crisis of 2008: An analysis of contributing trends, policies 
and failures’, (2012) Banking & Finance Law Review Volume 27, 465. 
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 H M Schooner and M Taylor, Global Bank Regulation: Principles and Policies (1
st
 Edition)  
(Academic Press 2010), 45. 
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 M Peihani, ‘The Global Financial Crisis of 2008: An analysis of contributing trends, policies 
and failures’ (2012) Banking & Finance Law Review Volume 27, 465, 473. 
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 Peihani (n48) 476. The increases in the value of properties came to an end thereby leaving 
the property with little or no equity to facilitate a re-mortgage or an outright sale of the 
property. 
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borrowers, the level of risk increased with the surge in the growth of 
securitisation53.  
1.3 Other Causes of the Global Financial Crisis 
Despite the practice of securitisation having been in existence since the early 
1930s54, it was not until a couple of years prior to the global financial crises 
that a huge upsurge in its use and popularity begun to develop55. 
Wilmarth Jr56 attributes this surge in popularity to two main reasons.  Firstly, 
the process of securitisation gave banks the opportunity to refinance illiquid 
assets like mortgages and other loan products to securities, the scale of which 
brought in much needed liquidity which could be used to finance other 
banking activities. 
While this application of the securitisation process was entirely legitimate, it 
was the other use of securitisation that gave cause for concern.  Because 
capital requirements at the time for trading books57 was less than the 
requirements for banking books (i.e banks were required to hold less capital 
for assets held in their trading books as opposed to the banking book), banks 
began to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage58. They avoided their 
obligations towards capital requirements59 by regrouping loans into different 
financial products and taking them off the banking books and into the trading 
books60. This process was achieved by banks through the creation of an entity 
called a structured investment vehicle (SIV) or a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) which held the asset-backed securities. 
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 Securitisation is the banking practice used by banks to diversify credit risk.  Through this 
practise, banks are able to pool different loans together (e.g residential mortgages, car loans 
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collateral for securities.  
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 The role of securitisation goes as far back as when the US bank Fannie Mae was created 
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 B Mahapatra, ‘Implications of Basel 3 for Capital, Liquidity and Profitability of Banks’ [2012] 
RBI Monthly Bulletin, 772. 
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Thus, banks and financial institutions became involved in the securitisation of 
mortgages in the US mortgage markets, and sold mortgage-backed securities 
to a substantial number of investors61. 
Douglas Arner argues that the originate-to-distribute model under the 
umbrella of universal banking assumed a different structure during the late 
1990s onwards. Arner suggests that this new structure/model could best be 
described as a ‘manufacturing model’ of ‘debt securities’62. Under this new 
model, banks and financial institutions were constantly creating, purchasing 
and trading in such debt securities. This enabled them to frequently pool 
together different types of assets to form a completely new and structured 
product to attract potential investors63.   
While these assets were constantly being created and traded, some were also 
being retained by the originators i.e.banks either on or off their balance 
sheets, or through SIVs which were sometimes not completely independent of 
the banks that set them up64. It is submitted that the creation of the 
‘manufacturing model’ meant that previously targeted end-investors were no 
longer purchasing these securitised products as new and existing debt 
securities were constantly purchased by banks. 
As liquidity increased the sub-prime residential mortgage industry 
experienced phenomenal growth and expansion. This led to property prices 
reaching very ‘high and unsustainable levels’65. In order to address the 
increasing property prices, a number of Central banks (not only in the U.S.A., 
but also in Europe), increased interest rates66. While this move helped curb 
the ever-increasing property prices and addressed inflation concerns67, 
increases in interest rates meant that sub-prime borrowers in the U.S.A, 
begun to struggle to pay off their mortgages. It thus came as no surprise when 
the sub-prime borrowers begun defaulting on their mortgage payment 
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obligations68. Banks that dealt directly/indirectly in these mortgage-backed 
securities started to suffer huge losses as the value of mortgage-backed 
securities dropped dramatically69.  This situation was even made much worse 
as banks scrambled to deleverage and off-load such toxic financial products70. 
It was far too late at this point as investors lost confidence in the securitised 
products, particularly asset-backed securities71. Banks stopped dealing with 
each other as they tried to hold on to the liquidity they already had72.  Liquidity 
in the inter-bank markets dried up73 and the contagion of systemic risk was 
underway, through the direct and indirect investments that banks had in such 
products and between themselves – the global financial crisis had just begun.  
Douglas Arner suggests that a ‘combination of debt capital, market technology 
regulatory incentives, excessively low interest rates and massive global 
investor demand’ set the stage for the crisis74. 
It is submitted that the images of investment bankers from the UK-based U.S. 
Investment Bank Lehman Brothers carrying their office belongings which was 
beamed across a number of T.V stations here in the UK and elsewhere 
marked the unfolding of the global financial crisis. 
It is further submitted that such scenes will undoubtedly remain etched in the 
minds of many people for a very long time, and it is worth pointing out that 
although the crisis begun in August 2007, the seeds of this unprecedented 
financial crisis had been sown years earlier in the U.S.A through the 
implementation of housing and mortgage policies designed to make property 
ownership affordable. 
Although the account provided above, briefly describes the trigger for the 
global financial crisis, there were other factors at play in the cause of the 
crisis. These other factors have contributed to the substantial literature 
available today on the causes of the global financial crisis, and although the 
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literature represents different views on the subject, there seems to be a 
degree of consensus on some of the causes.  
The publication of a report by a high level group on financial supervision in the 
E.U (The Larosiere Report)75 in 2009, groups the causes of the global 
financial crisis under six main headings. The Report identifies macroeconomic 
issues, risk management failings (leading to highly complex financial products 
and shadow banks), influence of Credit Rating Agencies, failure of corporate 
governance, the existence of ‘remuneration and incentive schemes within 
financial institutions’ which created an environment of excessive risk-taking 
and finally failures of regulatory and supervisory frameworks as well as that of 
crises management structures as causes of the global financial crisis. 
Linda Beale76 however, suggests that the cause of the financial crisis was due 
to three factors i.e, the role played by innovative financial products, 
inadequate financial regulation and the increasing role that financial 
innovation plays in the global economy. 
As the popularity of securitisation grew, so did the risks associated with it.  It 
was seen by the banking industry as an effective tool in reducing the risks and 
costs associated with credit intermediation. 
Beale argues that the creation of these complex financial products, such as 
credit derivatives, swaps etc through financial engineering and their 
subsequent use in financial derivative transactions that were complex and 
complicated i.e such as in ‘back-to-back’ transactions77 increased the level of 
risks that banks exposed themselves to. 
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This was also recognised by Anil K. Kashyaps, Raghuram G. Rajan and 
Jeremy C. Stein who suggested in a paper78 that although the initial rationale 
behind the ‘originate and distribute’ model of the securitisation process was to 
transfer risk away from the banks to institutions that could manage the risks79, 
this transfer of risk never occurred because a large number of mortgage-
backed securities linked to sub-prime lending risk still remained on the 
balance sheets of most U.S banks.  Thus the original purpose of securitisation 
which enabled banks to reduce credit intermediation costs and to divert credit 
risks to end investors had become distorted. 
This failure of the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model of the securitisation process, 
according to the Turner Review80, occurred because the end investor had not 
become the ultimate beneficiary of this securitisation process. On the 
contrary, credit risk that had been bundled and securitised was often 
purchased by other banks engaged in credit derivative transactions; sold in 
part by the originating bank, which then either retained the other part or re-
securitised the remaining part into an even more complex financial instrument 
and then sold off.  In other instances, these new complex financial products 
where used to access short-term liquidity by being offered as collateral in 
financial transactions. 
According to Turner, this resulted in multiple financial transactions between 
banks that were extremely complex in nature; not just in the nature of the 
financial transactions, but also in the financial products that were being dealt 
with. Thus what had begun as a much lauded credit risk management process 
in the embodiment of securitisation had degenerated or mutated into an 
unrecognisable process which was out of control. 
Contrastingly, and perhaps surprisingly, Rosa Lastra does not directly 
attribute the cause of the global financial crisis to securitisation. She suggests 
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that “.... it would be wrong to describe securitisation – a technique needed to 
bring market liquidity – as ‘the cause of the crisis’”81. 
Lastra further suggests that the significant depreciation in house prices, 
following 50 years of data was unprecedented. She adds that while the 
technique of securitisation in itself was not a bad thing, the ever-increasing 
complex nature of the processes meant that supervisors and even to some 
extent the bankers themselves did not understand and appreciate the nature 
and magnitude of the risks which were being transferred via these securitised 
products. 
Arner on the contrary points out that while the global financial crisis was 
initiated by the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage industry through borrower 
defaults the crisis was systemically transferred ‘throughout the financial 
system’ by the ‘structures of securitisation’82. 
Following a careful analysis of the findings of the Larosiere Report, it is 
submitted that one of the findings of the Report, that the cause of the global 
financial crisis was a direct result of the ‘extreme complexity of the structured 
financial product’83 resonates with Lastra’s assertion that supervisors and 
bankers did not appreciate the nature and magnitude of risks they were 
dealing with. This submission is made on the basis that the Larosiere Report, 
while highlighting corporate governance failures, also states that a number of 
Boards as well as the senior management of financial firms did not 
comprehend the complex nature of the ‘financial products they were dealing 
with’84. 
Mark W. Nichols, Jill M. Henderickson and Kevin Griffith in their paper85, have 
suggested that notwithstanding the already well–documented reasons for the 
global financial crisis, the main reason(s) why the global financial crisis 
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occurred should be attributed to two causes, i.e. the crisis was either caused 
by ‘too much regulation’ or ‘too little regulation’. The authors argue that the 
unprecedented growth in securitisation was due to ‘too little regulation’ which 
resulted in the failure to rein-in the process of securitisation.  
Tony Ciro and Michael Longo have suggested86 that in the immediate 
aftermath of the global financial crisis, the efforts of governments towards the 
adoption of a series of reforms in their respective jurisdictions which focused 
on ‘correcting regulatory and supervisory failure’87 was credible evidence in 
support of the ‘argument that inadequate or “light-touch” regulation’88 played a 
major role in the cause of the global financial crisis. 
Another issue attributed by Nichols, Hendrickson and Griffith to the cause of 
the crisis is deregulation. The authors suggest that deregulation within the 
banking industry allowed an overlap between commercial banking and 
investment banking through the activities of financial conglomerate 
institutions89. They suggest further that the ‘under-regulation of credit rating 
agencies and mortgage lending’90 were also contributory factors to the crisis. 
Linda Beale suggests91 that the concept of inter-connectedness had magnified 
contagion through systemic risk, and that as a result of ‘lax regulation’92, 
banks had been allowed to form huge conglomerate structures through the 
provision of different types of financial services. Beale suggests further that 
single banking conglomerate structures where a single banking entity 
combines ‘commercial banking, investment banking, insurance and 
proprietary trading’93 when conducting banking activity, have been allowed to 
occur, resulting in complex financial structures which have been deemed ‘too 
big to fail’ or ‘too inter-connected’ to fail94. 
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It is submitted that the lack of an appropriate banking insolvency resolution 
framework which addresses the failure of such complex financial structures 
was also a contributory factor to the cause of the global financial crisis.  
Although the creation of such complex single conglomerate banking 
structures through the Universal Banking Model allows such banks to be more 
competitive and profitable through the provision of a ‘one-stop-shop’, it is 
further suggested that an appropriate banking insolvency resolution 
framework is required to enable any ailing part of a conglomerate banking 
structure to be dissolved without any reverberations on the remaining healthy 
parts and also on the general public. It is therefore submitted that until such 
framework is developed, the conglomerate structure will permanently be 
vulnerable to systemic contagion of the risk emanating from the ailing part of 
the conglomerate to the healthy parts thus threatening financial stability. 
On the issue of whether too much regulation contributed to the global financial 
crisis as suggested by Nichols, Henderickson and Griffith, it is submitted that 
over-regulation of financial institutions such as banks resulted in the growth of 
hedge funds and other financial institutions that effectively fell outside the 
circle of influence that banking regulations had. This area outside the 
influence of banking regulations is commonly referred to as shadow banking 
which although having existed previously, steadily grew in size over the years 
and is often now listed as one of the causes of the global financial crisis.   
With regards to the role played by credit rating agencies towards the onset of 
the crisis, it may be recalled that credit rating agencies (CRAs) became 
prominent following the introduction of Basel 2. They became responsible for 
allocating credit ratings to counter-parties and the higher the credit rating a 
financial institution possessed, the more favourable their risk profile became.  
This ultimately impacted on the amount of capital banks had to set aside by 
way of risk assessment for any financial transaction they entered into.  
The Larosiere Report suggests that flaws95 existed within the methodologies 
employed/used by CRAs in calculating the actual ‘credit default risk’ resulting 
in huge underestimation of their value. This, according to the Report resulted 
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in the CRAs allocating a higher credit rating to securitised financial products 
than were actually due. The flaws mentioned in the Larosiere Report related 
to ‘the lack of sufficient historical data relating to the US sub-prime market, the 
underestimation of correlations in the defaults that would occur during a 
downturn’96 and a ‘severe weakening of underwriting standards’97 by ‘certain 
originators’98.   
Another issue discussed in the Report in relation to credit rating agencies was 
that the ‘issuer-pays model’99 approach adopted by Credit Rating agencies 
raised concerns of ‘conflict of interest’100. This led to discussions between the 
originator of the securitised product (i.e. bank/financial institution) and the 
Credit Rating Agencies on the implications of allocating a particular rating to a 
structured product. As a result of this, originators of securitised products, 
‘shopped around’101 in order to secure a very good rating. 
It is submitted that discussions between originators and CRAs, meant that the 
latter could no longer be trusted to provide an accurate assessment of the risk 
profile of a bank or its assets. Until such practices came to light, it is further 
submitted that bank regulators, supervisors and investors in these credit 
derivatives were reliant on and had great confidence in the risk assessments 
undertaken by these credit rating agencies102. The main reason why investors 
had such confidence in the assessments provided by the CRAs, was due to 
the fact that the securitisation process(es) had become very complex and it 
was almost impossible for investors to accurately assess103 the magnitude of 
risk that banks were exposed to through securitisation.  The risk models could 
only be properly evaluated by the credit agencies using highly complex 
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mathematical formulae, or in some cases by the banks themselves which had 
to rely on their own internal mathematical risk model104. 
Following the global financial crisis, it became evident that the mathematical 
formulae used by these credit agencies were seriously flawed and could not 
accurately capture the risks that banks had been exposed to through 
securitisation.  This flaw was compounded by the fact that because the credit 
derivative instruments were new, there were no sufficient and reliable 
historical data to help in the assessment of current and future risks105. 
In the Turner Review, it was suggested that the effectiveness of the ratings 
process took a nose-dive for three reasons. Firstly, the ratings were applied to 
structured instruments with, ‘limited historical data’; of ‘highly complex’ nature, 
and finally there had been an erroneous belief and confidence in the accuracy 
of the mathematical models used by the CRAs to identify risk106. 
Inspite of the role played by the CRAs, the failure of corporate governance 
was identified in the Larosiere Report as also one of the causes of the global 
financial crisis. The Report suggests that ‘failures in risk assessment and risk 
management’ were exacerbated by failures in corporate governance. The 
Report suggests further that a failure in corporate governance arose from the 
very fact that majority of board members and ‘senior management’ of financial 
institutions did not comprehend the complex nature of the securitised financial 
product, hence misunderstood the magnitude of the risks their financial 
institutions were being exposed to. 
Another aspect of corporate governance failure identified by the Report was 
the culture of excessive remuneration within the financial industry together 
with other huge incentives that led to ‘excessive risk-taking’107. It is submitted 
that the rewarding of ‘excessive risk-taking’ may have led to certain checks 
and balances associated with risk management being ignored or 
circumvented. 
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Another cause attributed to the global financial crisis and which is central to 
this thesis, is the issue of inadequate capital.   
B. Mahapatra108 suggests that a number of banks at the height of the financial 
crisis entered the crisis with inadequate capital.  He explains further by stating 
that banks had inadequate capital at the time of the crisis as a result of capital 
arbitrage109. 
Rosa M. Lastra and Geoffrey Wood110, also suggest that the global financial 
crisis was caused by a capital shortage. In an attempt to distinguish the global 
financial crisis from the ‘Great Depression’, they conclude that ‘the first crisis 
of the 21st century was a capital crisis, not a liquidity crisis’111.  
Contrary to the views of Lastra and Wood, George Alexander Walker112 points 
out that the global banking crisis was not directly caused by ‘low capital 
levels’113. Walker clarifies his argument by suggesting that capital became an 
‘aggravating factor’114 of the crisis after shortage of liquidity in the inter-bank 
markets had already occurred. 
It is therefore submitted that while there was undoubtedly a capital shortage 
crisis due to lack of quality capital held by banks prior to and at the height of 
the financial crisis, the global financial crisis was caused by a combination of 
capital and liquidity shortage.  
While aligning myself to the views of George Alexander Walker, evidence for 
my submission comes from no other jurisdiction other than the U.K, whose 
economy like that of most advanced countries was badly affected by the 
financial crisis.  In the UK, Northern Rock bank, one of the most well 
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capitalised UK banks at the time of the crisis, had to endure a bank run115.  It 
was later discovered that a substantial amount of the capital Northern Rock 
had, was in fact tied up in the derivatives markets particularly the mortgage-
backed securities market116. Because the market for such securities had 
dwindled, assets held through such securities had become virtually worthless 
and could not be off-loaded in exchange for liquidity. Thus there was a 
complete erosion of bank’s capital compounded by the difficulties banks faced 
in trying to acquire short-term financing. 
The unavailability of funds for short-term financing which worsened the crisis 
and contributed to the lack of liquidity (particularly within the inter-bank 
market) was because most banks, had begun to hold onto the little funds they 
had, in the firm belief that other banks would not be in a position to fulfil their 
repayment obligations to one another. 
1.4 Conclusion 
Following an analysis of the different accounts of the global financial crisis 
provided in this chapter, it is submitted that the lack of quality capital and/or 
the lack of liquidity was arguably the fundamental cause of the crisis. 
Notwithstanding this view, it is further submitted that the other factors 
mentioned in this chapter also collectively played a significant role in the 
cause of the crisis. The global reach of the crisis through financial 
globalisation meant that Africa was not spared. Even though the banking 
industries of Ghana and Kenya were not as badly affected as their 
counterparts in Europe and America they were still impacted by the crisis. In 
the next chapter, the author discusses the transmission mechanisms by which 
the crisis reached Africa particularly Ghana and Kenya and the policy 
responses undertaken. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
ON GHANA AND KENYA AND THEIR POLICY RESPONSES 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the impact of the crisis on Ghana and Kenya and what 
the authorities did by way of response. It also discusses the transmission 
mechanisms of the crisis from Europe to Africa particularly Ghana and Kenya, 
however more emphasis is given to the impact of the crisis on the banking 
sectors and stock markets of these 2 jurisdictions as well as that of Nigeria 
and South Africa by way of comparison. 
2.2 Modes of transmission and impact of the global financial crisis 
It is submitted that although the global financial crisis had a negative impact 
on growth in Africa at the onset of the crisis, economic growth in Africa had 
already begun to slow down in a downward decline117. This was evident during 
2005 - 2008118 when the growth rate slowed, dropping from an average peak 
of 6% to 2% in 2009119. 
Notwithstanding Africa’s low level of integration with the global financial 
markets, African countries were nonetheless still affected by the crisis.120 
Fortunately, the small size of local or regional inter-bank markets ensured that 
inter-bank lending activities involved moderate amounts in comparison to the 
global inter-bank markets and also the trade in innovative products such as 
credit derivatives in the markets were either on a very small scale or virtually 
non-existent in Sub-Saharan Africa121. 
While these factors may have contributed to the relatively low impact of the 
crisis on African countries, the fact also remains that lending activities 
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conducted by banks in low-income African countries was done in a fairly 
‘stable domestic saving markets’122 and was often backed by substantial 
reserves held by Central banks on behalf of the banks participating in such 
lending activities which was a significant contributing factor. 
Thus, this provided the African region with some level of protection from the 
immediate effects of the crisis. 
Despite this degree of protection enjoyed by banking systems in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Sophi Chauvin and Andre Geis, suggest123 that the contagion effect of 
the global financial crisis was transmitted to the African region in two waves. 
They point out that the first wave124 of contagion left Sub-Saharan Africa 
relatively unaffected125 however it was the second wave126 of contagion which 
brought a significant level of damage to the real economy of African countries. 
While there is absolutely no doubt that the African continent was affected by 
the global financial crisis, resulting in some African countries being worse off 
than others, it is submitted that an accurate assessment as to the exact time 
an African country entered the crisis, might be a herculean task to ascertain, 
even more so when the economy of that country concerned might have 
already suffered some form of economic crisis prior to, but not linked to the 
global financial crisis. 
In the view of Iwa Salami127, although African countries were somewhat 
spared the same level of damaging effects experienced by European 
industrialised countries, countries like South Africa and Nigeria suffered more 
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‘adverse consequences to the market and economy’, in comparison with 
Ghana and Kenya, whose effects were not as bad. 
This is perhaps not so surprising according to a paper presented by the AfDB 
Group which suggests128 that due to the external nature of the financial shock, 
i.e. contagion moving across borders, African countries that were most 
vulnerable and affected the most by the crisis were those countries which 
relied more on global trade and capital flows for economic growth.  Thus, 
South African and Nigerian economies were significant victims in that sense.  
According to Dirk Willem te Velde129, there were four main channels130 of 
transmission of the global financial crisis to the African continent. 
The findings131 by te Velde concluded that although the countries that 
participated in their research were affected differently by the crisis, due to the 
various levels of exposure to the transmission channels of the crisis, and 
coupled with the fact that almost all countries surveyed entered the crisis at 
different stages, there seemed to be a general pattern and agreement thereof 
that the transmission mechanisms of the effects of the crisis were identical for 
all the respondent countries i.e. through Private Investment or Financial flows: 
which included portfolio investment flows; Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); 
and International Bank Lending; Trade: through Commodity price shocks; 
Imports and Exchange rate developments etc; Remittances; and Aid132. 
They also noted that while a number of African countries were not affected on 
the same scale as the Advanced European countries and the USA, there 
were still a few African countries that suffered considerably133.  This, they 
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attributed to the degree to which the affected African countries were linked by 
export trade to the affected Advanced countries134. 
For a more reflective comparison to be made on the effects of the global 
financial crisis on large commercial banks in Ghana and Kenya, the author 
intends to focus more on the impact of the crisis on the financial markets of 
these two jurisdictions through the stock markets and banking sectors, The 
author has also highlighted the impact of the global financial crisis on the 
GDIs, FDIs and Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) of some of the jurisdictions 
discussed in this thesis135. Attention will also be drawn to the impact of the 
crisis on Nigeria and South Africa136 thereby providing an insight into the 
varying levels of impact experienced by the worst-hit Sub-Saharan African 
countries by way of comparison.  
2.2.1 Ghana 
Ghana has in the past undertaken a number of financial sector reforms.  In 
1988, the first wave of financial sector reforms begun under the Financial 
Sector Adjustment Programme (FINSAP)137.  This was followed in 2003, by 
the Financial Sector Strategic Plan (FINSSP)138 which the then government 
approved to mark the next stage of financial development in the country i.e. 
from 2004 to 2008139. 
In 2008, a review of FINSSP was undertaken to provide the basis for 
continuing the process of financial sector reform in the country.  In spite of 
these financial reforms, the re-denomination140 of the cedi currency on 1 July 
2007 and the increase in the minimum capital from 20 million cedis to 60 
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million cedis141 (about $40 million) by the Bank of Ghana were arguably the 
highlights of the financial sector reforms that had begun as far back as 1988. 
These reforms combined effectively to improve the macroeconomic stability of 
the economy and contributed generally to the steady pre-crisis growth of 
Ghana’s economy. Thus the past 20 years have witnessed a real GDP growth 
at a steady rate of around 5% a year142 – see table 2.1 in Appendix 2. 
While these GDP growth rates may be described as modest in comparison to 
say that of China during the same period, it is submitted that Ghana’s 
resilience during the global financial crisis might not have been possible had 
the ongoing financial sector reforms not been embarked upon. 
Ghana’s resilience is all the more remarkable considering the fuel crisis 
(2007-2008)143 that preceded the global financial crisis.  Admittedly, the impact 
of the fuel crisis might have been minimised by the increase in prices of 
gold144 and cocoa145 which are two of Ghana’s main sources of export 
revenue.  Notwithstanding this, the impact of the global financial crisis on 
Ghana came via portfolio investment flows, foreign direct investment and 
remittances146.  
Impact on Banking Sector 
In Ghana’s banking sector, the impact of the crisis was described as ‘rather 
modest’147. 
The Bank of Ghana, reported a fall in the growth of total assets in the banking 
industry from 50.4% in December 2007 to 37.2% over the same period in 
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2008148, however this was unsurprisingly accompanied by deterioration149 in 
loan portfolios. 
Although Ghana has a history of high non-performing loans (NPLs), the 
deterioration in loan portfolios before and during the financial crisis were 
attributed to a surge in exposure to vulnerabilities in the Ghanaian economy 
as a direct result of the speed in reforms experienced by the banking sector150.  
This state of affairs was not helped by the Bank of Ghana altering its credit 
lending position to businesses and individuals151 in the last quarter of 2008. 
Notwithstanding this, it is submitted that the deterioration in loan portfolios 
might also have arisen as a result of an increase in non-performing loans152. 
See table 2.2 in Appendix 2. 
A review of other key banking performance indicators in Ghana indicated that 
there was some effect on the banking system. Capital adequacy ratios 
decreased from 14.8% in December 2007 to 13.8% in December 2008153. See 
table 2.3 in Appendix 2. 
Although the capital adequacy ratio did not decrease below the minimum 
capital requirement of 10% in Ghana, it is submitted that there might have 
been two reasons for this decrease.  Firstly, the possibility that the Bank of 
Ghana lowered the capital adequacy for banks in order to create fiscal 
space154 required for the banks in the country to undertake immediate 
monetary response to the crisis.  The other possibility could have been that 
the lowering of the capital adequacy was to enable banks continue to lend 
money to institutions and individual borrowers to increase the flow of liquidity. 
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It is further submitted that the latter possibility may seem a bit remote, due to 
the fact that there was a decrease in lending to businesses and individuals by 
the Bank of Ghana during the last quarter of 2008. The amount of loans and 
advances recorded by the Bank of Ghana fell from 67.9% in 2007 to 42.7% in 
2008155. 
Impact on Stock Market 
Although Stock Markets in Africa are not as developed and sophisticated as 
those in Europe, Asia and the Americas, they were affected nonetheless156 by 
the global financial crisis and the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) was no 
exception. The Ghana Stock Exchange Market started to experience a 
number of setbacks as the equity markets faltered in the second half of 
2008157. 
The GSE All Share Index, its prior outstanding performance of which had 
been recognised worldwide in 2008, fell by more than 11%158 since the start of 
2009.  This performance was in sharp contrast to that of 2007-2008 where as 
a result of increased activity, the share index closed in the third quarter of 
2008 on a return of 65.02 (i.e. 33.20% in dollar terms) for the same period.  
The general performance of the Ghana Stock Exchange in comparison to 
other selected African Stock Markets is represented in table 2.4 of Appendix 
2. 
2.2.2 Kenya 
Kenya, in comparison with other east African countries is a country endowed 
with an array of financial establishments and also has a fairly developed stock 
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market, hence the banking sector in Kenya becoming reknowned for its sheer 
size and diversity159. 
Inspite of these wonderful attributes, Kenya’s banking industry has 
experienced a number of financial crises160 as a result of under-capitalisation, 
increased non-performing loans and a lack of good corporate governance 
mechanisms161. This led to the country’s then government publishing an 
Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) paper in 2003 in which they initiated and 
strategically embarked on the implementation of an economic recovery plan. 
In this ERS paper, the government acknowledged that the banking sector was 
facing serious challenges, particularly in relation to the high degree of non-
performing loans attributable to certain top banks162. Also, the lack of 
adequate competition within the banking industry coupled with the hike in 
interest rates which resulted in an increase in the cost of credit, among other 
factors163, threatened to destabilise the efficiency required in the operation of 
Kenya’s banking system. 
These shortcomings also prompted the Kenyan government to make a 
number of amendments to their Banking Act (Cap 488) which included the 
strengthening of bank licensing procedures, corporate governance, 
observation of capital adequacy requirements and risk management 
processes164. 
Inspite of these attempts by the Kenyan authorities to ensure stability within 
the banking system, it was the subsequent publication by the government in 
2007 of ‘Kenya’s Vision 2030’165 – a long term economic plan that arguably 
showed the clearest signal yet of the commitment to financial and economic 
reform.  This is because, at the heart of these reforms, were plans to improve 
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stability within the Banking and Finance industry and the delivery of financial 
products and services thereof, and most importantly making these financial 
products and services accessible and within easy reach of the people of 
Kenya. 
When the effects of the global financial crisis hit Kenya, the people of Kenya 
were already experiencing some sort of crisis of their own.  The economic and 
political upheaval166 preceding the global financial crisis threatened to derail 
the financial and economic gains of the past decade or so.  Even though post- 
election violence failed to impact negatively on Kenya’s banking industry, 
which had improved remarkably within the last decade167, the banking industry 
unfortunately could not avoid the impact of the global financial crisis. 
A survey168 conducted by the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) in October 2008 in 
an attempt to establish the level of exposure of the Kenyan banking system to 
the crisis had concluded that the impact was likely to be minimal169 as the  
banking institutions that participated in the survey indicated that they were 
unlikely to be impacted by the crisis since the level of involvement in the 
global financial markets was minimal. 
Although this turned out not to be the case, the modes of transmission of the 
crisis were generally of the kind predicted by te Velde.  After year-on-year 
increases in real GDP since 2002, Kenya’s real GDP in 2008 fell from the 
previous year’s high of 6.9% to 1.7%.  See table 2.5 in Appendix 2. 
Also, the flow of remittances from Kenyans in the diaspora which had 
increased from approximately $476.7 million in 2007 to $527.1 million in 2008 
(i.e. an increase of about 6.6%), fell slightly from $527.1 million to $504.6 
million in 2009170. 
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Although foreign direct investment (FDI) registered a decrease in 2008, this 
had been preceded by an increase in the previous year i.e. 2007 as a result of 
an increase in the net FDI flows into the country from 2000 – 2007.  See table 
2.6 in Appendix 2.  
Impact on Banking Sector 
The impact of the crisis on the Kenyan Banking Sector was characterised by a 
fall in bank profits171 as banks assets depreciated in value.  This was 
attributed to a decrease in the size of loans portfolio as banks refrained from 
giving credits to the private sector.  Another reason for the decrease in bank 
profits was a low exchange rate for the Kenyan Shilling which resulted in a 
decrease in the foreign exchange accrued by the banks. 
Foreign banks which represent a greater share172 of the banking industry in 
Kenya in terms of market capitalisation came under pressure to withdraw or 
divert liquid funds to other subsidiaries in the African region and elsewhere to 
prop them up.  Although most commercial banks in Kenya had already begun 
to restrict availability of credit to the private sector and to other borrowers, the 
inability173 of existing borrowers to repay their banking loans at the height of 
the crisis, resulted in a further worsening of the occurrence of non-performing 
loans174. See table 2.7 in Appendix 2. 
The high capital adequacy ratios of Kenyan banks prior to and during the 
crisis must have played a significant role in containing these losses that had 
begun to materialise through non-performing loans.  Unlike in the case of 
Ghana, where bank capital adequacy decreased slightly, the capital adequacy 
of Kenyan banks increased.  This might have been due to the decision by 
Kenyan commercial banks to restrict the availability of credit to the private 
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sector and borrowers generally.  This policy decision is in stark contrast to 
that undertaken by Banks in Ghana during the same period. See table 2.8 in 
Appendix 2. 
Impact on Stock Market 
Kenya’s capital market175 also became affected by the crisis.  As the Nairobi 
Stock Exchange 20 – Share Index plummeted, foreign investors sought to sell 
their investments in a bid to avoid huge equity losses176. See table 2.4 in 
Appendix 2. 
In March 2009, the NSE market index fell close to its 7 year low figure of 1983 
points having fallen by 2000 points177.  Although this downward slide stopped 
as the economy recovered somewhat with improvements of about 17.5% 
between March – June 2009, there was a further slump from July to 
September 2009, with a loss in the share index value of about 8.8%178. 
Although the decline in share prices at the time was attributed to foreign 
investors seeking an exit from the markets, it has also been suggested that 
lack of investor confidence was to blame, as wide-spread ‘panic-selling’ took 
hold.  
2.2.3 Nigeria 
Earlier in this chapter, the intention was made clear to make a comparison 
between the nature of the impact of the crisis on ‘least affected’ and that of 
‘worse-affected’ countries within Sub-Saharan Africa.  The two Sub-Saharan 
African countries identified by the author as arguably the worst-affected and 
hence selected for this comparative analysis were Nigeria and South Africa.  
Nigeria, Africa’s most populated nation arguably felt the brunt of the global 
financial crisis more than other African countries, but perhaps not on the same 
scale as South Africa. 
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Following the Financial System Stability Assessment179 conducted by the IMF 
in 2002, the Nigerian Government undertook a number of financial sector 
reforms aimed at strengthening financial stability in the country and improving 
the regulatory and supervisory structures within the Nigerian banking industry. 
Chukwuma Charles Soludo (then Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria) 
has suggested that had his programme of reforms not been introduced at the 
time, Nigeria would have probably been a lot worse off180.  The reforms181 
centred on the importance and need for all banks in Nigeria to improve their 
operational strength and to recapitalise, thereby increasing individual capital 
requirements from 2 billion naira to 25 billion naira. 
Thus, during the period between July 2004 and December 2005, a sum total 
of 553.44 billion naira (N) approximately (USD$ 4.29 billion) was raised182 by 
32 banks through the capital markets and in 2006, six banks joined forces to 
raise N146.98 billion (USD$1.16 billion) in compliance with the new minimum 
capital requirement introduced by Soludo. 
Nigeria had prior to the global financial crisis enjoyed a relative good 
economic growth, however, the decline in the price of crude oil begun to have 
a negative impact on the Nigerian economy.  With oil revenue accounting for 
about 80% of Nigeria’s foreign export earnings this was undoubtedly going to 
have an impact of some sort on the economy183. See table 2.9 in Appendix 2. 
The decline in crude oil prices from USD$147 per barrel in July 2008 to about 
USD$50 in 2009 – representing a decrease of about 51.2%, resulted also in a 
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decline in the government’s capital expenditure184.  Nigeria’s foreign reserves 
also declined as the country had to rely on its reserves to undertake various 
projects and maintain economic stability. 
Unemployment figures also rose globally; particularly in Europe and this 
generally affected the volume of remittances by migrants living in Europe to 
their families and Nigeria was no exception in terms of this area of impact.  
Table 2.10 in Appendix 2 suggests that after a pre-crisis continuous increase 
in volume of remittances, which peaked in 2008, a decrease in the volume of 
remittances followed. 
Impact on Banking Sector 
Prior to the onset of the crisis in Nigeria, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)185 
had announced that bank lending had experienced a growth of about 60.9% 
an indication of the general health and well-being of Nigerian banks.   By 31 
December 2008, the Nigerian inter-bank offer rate (NIBOR) had recorded 
increases in all areas of the lending market.  Although Nigeria isn’t an 
established player in the global financial markets, its position as a significant 
exporter of oil puts the country in a vulnerable position when the global oil 
prices fluctuate and fall186. 
Regardless of the pre-crisis banking reforms and the positive gains to the 
economy thereof, the Nigerian banking system was affected by the crisis 
nonetheless. The prior increase in bank lending as reported by the Central 
Bank of Nigeria all but soon disappeared and local inter-bank lending activity 
decreased as a result of less liquidity in the Nigerian Banking Market; a hike in 
the Nigerian inter-banking market and also due to a hike in the NIBOR from 
13.8% to 14.6%187. 
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There is a degree of uncertainty as to whether a hike in the NIBOR was a 
good decision, considering the circumstances at the time.  It may well be that 
a reason for this might have been due to a possible rise in the occurrence of 
non-performing loans as loan default rates increased See table 2.11 in 
Appendix 2. As liquidity dried up, the rate of non-performing loans increased 
and banks became less willing to lend money. This impacted negatively on 
the incidence of non-performing loans, followed by deterioration in bank asset 
quality resulting in a general decrease in banks’ financial soundness 
indicators figures such as Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) 
and risk-weighted Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR). See table 2.12 in Appendix 
2. 
Impact on Stock Market 
As the crisis continued to take hold in Nigeria, foreign portfolio investors 
begun to withdraw188 their investments, either completely or channelling funds 
into other areas of investment opportunities that were unlikely to suffer heavily 
from the effects of the crisis.  The All Share price index of the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NISE) fell dramatically to 22,349 points in January 2009.  This 
decline in share price index189 was linked to the fall in market capitalisation 
from about N12,640 trillion190 to a market capitalisation of N4,998 trillion. Thus 
the stock market capitalisation depreciated by 46% over 2008 and the share 
price index recorded a total share loss of -67% between March 2008 and 
March 2009. See table 2.13 in Appendix 2. 
The Nigerian Bond market was also affected by the crisis. During the period of 
September 2008 – March 2009 plans for a $500 million Eurobond issue had 
to be postponed191.  This state of affairs in the bond market at the height of the 
crisis is in sharp contrast to the period before the crisis, where in January of 
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2007, the Guaranty Trust Bank Plc (GTB, a Nigerian commercial bank) raised 
$350 million from the issue of a 5-year Eurobond, the demand for which was 
extremely high192. This same bank in July 2007 went on to become the first 
Nigerian bank to list global depositary receipts (GDRs) on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) following a highly successful global offering that realised 
$750 million.  
2.2.4 South Africa193 
South Africa, arguably one of Africa’s most industrialised countries has 
emerged194 from its colourful historic past to become a major economic player 
in the continent as well as a global partner195 on a host of international issues. 
As one of Africa’s leading importers196 of commodities particularly from Asia, 
South Africa’s economy prior to the global financial crisis enjoyed large 
increases in inflow of foreign capital resulting in steady economic growth.  
However, in the five years197 preceding the crisis, growth rates had begun to 
fall. See table 2.14 in Appendix 2.  This decline in the growth of the economy 
was dealt a further blow when demand for export commodities fell. 
Impact on Banking Sector 
It has been suggested that the South African banking and financial markets 
industry continued to function effectively during the crisis and were able to 
withstand the impact of the global financial crisis, due to the fact that the 
banking and finance institutions in South Africa were not highly exposed198 to 
sub-prime mortgage related products.  This level of protection accorded to the 
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banking institutions in South Africa irrespective of their dealings in 
derivatives199, has been credited to the sound macroeconomic policies and 
risk awareness that have been incorporated into their banking and finance 
regulations200. 
Regardless of the level of protection provided by the existing banking 
regulations in South Africa, the Monetary Policy Committee of the South 
African Reserve Bank (SARB) cut its policy rate by about 500 basis points.  
Bizarrely, the SARB stated that the changes in policy rate were neither 
effected201 to assist their banking sector nor was it a reaction to the global 
financial crisis.  
Notwithstanding this, it became quite evident during the financial crisis that 
availability of liquidity had become a global issue, particularly for banks 
involved in the global inter-bank markets and although South African banks 
were generally not dependent on foreign funding, cross-border bank lending 
also fell202.  While the decline in cross-border lending may have been due to 
other reasons203 other than increase in cost of lending, there is the possibility 
that the decrease in the policy rate of 500 basis points followed by 
subsequent cuts up to 6.5% was on the contrary, designed to stimulate 
lending within the economy, especially amongst local banks in South Africa. 
This view by the author seems to be consistent with the impression created by 
South African banks, that regardless of the impact the crisis had on the price 
and the maturity dates in cross-border lending, the ability of South African 
banks to obtain funds through lending was still possible.  Thus the local inter-
bank banking activities were not seriously affected and banks functioned 
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normally albeit with a heightened sense of care and general preference for a 
shorter maturity time-frame. 
Towards the end of 2009, there was a decline in the level of the South African 
Reserve Bank’s gross reserves by US$500 million to US$ 33.8 billion, but this 
was attributed to a decline in the price of gold coupled with the appreciation in 
the exchange rate value of the US dollar.  Also, by the end of February 2009, 
it was reported that the SARB had reduced the level of borrowed reserves to 
US$640 million having originally been at a high of US$ 3.5 billion in 2006.  
Unsurprisingly, the SARB suggested that this was an important strategic 
move, taken to reflect the good state of health of South Africa’s foreign 
reserves. 
Impact on Stock Market 
Thus, even though there was a general decline in capital inflows, this value 
was significantly outweighed by the volume of capital outflow from the 
country204.  This resulted in the poor performance of equity markets in South 
Africa, with the Stock Market (J.S.E.) recording a loss. Table 2.15 in Appendix 
2 shows the losses of the South African Stock Market in comparison to other 
Emerging countries. 
There was also a decrease in the volume of international bonds205 issued by 
South Africa and although South Africa is not heavily dependent on borrowing 
internationally, this decline was quite significant as it probably indicated a shift 
in investor’s needs and priorities and also a preference for assets of better 
quality hence their decision to look elsewhere. 
Table 2.16 in Appendix 2206, shows Financial Soundness Indicators for South 
Africa from 2002 – 2007 indicating that capital adequacy increased slightly 
from 12.3 in 2006 to 12.8 in 2007 just before the global financial crisis begun 
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in 2007 and the return on equity figures decreased slightly from 18.3 in 2006 
to 18.1 in 2007.  
2.3 Africa’s financial sector responses to the global financial crisis 
The responses by African countries to the global financial crisis were varied207 
and occurred at different times within the crisis period208.  This was because 
African countries were exposed at varying levels to the different modes of the 
crisis transmission depending on the level of exposure to the transmission 
mechanism and also due to the fact that affected countries entered and exited 
the crisis at different times. 
While some affected African countries adopted stimulus packages209 to prop 
up their economies and financial sectors, others, particularly low-income 
African countries had little or limited fiscal space to replicate some of these 
counter-cyclical measures. 
2.3.1 Ghana 
Although the global financial crisis affected both the ‘real sector’ and the 
‘banking and financial sector’ of the Ghanaian economy, the author believes 
that the impact might have been felt more in the former sector. 
This argument is put forward because quite a number of the policies210 
undertaken by the Ghana government were aimed at reducing the massive 
fiscal and current account deficits that had accrued and also to curb the ever-
rising inflation and the decline in the value of the currency. 
On the contrary however, it could be suggested that the then Ghana 
government would have implemented a monetary stimulus injection package 
had it not had limited reserves coupled with an unsound fiscal status211. 
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Perhaps this is the reason why some political commentators and critics 
believe that the sale212 of a 70% stake in Ghana Telecom (GT) by the  
government was designed to inject much needed213 financial stimulus into the 
Ghanaian economy. 
The Ghana government’s decision in January 2008 to postpone its plans to 
issue a US$300 million 7 year bond citing adverse global market conditions214 
is generally regarded as a direct ‘response’ to the crisis.  Also, in July 2008, 
the Monetary Policy Committee increased the prime rate from 16% to 17% 
and then to 18.5% in February 2009, a move believed to have been 
undertaken to keep investors happy with increased returns on their 
investments. 
2.3.2 Kenya 
In the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis, the Central Bank of 
Kenya (CBK) decided to put in place a number of monetary policies with the 
intention of stimulating the economy.  One such policy, designed to cut the 
interest rates215, resulted in the CBK lowering cash ratio from 6% to 5%216 and 
the Central Bank rate fell from 9% to 8.25%217. By November 2009, the 
interest rates had lowered further to 7%218. 
Despite this initial interest rate reduction by the CBK, lending rates rose from 
13.7% in September 2008 to 14.7% in September 2009.  This unexpected 
increase219 in bank lending rates was attributed by CBK to the continuing view 
by the Kenyan commercial banks of the prevalence of a high loan default rate.   
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This resulted in the private sector being unable to take up the ‘available 
liquidity’ that resulted from CBK’s inter-bank interest rate reduction. 
To further stimulate the economy, the Central Bank of Kenya issued a Kenyan 
Government infrastructure bond220 at the beginning of 2009221. Another 
infrastructure bond was sold in December 2009, having accepted 18.4 billion 
shillings from investors222.  Proceeds from the sale of these bonds were then 
used by the government for projects such as roads, water, energy etc. 
2.3.3 Nigeria 
When the effects of the crisis started to impact on the Nigerian economy, the 
country had to rely on surpluses that existed due to build up in reserves223.  
Being one of a number of oil producing African countries224 with a build up of 
revenue, Nigeria was able to rely on its reserves to reduce the initial impact 
the crisis had on its economy. 
Inspite of this, Nigeria’s financial position became all the more precarious 
despite reforms instituted by Professor Soludo and it took the resilience of the 
financial sector to keep the economy on track towards recovery. 
While the Central Bank of Nigeria undertook some banking reforms following 
the 2005 Nigerian banking crisis, the author finds it inappropriate to discuss 
this as these reforms were actually undertaken in a direct response to that 
crisis and not as a result of the global financial crisis. 
Other macroeconomic policies embarked upon by the Central Bank of Nigeria, 
included a lowering of its monetary policy rate (MPR) from 10.25% to 9.75%; 
a lowering of cash reserve requirement for banks and a reduction in the 
liquidity ratio225. 
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2.3.4 South Africa 
South Africa, being an emerging country possesses a better regulated 
banking system and a strong and effective capital market regulatory 
structure226 in contrast to Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya. 
According to Mminele227, South Africa’s banking and financial system 
remained resilient during the crisis and ‘unconventional measures or focus on 
financial stability issues were not necessary’. This view is in contrast to the 
general perception that the impact the crisis had on the South African 
economy required the right response. 
Thus between December 2008 and October 2009, the South African Reserve 
Bank lowered its policy rate by 500 basis points to enhance the availability of 
liquidity. Also, between 2010 and 2012, the South African government 
adopted a countercyclical fiscal stimulus228, with the release of R787 billion 
(equivalent to USD$100 billion) which it channelled into public investments in 
the public sector. 
Thus, although the policy responses undertaken by Ghana, Kenya Nigeria 
and South African during the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis 
were varied, the different accounts of responses provided herein do not by 
any means represent an exhaustive list of policy measures undertaken.  
Indeed, numerous other policies have been implemented by these countries 
which are reflective of the fact that even countries within the same region or 
continent were all impacted differently by the financial crisis. An account of 
these other policies however, would be outside the remits of this thesis. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Although commercial banks in Africa, particularly in the four jurisdictions 
discussed in this chapter were not as badly affected by the global financial 
crisis in comparison to their European and American counterparts, the steady 
increase in the establishment of Pan-African Banks across the African 
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continent, as well as the increasing presence of the subsidiaries of global 
banks from countries such as China suggests that Africa might not be so 
lucky when another global crisis occurs due to the issue of financial 
interconnectedness. 
Thus, as banks continue to expand beyond their shores, so does the risk of 
financial contagion increase, which ultimately raises issues of national and 
global financial stability in relation to bank regulation.  This highlights the need 
for banks to not only consider financial stability within their own jurisdictions, 
but to also look at the bigger picture as no country today is completely 
immune from the banking and financial crises experienced by another 
country. 
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CHAPTER 3  
INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION AND 
FINANCIAL STABILITY 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, an attempt is made to examine the role that banks play in 
society as well as within the banking industry. It is submitted that the role of 
banks has undergone an evolutionary process of change over the years which 
has resulted in an increase in the inherent risks that banks are exposed to 
through their daily banking activities. 
This increase in accompanying banking risks has brought about a renewed 
focus in the way banks are regulated, particularly during a period where a lot 
of banking transactions today both in terms of monetary value and number of 
transactions are of a cross-border nature. It is submitted that although the 
primary aim of banking regulation is to ensure financial stability and the 
ultimate protection of depositors’ funds the question of whether banking 
regulation achieves these objectives is a subjective one. 
3.2 The Role of Banks 
The role of banks has always been a very important one in any world 
economy. Banks world-wide, have over the years played a vital role in any 
‘payment mechanism system’. From a previously traditional role where they 
accepted deposits from depositors who entrusted them with their money, 
banks have also always provided a main source of finance for many 
borrowers229. 
Over the years, banks (particularly large banks) have in addition to retaining 
their traditional function as deposit-taking financial institutions, been engaging 
in other banking activities which at best could be described as ‘profit-making’ 
financial activities. While such activities230 in themselves have never been 
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contrary to banking regulations, and in fact have been largely encouraged by 
the banking industry, it has become a widely known and acceptable reason 
that these ‘other banking activities’ tend to amplify or exacerbate the risks that 
already exist231 or emanate from their more traditional role. 
Inspite of systemic risk being an unacceptable risk element in the activities of 
banks, and indeed a growing one in the relationships that banks have with 
one another, both nationally and globally, this inherent form of risk has 
assumed great significance particularly where banks have seemingly tended 
to move from perhaps the more common form of profit-making activities 
through fractional-reserve banking to the sophistry of dealings in largely 
innovative banking products specially designed to yield even more profits for 
the banks. 
It must be pointed out, that although systemic risk, is an ever-present risk 
element in any banking system, the inability of banks to control it through 
adequate prudential bank regulation, heightens the likelihood of local and  
cross-border contagion within the banking systems of any given jurisdiction, 
which ultimately becomes an unwelcome recipe for bank failure. 
Rosa Lastra, underscored the important role that banks play in a given 
jurisdiction in an article232 which is referred to by the author in an LLM 
dissertation where the author states that banks are special because: 
‘when they fail, there is the added “real possibility”233 of a spread of 
systemic risk through contagion, which may result in healthy banks 
suddenly facing liquidity crisis and ultimately potential collapse due to 
their intricate bank-on-bank relationships and inter-dependency in the 
inter-bank market’234. 
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Thus, while the ‘systemic risk’ and ‘subsequent potential collapse’235 argument 
is a valid reason for attributing importance to banks, a further argument that 
could be raised in support of the ‘bank importance’ phraseology, is that when 
banks fail, depositors are left exposed to the workings of regulations236 or 
official policies237 that may already be in place to either safe-guard all their 
deposits, or at worst some of it. 
In such a scenario, the protection of a bank depositor’s funds will be 
dependent on the existence of deposit insurance mechanisms amongst 
others238 within a given jurisdiction, and where that exists, the amount the 
depositor is able to reclaim will depend on the terms of the deposit insurance.  
Banks are also important because they deal with each other in the inter-bank 
market and the inability of one bank to settle with another may have a direct 
impact upon the bank which has not been paid239.  This in turn may make the 
bank unable to meet its obligations towards a third bank, and so on. 
Another reason why banks are considered important is due to the fact that 
they deal in maturity transformation240, which means that they transform 
illiquid assets, such as loans, into liquid liabilities such as deposits.  Because 
of the nature of fractional-reserve banking, banks will never have sufficient 
liquid assets to meet all liabilities241. 
This will be problematic, if for some reason, an unexpectedly large number of 
depositors demand their funds at the same time242.  Because it is very difficult 
for customers to distinguish between healthy and unhealthy banks, this may 
mean that perfectly well-managed banks are also put at risk of a bank run. 
Thus, while the importance of banks is undisputed, it is this same level of 
importance, which provides a host of reasons for banks to be regulated. 
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3.3 The Regulation of Banks 
Notwithstanding the existence of multiple reasons for regulating banks, the 
traditional and fundamental reason for bank regulation has been to ensure 
financial stability243 and the protection of depositors244.  
The importance of financial stability in any economy cannot be over-stated 
enough and it is as important today as it was in the 1980s and 1990s and 
even prior. In ensuring financial stability within the banking industry, it is 
important to recognise that the era of self-regulation is long gone and its 
practice confined to history and rightly so. 
The historical reliance by banks on internally-led markets’ standards of 
practice had to be abandoned in favour of a new approach as banking 
crises245 begun to occur globally with worrying frequency.  The new approach 
i.e. regulations was widely seen as a more acceptable approach by many 
countries in ensuring financial stability and marked a complete departure from 
the ‘status quo’ of ‘national market correction’ and ‘self-regulation’246 to a 
widely accepted system of banking regulations under the supervision of 
banking regulators and supervisors and other regulatory institutions. 
Following the introduction of bank regulations by national authorities and 
jurisdictions as a means of ensuring financial stability within jurisdictions, the 
rationale for banking regulation undertook a shift in focus and with time247, 
banking regulations were seen as a useful tool to reduce the level of 
competition within the banking industry. 
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Although the level of importance associated with bank regulations today is 
often attributed to the failure of the ‘market-based standards-setting’ 248 
approach under self-regulation, G.A. Walker begs to differ.  Walker suggests 
that it is without merit for the ‘previous system of self-regulation’249 to be 
dismissed as ‘fundamentally flawed’250, but rather, the concept of self-
regulation within the banking and finance industry had no longer become fit 
for purpose. Walker supports his argument by suggesting that the 
‘environment’251 for which such a system was designed to work no longer 
existed; notwithstanding the fact that most regulatory objectives were being 
met through market-led self-regulation252. To add to this, it is submitted that 
this ‘environment’ that Walker describes, all but disappeared as a result of the 
globalisation of the banking and finance industry. 
3.4 The International regulation of banks 
The era of financial liberalisation that swept through Europe and other 
industrialised western countries resulted in an increasing state of cross-border  
integration253 between banks and financial markets. 
It is submitted that this increasing cross-border integration of banks and 
financial markets was not supported by any form of cross-border banking 
supervisory framework. The lack of international co-operation and co-
ordination amongst banking regulators and supervisors was highlighted by 
Peter Cooke254 who stated that: 
‘………..no banking regulators knew anything at all about the banking   
regulations prevailing in other countries before the 1970s. Prior to 1975, 
                                                 
248
 Walker (n246). 
249
 ibid. 
250
 ibid. 
251
 ibid. 
252
 In a market-led self-regulatory environment, market participants through a code of 
conduct, adhere to a particular practice, custom or norm in a consistent manner thus creating 
an impact which could be likened to the desired impact, had the practice or custom been 
embodied in a regulatory framework. 
253
 S Ingves ‘The Evolution of the Basel Committee’ – A speech/keynote address to celebrate 
25 years of the Basel Capital Accord, 26 September 2013. 
254
 Former Chairman of the BCBS and is the longest serving chairman of the Basel 
Committee from 1976 to 1988. 
42 
regulation was nationally prescribed within national legislatures and 
without international co-operation from other jurisdictions’255. 
Despite this lack of international co-operation from other jurisdictions, it took 
the failures of the Franklin National Bank and the Bankhaus Herstatt bank for 
the international community i.e. members of the G10 to address the issue of 
the need for an international banking framework. This resulted in the 
formation of a Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervision towards 
the end of 1974. 
This Committee, which was later renamed the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision was given the mandate of establishing ‘regular co-operation 
between its member countries on banking supervisory matters’256. On 26 
September 1975, the Basle Committee introduced a Concordat257 of 
international banking supervision to address the issue of lack of co-operation 
amongst jurisdictions. The Concordat made it absolutely clear in its 
introductory paragraph that its objective was to establish guidelines which 
could define the scope of the co-operation amongst national banking 
supervisors in the supervision of foreign banks operating within their 
jurisdictions. The Concordat also introduced guidelines which clarified the 
supervisory function and requirements of both host and parent banking 
authorities. 
Throughout the subsequent revisions of the Basel Concordat; first in 1983, 
then in April 1990 and July 1992, the Basel Committee has continually 
acknowledged the internationalisation of banking and capital markets258. 
Perhaps the most significant revision to banking supervision by the BCBS 
which characterised the international banking regulatory framework at the 
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time was the introduction of the 25 basic core principles that underpin the 
Basel Committee’s banking and regulatory framework259. 
Further to the general recognition within the BCBS of the need to improve the 
international supervision of banks and to enhance co-operation and 
harmonisation amongst banks particularly within Europe, the BCBS also 
recognised that a harmonisation of banking regulations within the European 
Community could be better achieved through the introduction of ‘standard 
rules’ on capital adequacy260. These ‘standard rules’ on capital adequacy are 
introduced under the minimum capital requirement under the Basel 1 Capital 
Accord, and although the Basel Committee’s recommendations and decisions 
are not legally binding261, they have been adopted by over 100 countries 
world-wide including African countries such as Ghana and Kenya. 
Inspite of this compliance statistic, the submission is made that whereas the 
justification for the regulation of banks within national borders may easily be 
forthcoming and acceptable, the rationale for the international regulation of 
banks might arguably not enjoy the same support. Notwithstanding this, the 
justification for the international regulation of banks has increasingly over the 
years become difficult to disregard. 
While the need for an international banking regulatory framework is 
increasingly becoming justifiable, it must be appreciated that deeply rooted 
and potentially divergent national laws which split along common law and civil 
law trajectories may well provide a spanner in the wheels of efforts being 
made to harmonise global banking regulation and supervision. 
This common law, civil law dichotomy subsequently compounded by the 
potentially different interpretations accorded by jurisdictions to global banking 
regulations often results in regulatory arbitrage which if left unchecked may 
encourage banks to move to jurisdictions in which banking regulations and 
supervision are relatively softer and less intrusive. 
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The disparity in the banking regulations and supervision procedures in 
countries worldwide was acknowledged by Sahajwala and Van Der Bergh262 
who suggested that differing banking regulations and supervision procedures 
amongst countries could be attributed to the fact that each country had 
attained varying levels in the state of development263 and complexity of their 
respective financial systems which was matched by the varied levels of 
openness of the domestic financial system and its exposure264 to the level of 
competition that foreign bank competitors would bring or introduce.  Other 
reasons suggested were that the disclosure process and extent of disclosure 
of a bank’s financial position, together with the varying levels in availability of 
technology and human resources also enhanced inconsistencies in banking 
regulations and supervision and were also a contributory factor. 
While the ‘number, size and concentration of banking institutions’ are cited by 
Sahajwala and Van Der Bergh as yet another contributory reason to the 
variation in banking regulations worldwide, it is also an acknowledged fact, 
that the size and level of inter-connectedness of banking institutions and non-
banking institutions have led to an increase to any financial system of the 
risk/threat posed by shadow banking to financial stability, particularly where 
non-banking financial institutions are concerned265. 
Notwithstanding the reasons given by Sahajwala and Van Der Bergh, there 
had been prior recognition of the need for the harmonisation of national bank 
regulations amongst industrialised nations towards the end of the 1980s and 
early 1990s.  This was due to the fact that banks had started to develop an 
international presence and were no longer confined within their own local 
borders.  The idea of foreign banks operating within national jurisdictions was 
no longer an unwanted proposition266. 
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Maximillian J.B. Hall and George Kaufman suggest in their article267 that the 
call for harmonisation in banking regulations was an attempt to reduce the 
likelihood of bank failures and the systemic risk contagion that followed 
thereafter, and that such harmonisation was unlikely to encourage certain acts 
by governments which placed certain countries at a competitive advantage 
than others. They suggest further that such desire, led governments to ‘call for 
a transnational regulation’268 which would address the limitations of the market 
disciplines exhibited by banks in many countries, and the inability of private 
stakeholders and other government bank regulators to monitor their interests 
in their banks located in other jurisdictions. 
Today, whilst several global banks have been entering Africa e.g. from China 
and perhaps the UK, due to the existence of foreign investment laws that 
make it easier for these banks to open branches/offices/subsidiaries, not the 
same could be mentioned for banks in Africa wishing to open branches in say 
Europe269. 
It is submitted, that today the arguments in favour of the international 
regulation of banks is difficult to dismiss or ignore but nonetheless must be 
weighed against the argument in legal jurisprudence of the sovereignty of a 
State and the accordance of recognition to the individual characteristics of 
each national culture270.  It is the strength of such national cultural identity that 
often leads to some level of bias in favour of national laws or regulations as 
opposed to harmonisation of regulations271. This view is opposed by 
Universalists, who align themselves to the view that ‘universal legal principles 
would one day govern all of humanity’272. 
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The Universalist ideology273, often cites ‘a number of phenomena’ as 
justification in the optimism they have such as the ‘convergence  of national 
laws towards common principles’ and the frequency with which legal 
institutions created in one system are adopted by another274. 
In a recently held conference in London275, Dr David Bholat from the Bank of 
England stated ‘Culture eats law for lunch’. He explained by suggesting that 
he was unsure if regulation alone could improve the current situation in the 
banking industry because ‘we have had regulations since 1979, i.e. statutory-
based regulation yet still we seem to be having the same problem’276.  While 
one might argue that Dr Bholat’s statement was somewhat limited to the UK 
Banking Industry, there are legal experts277 who have criticised the Basel 
Accords, particularly Basel 2 for its failure to prevent the global financial crisis. 
The phrase used by Dr Bholat together with the discussions that followed, 
prompted Professor Joan Loughrey to suggest that ‘If regulations do not seem 
to be working, what else would? Should there be a mix of principles-based 
regulation and culture?’278 
It is submitted that such an approach will be unworkable due to the strong 
banking cultures that exist in certain jurisdictions like the U.S.A and the U.K. 
where very powerful bank lobbyist groups thrive.  Indeed, Professor Joanna 
Gray warns of the possibility of ‘regulatory capture’279 if the banking industry is 
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constantly allowed to lobby the regulators resulting in the ‘watering down’ of 
the regulations280.  
3.5 Financial globalisation and bank regulation in Africa 
It is submitted that the era of ‘financial liberalisation’281 which was marked by 
deregulation was aimed at introducing competition within the banking 
industry282. This resulted in yet another departure from the original purpose of 
bank regulations as banks had started to become less profitable due to 
increased competition283. Financial liberalisation thus called into question the 
very reason for which banking regulation was first introduced. 
The deregulation within the banking industries of a number of jurisdictions and 
the relaxation of restrictions on the establishment of foreign banking 
subsidiaries within these jurisdictions, paved the way for the onset of financial 
globalisation284. The resulting effect, such as ever-increasing banking 
transactions, cross-border mergers and acquisitions and a growing number of 
bilateral and multilateral foreign investment agreements being entered into by 
countries and financial institutions (particularly banks) has resulted in a global 
explosion of inter-bank activities285. In some instances where mergers and 
acquisitions have resulted in large financial conglomerate structures, it has 
often been followed by an amplification of the threat of all types of banking 
risks which would have previously been limited to the individual balance 
sheets286 of banks. It is submitted therefore that today, as a result of financial 
globalisation and banking deregulation, the transmission of systemic risk 
through financial contagion has become a real threat to both national and 
international financial stability. 
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Further to this view, an IMF Global Financial Stability Report287 published in 
April 2007 acknowledged that financial institutions had entered an era of 
institutional globalisation which had serious implications for financial 
stability288. The Report added further that although globalisation of financial 
institutions had improved financial stability generally, there was some level of 
uncertainty as to whether globalisation enabled ‘financial systems to withstand 
extreme events’289.  On the issue of whether globalisation made financial 
systems capable of withstanding extreme events, it is submitted that the 
ability of financial systems on both a national level and an international level 
to withstand extreme events, would be dependent on the inter-linkages of the 
different banks within that financial system, the sizes of those banks involved 
and the nature and extent to which credit derivatives are dealt in, on national 
and cross-border level. 
Although the ability of a bank to withstand extreme events is crucial to 
financial stability, the lack of an effective cross-border bank insolvency 
resolution procedure implies that when banks fail, local and international bank 
customers including stakeholders and other institutions that have a vested 
interest in the failing/failed financial institution may not have any realistic 
chance of getting their money or investment back. 
Also, the intricate nature of the links and relationships that exist between and 
amongst banks points to the fact that any form of financial crisis could result in 
a potential conflict between national banking authorities on the issue of bank 
insolvency resolution.  If this occurs, this could go on for years and could be 
very costly. 
The era of financial liberalisation that swept through Europe and other 
industrialised western countries eventually found its way through the African 
continent. Inutu Lukonga and Kay Chung290, suggest that cross-border 
expansion of banks of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) origin is an ongoing 
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phenomenon and by the end of 2009, there were 18 Sub-Saharan banks that 
had a presence in four or more countries.  Such is the rate of expansion that 
they even suggest that banks of SSA origin have now attained a global 
presence as well.  
3.5.1 Pan-African Banks 
Pan-African Banks have been defined as ‘Banking groups domiciled in Africa 
with subsidiaries in several countries’291. According to Benedicte Vibe 
Christensen, their expansion across the African continent may be attributed to 
the relaxation of investment regulations by certain host countries that 
previously barred foreign banks from opening subsidiaries within their 
jurisdictions.  It has also been suggested292 that the ever-increasing financial 
integration within the various financial markets in the Sub-Saharan African 
region has been mainly due to the expansion of the Pan-African Banking 
groups. 
Although most of the Pan-African banking groups are headquartered in South 
Africa, Nigeria and Morocco, other Pan-African banking groups exist that have 
their head-office in other countries such as Togo.  In Ghana, Ecobank293 and 
Bank of Africa are typical examples of the presence of Pan-African banks, 
whereas in Kenya, the Kenya Commercial Bank, Equity Bank and the 
Commercial Bank of Africa represent a few of the Pan-African Banks 
originating from Kenya. 
It is submitted that the expansion of Pan-African Banking within Sub-Saharan 
Africa has both positive and negative implications for the African continent.  
Although Pan-African banks294 introduce competition295 within the local 
banking systems of the host countries they reside in, as well as technical 
expertise and possibly improved IT systems and infrastructure, their presence 
in any jurisdiction is a potential source of systemic risk for the host country 
and the wider financial stability of the African Continent at large. 
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Although Inutu Lukonga and Kay Chung, find in their paper, that the 
expansion of large conglomerate financial institutions (LCFIs) e.g. Pan-African 
Banks poses no immediate threat to the financial stability of the African 
region, they agree that such a potential threat still remains especially where 
there is no harmonisation in the banking regulatory practices of the home and 
host jurisdictions of these LCFIs. 
They add that the source of such potential threat may be traced to the lack of 
‘consolidated and cross-border supervision’, which leads to a lack of harmony 
in the banking regulatory standards of both home and host country and the 
lack of a cross-border banking insolvency framework and until these 
‘deficiencies’ are addressed, the threat of financial stability posed by LCFIs 
will still remain 
3.5.2 Regional harmonisation of banking regulations 
The importance of an African regional banking regulatory framework cannot 
be overstated enough, not least because of the presence of foreign banks 
within the African continent, a significant number of which are of Pan-African 
origin. 
Hence, it is submitted that the need for such a framework is underscored by 
the increase in the presence of Pan-African banks within African countries 
and also the ever-increasing volume of transactions and cross-border 
dealings between and amongst countries in Africa. 
It is further submitted that increased cross-border transactions has a 
significant impact on African banks in that it increases the threat to regional 
financial stability through contagion.  Thus not only will regional harmonisation 
of banking regulation significantly reduce the risk of banking crisis through 
cross-border contagion, but it would increase the variety and efficiency of 
banking and financial services which would ultimately be beneficial for 
competition within the banking industry. 
The East African Community (EAC) consisting of Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Tanzania and Uganda have already begun the consultation process aimed at 
harmonising their banking and finance regulatory framework whereas 
members of the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) consisting of Ghana, 
51 
Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone have also begun similar and 
parallel attempts to harmonise their banking regulations and supervision.  
Notwithstanding these efforts296 by African countries, there is still lack of 
progress after more than a decade of negotiations, a situation which may 
arguably be due to lack of co-operation between the relevant institutions or 
possibly a lack of political will to carry these ground-breaking reforms through. 
3.5.3 Global harmonisation of banking regulations 
While the case for harmonisation in banking regulations has arguably been 
established, not least following the prolific expansion of Pan-African banks, 
the African continent is still yet to devise a banking regulatory framework 
which recognises or takes into account the slow pace in the development of 
individual financial systems of African countries297. 
Whilst the African continent still awaits such an ‘African-designed’ banking 
regulatory framework, the ever-increasing cross-border integration of financial 
institutions from Emerging countries like China with financial institutions in 
Africa is increasingly becoming difficult to ignore298. 
Also, notwithstanding the continued presence in African countries of the 
subsidiaries of global banks domiciled in countries such as the United 
Kingdom299 and France300, Emerging countries such as China have in recent 
times been expanding their financial institutions in Africa301.  Other evidence of 
increasing co-operation between Chinese and African banks, include an 
Agreement signed in 2009 by China and Ecobank to increase co-operation 
and a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2008 between China 
Development Bank and the United Bank of Africa to provide finance for long-
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term projects aimed at improving the infrastructure within the African 
continent302. 
3.6 International convergence of banking regulations 
It is submitted, that the case for international convergence of banking 
regulations was established when financial deregulation and financial 
liberalisation first occurred303.  This case was further strengthened following 
increased cross-border financial transactions and co-operation through 
international trade and the cross-border establishment of financial 
institutions304. 
Earlier in this chapter, it was established that one of the fundamental reasons 
for bank regulation was to ensure financial stability305.  It is thus submitted that 
it makes sense for there to be consistency in the enforcement of banking 
regulations worldwide, particularly where there continues to be increased 
levels of financial integration amongst countries world-wide306. 
While there is no doubt that a consistent application of global banking 
regulation is the way forward to ensure global financial stability, there have 
admittedly been challenges where the application of global banking 
regulations in Africa is concerned307. These challenges have largely been due 
to a lack of funds, human resources and IT technical expertise to implement 
international financial standards308. 
It is submitted that this could be one of the reasons why Ricardo Gottschalk 
and Stephany Griffiths-Jones find that even though 71% of their respondents 
from Africa309 expressed an intention to implement Basel 2, only Mauritius and 
Namibia had fully implemented Basel 2310. 
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Although global banking regulations enhance global financial stability, it is 
submitted that the maintenance of adequate capital levels by a bank is not 
sufficient in itself to guarantee financial stability. Acharya finds that the 
international convergence of capital adequacy regulation is a desirable 
outcome which should be ‘accompanied by standardisation of closure 
policies’311.  While efforts are continually being made towards a global bank 
insolvency regulatory framework, such a framework may arguably still be a 
long way off as the countries involved try to reach a common agreement in 
the face of perhaps deeply entrenched and divergent national bank insolvency 
regulations. 
Majority of respondent banks agreed that the international convergence of 
banking regulations was desirable however the adoption statistics of Basel 2 
by African countries is not representative of this fact. 
3.7 Compliance of Basel Regulations in Africa (Ghana & Kenya) 
Although Ghana and Kenya are still yet to fully implement Basel 2, it is fair to 
say that some level of implementation has already taken place in both 
jurisdictions312. While Kenyan banks have been reported313 to be currently 
implementing some provisions of Basel 2 in relation to the quality of bank 
assets as well as provisions relating to capital adequacy, commercial banks in 
Ghana have already implemented314 the standard approach in relation to 
credit risk measurement under Basel 2. 
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It is submitted that there is a distinct possibility that African countries will 
adopt a ‘wait and see’ attitude and consider the implementation of Basel 3315 
instead, thus by-passing the full implementation of Basel 2. Should this occur, 
it is further submitted that adoption of Basel 3 by African countries who have 
still not fully adopted Basel 2 would have been influenced by South Africa’s 
adoption of Basel 3 by virtue of its G20 membership. 
There is absolutely no doubt that a consistent and uniform application of 
Basel Accords would be most desirable316, however it is submitted that until 
the challenges that African countries usually experience regarding the 
adoption of the Basel Banking Accords are addressed, any future 
implementation of Basel 3 in Africa or for the purposes of this thesis Ghana 
and Kenya, will be inconsistent from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
3.8 Why Countries adopt the Basel Accords 
In an article written by Daniel Ho317, he tries to investigate what compels 
countries to implement the Basel Accord (Basel 1).  From a dataset of 107 
countries, Daniel Ho made the observation that although Basel 1 was at the 
time of conception signed by the then G-10 countries (despite being soft law 
and therefore not legally binding or enforceable), it has since been adopted by 
over 100 countries globally318. 
Ho points out that although Basel 1 initially set out to regulate internationally 
active banks, virtually all countries had implemented Basel 1 since 1988.  This 
according to Kern Alexander319 is due to the fact that regardless of Basel 1 
regulations being part of international soft law and as a result, not legally 
binding or enforceable, they are more than capable of exerting great influence 
over the attitudes and behaviours of countries and organisations320. 
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Kern Alexander further suggests that compliance by States may be due to 
international pressures from certain organisations that have been established 
by international treaty and to which these States are all signatories to. The 
IMF, World Bank, WTO and IOSCO amongst others are some of the 
organisations through which the Basel regulations are enforced.  He explains 
further that this pressure is channelled by the IMF and World Bank through 
their Article IV surveillance programme321 and particularly through their Article 
V conditionality programme322. 
The Article V conditionality programme according to Kern Alexander is usually 
linked to the IMF Financial Assessment Programmes which details other 
conditions IMF member states are required to adhere to. Thus if membership 
of the IMF puts an obligatory requirement on member states to adopt the 
Basel regulations, then it is my opinion that African member states of the IMF 
will be under a perpetual obligation to adopt these soft international banking 
and finance regulations. It is submitted, that this obligation on African member 
states will not only arise by virtue of their membership, but also because 99% 
of African States are not self-sufficient and are constantly borrowing money 
from these organisations and as such have no choice but to comply with the 
conditions attached. 
It is also submitted that it is on the basis of these ‘bullying tactics’ that African 
countries have either implemented Basel 2 or expressed an intention to do so 
and it is likely that the future implementation of Basel 3 by African countries 
will follow a similar adoption pathway.  Since the implementation of the Basel 
regulations has always been spearheaded by EU member states that are also 
members of the G20 in a bid to lead by example, it is quite ironic that 
decisions taken by the members of the G20 with little or no input by African 
countries should be made applicable to African States by virtue of their 
membership of some international organisation and/or being signatory to an 
international treaty.  
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With the coming into effect of BaseI 3323, all member states of the G20 have 
vowed to implement this new international banking regulation in their 
respective national laws and South Africa the only African country with 
membership of the G20 has also begun the implementation of Basel 3. 
In spite of the constant international pressure that most African countries have 
faced in the past where the implementation of Basel 1 and Basel 2 are 
concerned, a few African countries have either only just recently implemented 
Basel 2324 (i.e. well outside the time-frame for implementation) or are even yet 
to implement Basel 2. This begs the question that if Basel 2 proved to be a 
challenge in terms of its implementation in Africa, then there is a likelihood 
that Basel 3 will equally present challenges to the African continent in terms of 
its uniform application or implementation in the future. 
With South Africa already having begun the implementation of Basel 3, the 
fate of Africa in terms of its future implementation has arguably been sealed.  
The suggestion by Iwa Salami, that banking regulators in frontier markets may 
implement Basel 3 in order to send a message that the banking regulatory 
standards are on a par with international standards and not weaker, in the 
hope of attracting potential investors325 is flawed in the light of the evidence326 
provided by Kern Alexander. The flaw in Iwa Salami’s argument above is 
exposed when the question is posed that why would African countries 
voluntarily implement Basel 3 banking regulations to attract investors when it 
will be costly to do so? 
Although there seems to be conclusive evidence that the international 
convergence of banking regulations is desirable, it has often been argued, 
that a fundamental reason attributable to the lack of success in the 
harmonisation of banking regulations on a global level scale, is the fact that 
these global regulations are generally regarded as guidelines or soft law327 
which do not have the force of law and as a result cannot be properly 
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enforced or effectively incorporated into national law for it to have legislative 
efficacy. 
It is submitted however, that within the African region, the issues likely to 
affect compliance with the Basel laws and are often cited by African countries, 
are the high cost of implementation or adoption of the Basel regulations; and 
the lack of resources i.e. human or physical to implement it.  
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter concludes with the submission that financial globalisation and 
the steady increase in pan-African banking have contributed in bringing to the 
fore the importance and relevance of harmonisation of banking regulations to 
banks in Africa. 
While attempts at harmonisation of African regional banking regulations 
continue (albeit at a slow pace), it is further submitted that such attempts 
should not detract from the overall importance and relevance of harmonisation 
in international banking regulations. Also, the author suggests that the over-
riding factor in the argument in favour of an international convergence in 
banking regulations is the potential reduction in regulatory arbitrariness, thus 
ensuring an increase in the degree of consistency in the application of 
banking regulation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In the next chapter, the 
author highlights the attempts by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision to achieve harmonisation of banking regulations through the 
application of capital adequacy principles introduced under the Basel Core 
Principles on Banking Supervision.  
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CHAPTER 4  
BANK CAPITAL REGULATION AND CAPITAL ADEQUACY 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the author highlights the evolutionary transition of the concept 
of capital adequacy. It is submitted that for banks to be adequately 
capitalised, the role that bank capital plays ought to be addressed. Atuk K. 
Shah suggests328 that the introduction of the 25 Basic Core Principles on 
Banking by the BCBS is a recognition by the BCBS that harmonisation of 
banking regulations could be achieved if ‘standard rules’329 on capital 
adequacy were introduced. This chapter hence addresses the meaning of 
bank regulatory capital, its regulation and the development of the concept of 
capital adequacy.  
4.2 Importance of Bank Capital 
Bank capital is one of a number of factors often considered where the safety 
and viability of banks are concerned. Indeed as pointed out by Rosa Lastra330, 
it is represented by the letter ‘C’ in the acronym ‘CAMELS’331 which was 
coined in the USA and provides a form of guideline which a significant number 
of bank managers and regulators take into account when determining the 
soundness of a bank332. 
In a Report by the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs333, 
‘Bank Capital’ was defined as referring:  
‘to the part of the bank’s financing that comes from shareholder funds, 
subordinated debt, certain types of reserves and hybrid debt/equity 
instruments’334.  
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Due to the importance335 of banks it is absolutely vital that banks have enough 
capital (and liquidity), not only for the purpose of undertaking banking 
business with the view to make profits, but for the fundamental reason that the 
ability of bank capital to absorb losses, (both expected and arguably 
unexpected losses), is an important factor in ensuring depositors’ continued 
confidence in any given bank.  
Notwithstanding this, the lack of adequate bank capital could potentially result 
in the revocation of a bank’s license to operate as a business entity, and 
where such state of affairs result in bank insolvency, the consequences in 
most cases can be far-reaching, thus negatively impacting depositors, 
shareholders (both individual and institutional) and the economy336 at large.  
It is absolutely important to distinguish economic capital337 from regulatory 
capital338, which according to Agiwal are both arguably conceptually similar339.  
Lastra, on the contrary suggests that these two types of capital do not 
coincide340. Regardless of the mutual exclusiveness i.e. the distinctions or 
similarities between these two forms of capital, one thing is absolutely certain 
i.e. the original purpose for which the concept of economic capital was 
developed by banks has undergone a gradual change over the years. 
The shift in focus has been from a role or function as a: 
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‘tool for capital allocation and performance assessment’341…….. to 
applications that require accuracy in estimation of the level of capital 
(or risk), such as the quantification of the absolute level of internal 
capital needed by a bank’342. 
Greuning and Bratanovic343 suggest that bank capital ensures the continuing 
level of confidence that depositors have in banks is maintained due to its 
ability to absorb losses344. While this observation may be true to some extent, 
it is submitted that the level of confidence depositors may have in the capital 
levels of any given bank goes only as far as the disclosure of capital by a 
bank permits, eg say in any given Offering Circular that a bank might issue in 
the hope of attracting potential investors. 
It is further submitted that due to the externality factor of information 
asymmetry in banks and the fact that the capital (economic or regulatory) of a 
bank may fluctuate, it is inconceivable that depositors may be aware of such 
changes in capital positions for it to have any meaningful impact on the level 
of confidence they might have in a bank. Notwithstanding this view, it is also 
submitted that the confidence of depositors might be swayed either positively 
or negatively where pre-tax profits are announced year on year (a sign of a 
healthy bank) or where an announcement is made that a particular bank has 
been recapitalised (a sign of a struggling bank) respectively. 
Greuning, also suggests that bank capital is the ultimate deciding factor in any 
bank’s capacity to lend345. Again, it is submitted that this suggestion may not 
be entirely true, as the ability or capacity of a bank to lend is hinged on the 
level of leverage that the bank has already undertaken. During the recent 
global financial crisis, it was discovered that although some banks, particularly 
in Europe and perhaps elsewhere346 boasted of high capital assets in their 
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annual reports and banking/trading books, the true position was absolutely 
shocking as most banks were highly leveraged347 and had no room for 
manoeuvre. Thus it is submitted that too much leveraging had technically 
eroded their capital base albeit not evident on the balance sheet. 
This, amongst other factors discussed earlier in Chapter 1 contributed to the 
escalation in capital and liquidity shortage at the onset of the crisis. Another 
suggestion by Greuning that a bank experiencing capital shortage or high cost 
of capital ultimately loses out to its competitors in the banking industry348 
requires a degree of qualification. 
It is submitted that while there is no doubt that a bank experiencing capital 
shortage is likely to experience some depositor desertion (perhaps not on a 
very large scale as some depositors are inherently and without reason fiercely 
loyal), the level of desertion by depositors could potentially increase where 
banks experiencing a high cost of capital; unilaterally pass on such high costs 
to consumers (i.e. borrowers, depositors, shareholders etc) without explicit or 
tacit support from the market industry. 
In other words, if the high cost of capital is passed on by all banks within a 
particular jurisdiction to consumers, then the loss to other banks by way of 
competition will be minimised but only to the extent that the cost that is 
passed on to the consumer is not excessively high349. 
Finally, another attribute of capital suggested by Greuning which has arguably 
stood the test of time up until the global financial crisis is the idea that the 
purpose of capital is to provide financial stability in any given economy 
through the absorption of losses thus providing a level of protection to 
stakeholders, particularly depositors following bank insolvency. 
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4.3 Bank Capital Regulation 
Due to the role that bank capital plays and the level of its importance 
particularly with respect to the soundness of banks, the argument could be put 
forward that bank capital ought to be regulated. 
Santos350, suggests that the reasons why bank capital ought to be regulated 
can be attributed to three factors; the ever-important role that bank capital 
plays in promoting soundness in banks thus ultimately ensuring financial 
stability; that bank capital provides the allure of risk-taking incentives that 
banks cannot resist and end up undertaking; and finally, that bank capital 
plays a very important role in the corporate governance of banks and as such 
ought to be regulated. 
On the issue of financial stability, it was suggested by Diamond and Dybvig351 
that the aim of capital regulation was to enhance financial stability ‘which 
would otherwise be threatened in the event of widespread bank failures’352. 
This point raised by Diamond is indeed true and relevant but only to some 
extent. This is mainly because it is submitted that too much bank regulation 
and for that matter capital regulation has the potential to increase the 
unwanted scenario of shadow banking353 which has the tendency to 
undermine financial stability within any given jurisdiction. 
Lastra, however addresses the rationale for capital regulation from a different 
perspective. She suggests that capital regulation has become the main form 
of regulatory response which has been developed to counter the difficult 
practical issues that a ‘bank’s balance sheet structure’ presents354. Lastra 
however, qualifies this assertion by stating subsequently that ‘the use of 
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capital requirements as a regulatory tool is no panacea however. It is not a 
“cure” for all “the banking problems”’.355 
The three features which in her opinion characterises a bank’s balance sheet 
structure thus ultimately providing a source of ‘financial fragility and the cause 
of regulatory concern’ are, the issue of low cash to assets due to fractional 
reserve banking; excessive leverage activity resulting in low capital to assets 
ratio and finally the maturity mismatches that typically characterises bank 
lending in contrast to its assets. 
Thus, although the role of banks together with the capital they possess is very 
important on their own individual merit to warrant bank regulation, a distinct 
argument justifying the need for regulation of bank capital is arguably difficult 
to proceed on without it over-lapping the wider role of banks. This perhaps 
explains why the argument in support of the rationale for bank capital 
regulation presented by Lastra, seemed somewhat fused with the rationale for 
bank regulation. 
The Report by the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs in 
the author’s opinion ensured clarity was not in short supply when it suggested 
that the rationale for capital regulation emanated from the three purposes that 
bank capital serve. The Report suggested that firstly, bank capital exposes 
shareholders to the risk of bank failure and as a result, capital requirements 
are necessary to counter any potential negative impact that bank failures may 
have on them thus ultimately enhancing ‘good risk management practices’356. 
Secondly, the requirement on banks to ensure that an adequate level of 
equity-based Tier 1 capital is maintained to act as a buffer357 against bank 
insolvency, presents banks with risk-taking incentives which banks capitalise 
on to maximise their profits. Finally, due to the loss-absorption qualities 
provided by Tier 2 capital (non-equity) in support of the loss-absorption 
qualities provided by equity Tier 1 capital, in the possible event of a bank 
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failure, it becomes absolutely necessary for bank capital to be regulated to 
enable it fulfil its role and function efficiently. 
The Select Committee thus concluded that bank capital regulations were 
introduced primarily to ‘redress the natural tendency of banks to hold 
insufficient capital’358 through the undertaking of risk-taking incentives. 
Although this arguably represents the main justification for the regulation of 
bank capital, it is submitted that the ever-present problem of creative 
compliance359 underscores the continued justification for bank capital 
regulation, and ultimately bank regulation notwithstanding the distinct 
disadvantage where capital regulation may potentially exacerbate economic 
turbulence within regulated financial entities in a pro-cyclical way360. 
Having earlier established the distinction between economic capital and 
regulatory capital, it is absolutely important to stress that for regulatory bank 
capital to be classed as eligible, it must be capable of falling into two separate 
but fundamentally distinct categories, i.e. Going concern capital or Gone 
concern capital. 
In the publication ‘A regulatory response to the global banking crisis’361, Going 
concern capital was described as capital which was capable of absorbing 
losses while the firm continued to operate as a Going concern regardless of 
whether the firm was in a good state of financial health or experiencing 
financial stress, whereas Gone concern capital was referred to as capital 
capable of absorbing losses at a Gone concern stage thus ensuring or 
safeguarding the interests of depositors following bank insolvency. 
Thus whereas the components of economic capital encompass credit risk 
capital; market risk capital; operational risk capital; 
business/reputation/strategic risk capital; liquidity risk capital and interest rate 
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capital, economic capital may broadly be used362 in the following banking 
concepts i.e. capital adequacy; risk-based pricing; credit portfolio 
management; capital budgeting; strategic planning; target selling and risk-
based performance management. With this background insight, this thesis will 
dwell on the application of regulatory capital in respect of capital adequacy. 
4.4 Capital Adequacy 
Due to the role that banks play in society, daily exposure to risks remains a 
continuing and inherent part of banking business and business strategic 
planning. As a result of this, it is important for any bank to have a financial risk 
management set up in place to ensure that the level of capital held by a bank 
is commensurate to or adequately caters for the overall risks that a bank 
faces in the performance of its banking activities. This concept of ensuring 
that a bank has adequate or sufficient capital to address risks is what is 
commonly referred to as capital adequacy.  
The term or phrase capital adequacy has been referred to as: 
‘……………..the adequacy of a bank’s aggregate capital in relation to 
the risks which arise from its assets, its off-balance sheet transactions, 
its dealing operations and all other risks associated with its 
business’363. 
Prior to the concept of capital adequacy becoming embodied in Basel 1, 
banks existed in an era characterised by individual and inconsistent ways of 
addressing capital adequacy. 
In the early 1970s through to the early 1980s, banks understood the 
importance of the need to set aside capital which could be used to address 
the risks inherent in banking business. However, it took the occurrence of a 
series of banking and financial crises in the early 1980s to spark some kind of 
response from countries to formally address this issue. 
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Although the recognition of the importance of a formal capital adequacy 
framework might have been a direct consequence of the banking crises in the 
early 1980s, there is some degree of certainty in the author’s opinion that the 
ever-increasing role and importance of capital within a typical bank set up was 
also a contributing factor. 
This view notwithstanding, the pathway to the adoption of a minimum capital 
standard was initiated following a Bilateral Capital Agreement in 1985 
between the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom. This Bilateral Agreement 
eventually paved the way for members of the G10 to commence negotiations 
that ultimately resulted in the creation of the Basel Capital Accord in (1988). 
At the time, the rationale for the introduction of a capital adequacy framework 
was stated in paragraph 7 of the Accord as ‘…..to establish minimum levels of 
capital for internationally active banks’, however, this Accord was later 
adopted by over 120 countries world-wide364 including Ghana and Kenya. 
Throughout this period, capital adequacy evolved through the transition from 
the simple risk-weight system introduced under Basel 1 to a more risk-
sensitive approach towards the measurement of banking risks under Basel 2. 
This risk-sensitive approach under Basel 2 was preceded by the Market Risk 
Amendment in 1996 which gave banks the opportunity to apply their own 
internal models365 (on condition that the banking supervisory authorities gave 
their seal of approval) as opposed to the standard366 computation to assess 
risks in order to ascertain the regulatory capital requirement needed to be set 
aside for market risk. 
The platform created by the Market Risk amendment, with respect to the use 
of internal models by banks was broadened when Basel 2 was introduced in 
2004. This led to the introduction of risk-sensitive approaches towards the 
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computation of regulatory capital requirements under Basel 2, a framework 
which largely remains unchanged367 despite the introduction of Basel 3. 
According to an IOSCO Report dated 2006
368
, there are four different types369 
of approaches adopted by countries world-wide when implementing capital 
adequacy, which gives an insight into the fact that no standard and consistent 
definition of capital adequacy exists, and that different jurisdictions implement 
some form of capital adequacy process through one of the four approaches.  
This insight provided by the IOSCO Report gives credence to an earlier 
statement by Crosse and Hamsel in 1980 that ‘…..the adequacy of capital is a 
dynamic concept and it is influenced by the prevailing and expected economic 
conditions of the entire economy’370. 
Notwithstanding this, it is important for there to be a general consensus to the 
suggestion that for there to be an appropriate and effective measurement of 
capital adequacy, there must be consistency in the proper recognition and 
assessment of all elements of banking risk. 
4.4.1 Capital Adequacy – Basel Capital Accord (Basel 1) 
Even though the Basel Capital Accord introduced the means by which bank 
capital could be determined and measured and also a common standard 
applicable to the measurement of credit risk, it also epitomised the four 
fundamental principles which the BCBS wanted to introduce to counter the 
then prevailing issue of banking crises. 
The four fundamental principles encapsulated in the Basel Capital Accord 
established: 
 An attempt to provide a common and perhaps consistent definition of 
regulatory capital;  
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 A need for banks to hold a certain amount of capital based on a risk-
weight methodology approach, applicable to a bank’s assets from the 
on and off-balance sheet; 
 The development of a standard capital adequacy ratio against which a 
bank can assess its preparedness against credit risks; and 
 The importance of consolidated banking supervision towards banking 
groups i.e. a macro-prudential approach towards banking supervision. 
At the time, credit risk was perceived to be arguably the sole source of risk 
that banks faced as a result of their banking activities and this was evident in 
the fact that the 1988 Capital Accord only addressed the credit risks that 
banks were exposed to through their banking activities. 
Under the Capital Accord, bank assets were accorded a particular risk-
weighting on the basis of the category to which that particular asset had been 
grouped. This process involved grouping a bank’s asset into five (5) ‘risk-
buckets’371 depending on the type of asset and irrespective of whether the 
asset was on or off the balance sheet. See table 4.1 in Appendix 4.  
Once a risk allocation had been made, a capital charge would then be applied 
depending on which risk factor group the asset belonged to. 
Thus under Basel 1, the capital adequacy ratio for non-trading book items was 
represented by the equation: 
CAR               Tier 1 + Tier 2 Capital ≥ 8% 
              Risk-Weighted Assets + Off-balance sheet items 
For credit risks emanating from a bank’s off-balance sheet exposure, the 
credit risk was first assessed through the application of a credit conversion 
factor (See table 4.2 in Appendix 4) to the off-balance sheet liability, 
instrument or transaction, after which the corresponding capital charge would 
be duly applied. 
Thus on the basis of this credit risk assessment methodology, banks were 
obliged to hold regulatory capital of at least 8% of the applicable risk-weighted 
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asset, of which 4% was to be applied to the ‘core’ element of capital described 
as Tier 1 capital.  
Following a surge in the trading of securities and credit derivatives by banks 
together with the growth of global financial markets (and even some local 
financial markets in developed countries), banks became exposed to market 
risks372. In recognition of this development, the BCBS in January 1996, 
introduced an additional capital charge to address market risks, however it 
soon became evident that while Basel 1 was quite straight forward and easy 
to comprehend particularly with respect to the allocation of risks to different 
bank assets, this process of risk methodology was deeply flawed and hence 
sealed the fate of the Basel Accord. 
The Basel Accord was criticised and the suggestion made that ‘the original 
scope of the Accord was too restrictive, and that the original methodology for 
quantifying risk was deficient’373. 
This restriction resulted in the farcical situation where borrowers were 
grouped in the same credit exposure category, irrespective of the borrower’s 
credit rating374. Another issue of grave concern which Saidenberg and 
Schuerman pointed out was that the Capital Accord provided a recipe for 
regulatory capital arbitrage particularly because a typical on-balance sheet 
loan was subjected to a relatively higher capital requirement in contrast to an 
off-balance sheet loan belonging to the same borrower. This was the case 
even though such difference could potentially be of little significance as a 
result of financial engineering. 
Despite early warning signs that the Capital Accord was flawed, the BCBS 
had to reach a general consensus that the risk methodology applied under the 
1988 Basel Capital Accord in the determination of regulatory capital was 
generally too broad. In light of this, Constantinos Stephanou and Juan Carlos 
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Mendoza suggested in their article375 that the flaws could be grouped into four 
main problem areas:  
Box 1  
1. Inadequate and insufficient risk determining profiles for 
individual loans 
Here, the authors point out that the capital charge allocated to all 
types of corporate exposure regardless of the credit rating of the 
borrower was evidence in itself that the risk-weighting methodology 
introduced by the Capital Accord did not in any way acknowledge or 
incorporate the fact that different counterparties had different risk 
profiles376.  
2. No recognition accorded to diversity in loan portfolios 
The authors suggest that Basel 1 provided no difference in its capital 
treatment of a highly-diversified loan portfolio which was bound to 
pose less risk, from a significantly less-diversified loan portfolio 
which was undoubtedly concentrated, thus more risky. 
3. Lack of a true appreciation of Sovereign risk 
The attractiveness in bank lending to OECD377 governments as a 
result of no regulatory capital charge arising for such lending act, 
was largely due to the lack of foresight in appreciating the fact that 
different member countries of the OECD had different credit ratings. 
Also, the fact that claims to ‘national central governments’ attracted a 
risk-weighting of zero, played into the hands of numerous banks 
particularly banks in developing countries by providing them with an 
opportunity to flout the fundamental principle of risk-diversification 
applicable to banking or bank exposures. A number of banks took 
advantage by providing huge loans to their Governments or 
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Sovereigns with a number of State-owned enterprises often directly 
or indirectly acting as a conduit for such lending.  
4. Lack of an all-round appreciation of risk measurement and 
prudential management due to few incentives 
This final problem area identified by Stephanou and Mendoza, 
suggest that a bank with a relatively high capital adequacy ratio often 
provided a misguided impression that other types of risk378 had been 
taken into consideration prior to the calculation of the capital 
adequacy ratio of the bank. The total lack of recognition of these 
other risks by banks did little to enhance an awareness of the 
importance of risk identification and measurement in the process of 
risk governance.  
4.4.2 Capital Adequacy under Basel 2 
In 2004, the BCBS published the final version of Basel 2379 which was meant 
to replace Basel 1. Although a likely reason for the introduction of Basel 2 
might have arguably been due to financial innovation which encouraged 
banks to succumb to risk mitigation practices, the inherent flaws within the 
Capital Accord undoubtedly also played a crucial and important role. At the 
time of publication of Basel 2, the BCBS acknowledged that380: 
 Capital ratios were not an absolute indicator of the soundness of a 
bank;  
 The risk-weighting methodology introduced by the Basel Capital 
Accord was obsolete and ‘crude’ and completely ignored the credit 
rating of the borrower or the counterparty; 
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 The insensitivity of the risk-weighting methodology towards credit risk, 
created an unwanted incentive381 for banks to engage in the 
exploitation of the different roles that economic capital and regulatory 
capital played in the overall capital position of a bank; 
 The credit risk mitigation opportunities created through the use of credit 
derivatives were not taken into consideration under the Basel Capital 
Accord; and 
 Investment by banks in the development of accurate and adequate risk 
assessment processes were lacking due to lack of sufficient incentives.  
Thus the introduction of Basel 2 was based on the overall objective of the 
BCBS to ‘strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking 
system’382 through the adoption and application of an improved risk 
management system. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Basel 2 replaces the Basel Capital Accord, Basel 
2 retains the 4 fundamental principles introduced under the Basel Capital 
Accord. It manages to achieve this feat despite introducing changes at the 
same time. The fundamental changes introduced by Basel 2, were: 
Box 2  
1. The introduction and adoption of external credit ratings in the 
process where counterparty risk weights aligned to credit risk are 
determined using the Standardised Approach; 
2. The ability of banks (subject to the satisfaction of  a number of 
requirements) to apply their individual internal credit ratings in the 
computation of capital charges in complete contrast to the 
standardised approach mentioned above; 
3. Increased awareness of the use of credit risk mitigation processes 
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such as credit derivatives and collateral, to ensure that capital 
charges for some of these products are increased to help address 
the issue of regulatory capital arbitrage; 
4. The introduction of certain provisions designed to address the 
concept of securitisations; 
5. The recognition of Operational Risk, and the introduction of a 
capital charge applicable to such risk; and 
6. An enhancement in the requirement for market disclosure. 
Thus these fundamental changes in unison represented a complete departure 
from the overly simplified risk approach methodology under the Basel Capital 
Accord. Despite these changes adding to the complexity of Basel 2, the 
changes introduced a more robust risk assessment process which ensured 
that the appropriate capital charge was applied to an asset whose risk profile 
accurately matched 383 the capital charge. 
The regulation and supervision of banks under Basel 2 is driven by a 3 pillar384 
structured approach, of which while maintaining a level of individuality are to 
some degree over-lapping and mutually inter-dependent towards the 
attainment of the overall objective of an enhancement in the regulation and 
supervision of banks. 
Pillar 1:  Pillar 1 under Basel 2, encompasses the minimum capital 
requirement which banks ought to adhere to and at 8% of risk-weighted 
assets remains largely unchanged385 from the Basel Capital Accord. Under 
this pillar, Basel 2 also introduces new rules applicable in the calculation of 
risk-weights for all kinds of loans and sets out a requirement for capital to be 
held towards ‘Operational Risk’. 
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Pillar 2:  Pillar 2 under Basel 2, represents the supervisory process which 
banking supervisors are required to implement to ensure that internal 
processes within banks are adequately monitored thus enhancing an accurate 
risk assessment for the purposes of capital adequacy. 
Pillar 3:  Pillar 3 under Basel 2, introduces new provisions aimed at 
enhancing disclosure requirements on banks in an attempt to promote market 
discipline. 
4.4.3 Bank Capital under Basel 2 
The characteristics and functions of bank regulatory capital under Basel 2, 
remain unchanged from the features of regulatory capital under the Basel 
Capital Accord hence the decision by the author to discuss regulatory capital 
under this title. 
Thus, with respect to the capital adequacy ratio equation, the most significant 
change introduced by Basel 2 was the replacement of the ‘crude’ risk- 
weighting methodology approach under the Capital Accord with a more risk-
sensitive approach. This new risk-sensitive approach towards risk 
measurement includes three different methods of calculating credit risk as 
well as three or four methods applicable in the determination of the capital 
charge for operational risk. 
Although these changes resulted in an increase in the complexity of Basel 2, it 
most importantly provided a much needed departure from the overly simplified 
risk methodology under the Basel Capital Accord.  
Under the Basel Capital Accord, the BCBS agreed that capital had to 
predominantly consist of paid-up share capital/common stock and disclosed 
reserves as these components of capital386 were always available in an 
insolvency situation to fulfil a bank’s obligations towards its shareholders and 
other creditors. They also took cognisance of the existence of other types of 
capital387, such as capital with both equity and debt-like features (hybrid 
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capital), quasi-capital and other reserves that were also potentially available 
to a bank towards the satisfaction of its obligations during insolvency. 
To distinguish between the different types of capital (on the basis of quality 
and individual characteristics, the Basel Capital Accord introduced a 3 tier 
system of capital of which components of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital have been 
further distinguished. Thus under Tier 1 of Basel 1, banks were under an 
obligation to have a certain minimum level of capital which represented core 
capital. Such capital had to be ‘subordinated and perpetual’ and ensured that 
holders of such capital were the last to claim any distributions in an insolvency 
(subject to prior payments to other claimants), and also were not entitled to 
any accumulation of dividends/distributions previously unpaid. 
Thus core capital which was effectively Tier 1 capital had to consist of at least 
50% of available regulatory capital with the remaining 50% of regulatory 
capital which included ‘quasi-capital’ making up Tier 2 and Tier 3. See table 
4.3 in Appendix 4. 
The Basel Capital Accord also makes provision for the deduction388 of certain 
intangibles from capital. Whereas Goodwill389 is deducted from Tier 1 Capital, 
other intangibles are expected to be deducted from total regulatory capital390. 
When Basel 2 was introduced, one of the key concepts of the Basel Capital 
Accord that was adopted by Basel 2 was the definition and components of 
capital. However, as a result of a surge in the use of innovative capital 
instruments by banks in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the BCBS had to 
reiterate in a press release in October 1998, the need for capital instruments 
in Tier 1 i.e. Core capital to be of a permanent nature and capable of 
absorbing losses on a going-concern basis391. 
Through this press release, the BCBS highlighted the growing importance of 
innovative capital instruments but nonetheless underscored the greater 
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qualities of common stock, disclosed reserves or retained earnings by stating 
that it was absolutely crucial for Innovative Capital Instruments not to exceed 
15% of the entire Tier 1 capital. 
While it is submitted that this small allocation of capital was set aside by the 
BCBS to preserve the loss absorption qualities of Tier 1 through the retention 
of a larger proportion of the capital base, Greuning is more specific by 
suggesting that the contents of the press release pointed to the fact that the 
components of Tier 1 capital: 
 Formed a crucial element of capital; 
 Were of a permanent nature and enabled a bank to absorb its losses 
on a going concern basis; 
 Did not provide holders of such capital with the right to claim 
distributions before payments to other claimants had been made in an 
insolvency situation; 
 Represented a yardstick with which the markets could assess the 
soundness of a bank in terms of its capital adequacy levels; 
 Provided a level of stability in terms of market discipline as the voting 
rights inherent in common shares discouraged potential abuse by 
holders; and 
 Remained to a large extent, the dominant component of Tier 1 capital. 
4.4.3.1 Basel 2 (Tier 1 Capital) 
As mentioned earlier, the definition and components of capital under Basel 1 
continues to apply however, under Basel 2 innovative capital instruments 
occupy the upper echelons of Tier 1, implying therefore that the remaining 
components of Tier 1 capital under Basel 2, consists of shareholder’s equity, 
i.e. issued and paid-up ordinary shares and common stock that are 
permanent in nature; preference shares which are perpetual but non-
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cumulative and disclosed reserves392. This is also applicable to the 
composition of Tier 1 capital for any banking group under Basel 2. 
The inclusion or exclusion of capital contributions as part of Core Tier 1 
capital, according to Greuning depends on whether the contribution was made 
in cash or kind393. He suggests further that contributions in kind were 
sometimes subjected to a certain limitation by banking regulators i.e. such 
limitation often being expressed as a percentage value of the entire Tier 1 
capital. 
These limitations according to Greuning were sometimes imposed by bank 
regulators in the knowledge that contributions in kind were subject to 
fluctuations in their value which ultimately made them unreliable in terms of 
quantifying the exact contribution made. In such circumstances, banking 
regulators could demand that such ‘contributions in kind’394, seek independent 
evaluation by an unconnected third-party before being considered as part of a 
bank’s capital. 
4.4.3.2 Basel 2 (Tier 2 Capital) 
The components of Tier 2 capital under Basel 2 are usually ‘quasi-capital’ and 
as such do not share the same characteristic of ‘permanence’ that underpins 
Core Tier 1 capital. Examples of components of Basel 2 Tier 2 capital are 
undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions/general loan-
loss reserves, hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments and subordinated term 
debt. The inclusion of these components as Tier 2 capital is subject to certain 
limitations within the Basel Capital Accord. 
(i) Undisclosed reserves 
This form of quasi-capital consists of the post-tax surplus which a bank makes 
from retained profits and may be eligible for inclusion as Tier 2 capital 
provided such a practice is acceptable by the banking supervisor within the 
bank’s jurisdiction. 
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Notwithstanding the absence of undisclosed reserves on the balance sheet, it 
is expected that undisclosed reserves are of such high quality, akin to that of 
disclosed reserves395. As a result, undisclosed reserves are permitted to be 
included in Tier 2 capital on condition that its availability to meet 
unforeseeable future losses is not fettered with any encumbrance or liability396 
(ii) Revaluation Reserves 
Revaluation reserves may accrue following the revaluation of immovable 
assets or fixed assets, eg premises of a bank. Revaluations of such kind may 
be done to reflect fluctuations in the value of such asset and are reflected on 
the balance sheet. 
Accrual of revaluation reserves may also occur through ‘latent’397 revaluation 
of equity securities that have been the subject of long-term holdings in 
comparison to its historic cost at the time of acquisition. Following the latent 
revaluation of equity securities, a discount398 may be applied to reflect the 
difference between the current market value and the historic value399 after 
which only 50% of the final amount may be made part of Tier 2 capital. 
(iii) General provisions loan loss reserves 
Where provisions or reserves are set aside or allocated to unidentifiable 
losses that are yet to materialise, such provisions or reserves do qualify for 
inclusion as Tier 2 capital and may be subsequently appropriated towards the 
covering of such future losses when they indeed occur. However, any general 
provisions/loan loss reserves qualifying for inclusion in Tier 2 capital, is 
subjected to a cap of 1.25 percentage points of the weighted-risk assets to 
which such provisions/loss may relate400. 
In Ghana, all banks prior to receiving their license to operate as banks are 
required to deposit a certain amount of money, known as the statutory reserve 
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with the Bank of Ghana (the Banking Regulator/Supervisor). While this does 
not technically form part of disclosed reserves, its purpose is to make such 
funds available to absorb losses should they occur. It has been observed that 
because Ghana does not operate a deposit scheme in the traditional sense, 
this statutory reserve requirement plays a similar role to a deposit insurance 
framework albeit not explicitly. 
(iv) Hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments 
Hybrid capital instruments possess both equity and debt-like characteristics 
and may be eligible for inclusion as Tier 2 capital, provided they are paid-up in 
full, unsecured and subordinated in nature. They are generally non-
redeemable by the holder unless prior consent has been provided by the 
supervisory authority. 
Hybrid capital instruments may also be applied to absorb losses even as the 
bank continues to operate as a going concern. Where there exists an 
obligation on the part of a bank to make payment401 on a capital instrument, 
such an obligation may be deferred on condition that lack of profitability within 
the bank makes it unable to honour such payment. 
Following the banning of hybrid capital under Basel 3, hybrid capital 
instruments are being gradually phased out through grandfathering and are 
expected to be completely phased out by 2023. This implies that cumulative 
preference shares, possessing both equity and debt-like characteristics would 
be gradually phased out. Thus with the exception of South Africa, it is 
envisaged that foreign banks in Africa that have their home jurisdiction in 
countries that have begun the implementation of Basel 3 may also gradually 
phase out any of such hybrid capital including perpetual subordinated debt 
and preference shares from their capital portfolio which may ultimately impact 
other banks especially in Africa and for that matter Ghana and Kenya. This is 
because the market for such capital products in jurisdictions where foreign 
banks own a large proportion by way of market capitalisation and or asset 
share would begin to dwindle and gradually become non-existent. 
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(v) Subordinated term debt 
This consists of unsecured, subordinated debt capital instruments with a 
maturity date exceeding at least 5 years. In the last 5 years prior to reaching 
maturity, and prior to its inclusion in Tier 2 capital, amortisation will occur, 
where a cumulative discount of 20%402 is applied thus acknowledging the 
receding value of the subordinated debt capital instrument. 
Subordinated term debt is only available to absorb losses where the bank has 
become a gone concern i.e. no longer viable and has ceased trading, and as 
such, when included in Tier 2 capital, cannot be allowed to exceed 50% of 
core capital i.e (Tier 1 capital). 
4.4.3.3 Basel 2 - Tier 3 Capital 
Tier 3 capital may consist of short-term repayable subordinated debt with a 
maturity date of not less than two (2) years. It is used to address market risks 
that may arise from the trading book, as well as risks arising from both 
banking and trading books due to foreign exchange and commodities 
transactions. 
Tier 3 capital is subject to a ‘lock-in’ clause that prevents the payment of 
interest and principal if such payment will result in the bank’s total capital 
position falling short of the minimum capital stipulated. 
Thus in summary form, an overview of Basel 2 capital may be represented in 
broad terms in tables 4.3 and 4.4 in Appendix 4.  
With the abolishing of Tier 3 capital under Basel 3, banks already 
implementing Basel 3 in Basel 3 compliant jurisdictions may have to set aside 
capital from perhaps the capital conservation buffer, the countercyclical buffer 
or elsewhere towards market risks. 
4.5 Deductions under Basel 2 
Intangibles403 are subject to deduction from the components of capital under 
Basel 2 just as under the Basel Capital Accord. In addition to this, Basel 2 
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capital is also subject to the following deductions which fall under 5 broad 
categories:  
4.5.1 Investments in majority-owned securities and other financial 
subsidiaries404 
Where a bank owns investments in a majority owned securities firm or any 
other financial subsidiary(ies), Basel 2 requires that deductions of such 
investments are applied to the holding bank’s capital on condition that the 
holding bank is not consolidated to the subsidiary in which the investments 
are held.  Also, any third-party investments in the subsidiary of such holding 
bank will be deducted and where a capital shortfall is likely to arise following 
deductions from such subsidiaries, the amount of shortfall will be deducted 
from the capital of the holding bank itself405. 
4.5.2 Investments by banks in insurance subsidiaries406 
Where a bank owns investments in an insurance subsidiary, such investment 
is excluded or deducted from the holding bank’s capital. This also ensures 
that the insurance subsidiary is adequately capitalised on a stand-alone 
basis407, however, if the insurance subsidiary experiences a shortfall in its 
capital base, such shortfall(s) will have to be made good using capital from 
the holding bank’s capital.  
4.5.3 Significant minority-owned investments408 
Where a bank owns significant but minority-owned investments in other 
banking entities, securities firms and other financial entities409 at any given 
time, deductions are applied to the capital of the holding bank. A threshold 
level may be applicable to deductions under circumstances of which 
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determination of such ‘cap’ level would be the responsibility of relevant 
national supervisors410. 
4.5.4 Significant investments in commercial entities411 
Where a bank has individual investments in commercial entities exceeding 
15% of the investing bank’s capital, such excess investment would be 
deducted from the investing bank’s capital. However, where the bank 
possesses investments in multiple commercial entities, such investments 
would be aggregated and where this exceeds 60% of the investing bank’s 
capital, then deductions would be applied to the bank’s capital in relation to 
any excess level of investments. 
4.5.5 Investments in unconsolidated entities 
Where deductions become applicable to investments by banks in 
unconsolidated entities, Part (VI) paragraph 37 of Basel 2 states that 50% of 
such investment would be deducted from Tier 1 capital and the remaining 
50% from the Tier 2 capital of the investing bank. However, the limits 
applicable412 to investments of such nature, i.e. investments in unconsolidated 
entities would be applicable only after deductions of goodwill have already 
been made to the bank’s capital, but prior to the actual implementation of 
deductions to such investments. 
4.6 Credit risk and measurement under Basel 2 
The introduction of a new risk-sensitive approach towards risk measurement 
under Basel 2 was arguably the most significant of the fundamental changes 
ushered in by Basel 2. The overly simplified risk-weighted methodology i.e. 
the standard approach for credit risk measurement under Basel 1 was 
replaced by a more robust yet complex system of risk measurement which 
sought to ensure that the capital charge calculated for a given risk-weighted 
asset accurately matched the risk profile of that particular asset. 
Underpinning this new risk-sensitive approach was the introduction of 
External Credit Ratings Agencies whose role it was to assess the credit risk of 
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the counterparty and assign to the latter, a ‘risk-bucket’ or ‘credit quality steps’ 
instead of the old risk-weighting system under Basel 1. Likewise, the 
recognition of operational risk as a real risk under the market risk amendment 
by the BCBS necessitated the addition of a capital charge requirement for 
risks that fell under this category. 
Whereas Basel 2 introduced the 3 pillar structure under which banking 
regulation and supervision is conducted by different regulatory bodies world-
wide413, an analysis of the risk-sensitive approach introduced by Basel 2 falls 
under pillar 1 of the 3 pillar framework i.e. the minimum capital requirement 
framework. Bearing this in mind, it is only logical that this thesis seeks to 
make pillar 1 the focal point of the ensuing discussion particularly in relation to 
the concept of capital adequacy. 
Notwithstanding this statement of intent, occasional references may be made 
to pillar 2 i.e. the pillar that deals with banking supervision and thus 
subsequently the individual and collective internal capital adequacy processes 
of the commercial banks that participated in this research. Under Basel 2, the 
pillar 1 structure retains the Basel 1 minimum capital requirement of 8% of 
risk-weighted assets. This capital requirement is mandatory and allows banks 
to adequately cater for all banking risks, particularly the three (3) main types 
of risk which banks face under pillar 1. These three risks are credit risk, 
market risk and operational risk. For each of these risks, Basel 2 sets out risk 
measurement approaches which enable the appropriate capital charges to be 
set aside. 
4.6.1 Credit Risk  
Credit risk is referred to by Constantinos Stephanou and Juan Carlos 
Mendoza in their article414 as:  
‘………...traditionally defined as default risk, i.e. the risk of loss from a 
borrower/counterparty’s failure to repay the amount owed (principal or 
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interest) to the bank on a timely manner based on a previously agreed 
payment schedule’.415 
Basel 2 introduces three (3) risk measurement approaches in respect of credit 
risk, namely the standardised approach, foundation internal ratings-based 
approach (FIRB) or the advanced IRB approach (AIRB). 
4.6.1.1 Standardised Approach 
This approach, although similar to the standard approach under Basel 1, 
differs from Basel 1 in that it adopts greater risk sensitivity. This heightened 
risk sensitivity is attained due to the use of credit ratings provided by external 
credit assessment institutions (ECAIs). These credit ratings are then used to 
determine the applicable risk-weights when determining the capital charge for 
credit risk. 
Although the concept of risk-weighted assets is still retained, (i.e. where the 
level of exposure of a particular asset is multiplied by a risk-weight assigned 
to a particular counterparty), the main difference here is that the risk-weight of 
the counterparty is now determined by the external credit rating provided by 
the ECAI with respect to that counterparty over a period of time416. 
Notwithstanding the ever-present prospect that financial institutions in Ghana 
and Kenya face of having their credit ratings determined by external credit 
institutions outside Africa, this new risk-sensitive approach represented a 
departure from the old approach under Basel 1, where counterparties were 
grouped into risk-buckets regardless of their individual credit quality417. It 
ensured that the capital charges computed were reflective of the credit risks 
posed by the counterparty. The standardised approach applies to banks418 
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that have not sought permission from banking supervisors within their 
jurisdiction to apply the internal ratings-based approach. Its application 
however depends on whether the counterparty risk weight is being computed 
due to a sovereign exposure or a bank.  
i. Sovereign Exposure419 
There are two (2) methods used to determine counterparty risk-weights 
applicable to sovereign exposures. 
First Method 
Counterparty risk weight determined on the basis of the external credit 
rating of the Sovereign. 
This method is adopted by national banking supervisors where exposures are 
in the local currency and are accorded a low risk weight. 
Thus, the national banking supervisor may apply a lower risk-weight to the 
sovereign exposure where the exposure has been funded and denominated in 
the local currency.  See table 4.5 in Appendix 4. 
Second Method 
Counterparty risk weight provided by national export credit agencies 
(ECAs). 
ECAs under the auspices of the OECD’s ‘Arrangement on Guidelines for 
Officially Supported Export Credits’420 publish risk scores for different 
countries which are then used by banks to determine the risk weighting. See 
table 4.6 in Appendix 4. 
Thus any claim on a local public sector body will be regarded as though it was 
a claim on a bank within the same jurisdiction of that public sector body 
regardless of the option the banking regulator in that jurisdiction chooses for 
the bank(s). Alternatively, the banking supervisor within that jurisdiction may 
regard a claim on a public sector body as akin to a claim on the sovereign 
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within which the public sector body is located. The assumption421 here being 
that the credit risk posed by a public sector body is likely to be the same as 
the credit risk posed by the sovereign exposure.  
ii. Banks 
The methods applicable in the determination of counterparty risks weights for 
bank exposures are based on two options. Under option 1, every single bank 
incorporated in a given country will be assessed as having a risk weight one 
level below the risk weight applicable to that particular country or sovereign. 
Thus where claims are made on a bank whose sovereign is rated BB+ to B-, 
then the credit rating of the bank within the same jurisdiction will be assessed 
as below B-. However, a bank with a credit rating of B- or unrated will have a 
risk weight cap of 100% applied instead of 150%. See table 4.7 in Appendix 4.  
It is also unlikely an unrated bank would be treated worse than the ratings of 
the country in which the bank resides422.  
Under option 2, a bank is accorded a risk-weighting on the basis of the bank’s 
individual credit rating. Where a claim is described as a short-term claim423, a 
preferential risk424 weight may become applicable instead.  See table 4.8 in 
Appendix 4. 
 
iii. Corporates (See table 4.9 in Appendix 4). 
iv. Others 
Eg. Claims on Multilateral Development Banks and International 
Organisations425. 
Claims on e.g International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD 
– the World Bank), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Inter- 
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American Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, (EIB), the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Nordic 
Investment Bank (NIB), the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), the Council 
of Europe Development Bank (CEDB) and all international organisations such 
as the EC, IMF and BIS all have a credit risk weighting of zero. 
4.6.1.2 Internal Ratings Based (IRB) 
The rationale behind the introduction of the IRB according to the Basel 
Committee was to promote two fundamentally important objectives426, i.e. 
ensuring that capital charges were risk-sensitive and also providing some kind 
of impetus on the part of banks to enhance a reduction in risk through better 
credit risk management procedures. 
In the article published by Slaughter & May LLP, the authors suggest there 
are five key principles427 that underpin the IRB approach i.e.: 
Box 3  
1. Each exposure is grouped or classified according to the type of 
exposure428; 
2. The bank is required to provide its own figures for the probability of 
default (PD) using internal measurements for each individual 
exposure. However where the advanced method (i.e. Advanced 
IRB) is to be applied, estimates for the remaining risk components 
are to be supplied by the banking regulator; 
3. The risk charge is then calculated based on the risk weights 
allocated to each portfolio, and the values of the risk components 
which have already been determined; 
4. Certain minimum requirements ought to be satisfied before a bank 
may start to use the IRB approach; and 
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5. Banks are obliged to seek permission and obtain consent from 
their banking regulator prior to using either form of the IRB 
approach. 
Thus as highlighted in the fifth key principle above, the IRB approach can only 
be adopted and implemented by a bank after permission has been sought429 
from the banking regulator within the bank’s jurisdiction.  In order to be 
granted permission to implement the IRB approach, the bank ought to show 
that its systems are well suited and adapted430 towards the proper assessment 
and measurement of credit risks. 
The banking regulator may also grant permission where the bank can 
adequately demonstrate that it had already been using a similar risk 
measurement approach for the three years prior to the permission being 
sought. Following the granting of permission by the banking regulator, the 
permission-seeking bank is prevented431 from then reneging on its obligation 
to implement the IRB approach. 
Thus, in order for a bank to resort to the Standardised approach following the 
grant of permission, such bank will have to seek permission again to revert to 
the less onerous obligations under the Standardised approach. 
There are two ways by which a bank could implement the Internal Ratings-
Based Approach (IRB) i.e. the ‘Foundation Approach’ and the ‘Advanced 
Approach’. A bank implementing the IRB approach usually makes a 
distinction between the exposures by grouping the exposures into six distinct 
portfolios432. After the groupings have been made, the bank may then apply 
one of the two approaches to a particular portfolio of exposures. 
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(i) Foundation Approach 
Under the foundation approach, the bank is under an obligation to provide the 
probability of default (PD)433 for all the different exposures, the sum total of 
which is applied to the standard figures for ‘EAD’ and ‘LGD’ which are 
provided by the banking regulator in that jurisdiction and a capital charge 
calculated depending on the risk weight attached to each individual portfolio.  
Data for the risk component ‘Maturity’ (M) which is only applicable to the 
corporate portfolio is also provided by the banking regulator. The corporate 
portfolio has within it five sub-groupings434 based on different types of 
specialised lending. 
Surprisingly, out of the 22 commercial banks that took part in this research, 
only five banks (two from Ghana and three from Kenya) indicated that the IRB 
approach was implemented435. Of the remaining banks (i.e. 17 banks), 15 
used the standardised approach and two banks (from Ghana) failed to 
indicate which method was being used for credit risk measurement. One 
respondent bank from Ghana indicated that it used both standardised and 
advanced IRB depending on the type of risk. 
Special rules436 apply to exposures to a securitisation transaction and 
purchased receivables both of which remain outside the remit of this thesis. 
(ii) Advanced Approach 
Under the advanced approach, all the risk components are provided by the 
bank itself. Thus the bank provides its own internal estimates for PD, EAD 
and LGD using historical data acquired through experience.  This suggests 
that regardless of whether a bank uses the foundation IRB approach or 
advanced IRB approach, the bank will have to provide the PD, from its own 
internal measurements. 
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Although the main difference in the calculation of the capital charge between 
the foundation approach and the advanced approach depends on who 
supplies the data for the risk components, there are other factors to be 
considered. Under the advanced approach of the IRB, the capital charge is 
calculated using the same formula.  However, although both approaches rely 
on the continuous operation of the risk components i.e. probability of default 
(PD) and loss given default (LGD), the advanced approach relies on the extra 
element of ‘maturity of exposures’. 
Also, banks adopting the advanced approach are able to use their individual 
internal models for off-balance sheet assets as opposed to the use of credit 
conversion factors. This concession is applicable provided the exposure 
would not have attracted a credit conversion factor (CCF) of 100%437 under 
the foundation IRB approach. 
4.6.2 Minimum Requirements for IRB implementation438 
There are certain minimum requirements that banks must satisfy before using 
the IRB approach and these minimum requirements ought to be satisfied 
regardless of whether they use the foundation or advanced internal ratings-
based approach.  Box 4 below sets out the minimum requirements for the 
adoption of the IRB approach: 
Box 4  
1. The applicable IRB system must always take into consideration the 
risk of default of the borrower and the type of transaction to which 
the exposure relates to; 
2. The bank is expected to be assessed on its credit status, risk 
management processes and the process of internal capital allocation 
and its adherence to corporate governance principles prior to 
permission being granted for the adoption of IRB. Thus banks ought 
to be able to provide evidence indicating the internal use of a similar 
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credit risk measurement process for at least three years prior to the 
application to use the IRB; 
3. Internal ratings processes already in place at the banks must be 
overseen by independent bank personnel who are not responsible 
for lending money at the bank. Also, the ratings at the bank must be 
subjected to annual reviews; 
4. The bank’s internal rating system and processes must have already 
been approved by senior figures at the bank, e.g. directors who have 
a good understanding of the design and workings of such processes; 
5. The bank’s existing internal rating system must be subjected to an 
annual review, by the audit team of the bank. Likewise, national 
supervisors of banks must permit external auditors to conduct annual 
reviews of their systems and processes; and 
6. A pre-requisite for a bank aspiring to implement the foundation IRB 
or advanced IRB is for the bank to conduct a similar assessment or 
calculation using the Basel Capital Accord as its basis. 
4.7 Risk Components 
For the concept439 of IRB to be comprehended in its entirety, the components 
of risk that together provide the method for the computation of the charge for 
credit risk must be set out after which the function and seamless interaction of 
all components discussed. 
 
Box 5 
1. ‘Default’: A default arises where a borrower or an obligor is either 
unable to make good its full credit obligations to a bank following 
the expiration of 90 days after payment was initially due. 
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2. ‘Probability of Default’ (PD): This represents the probability that 
a borrower/obligor or a group of borrowers will default within 12 
months after their credit obligation to a bank arises. This likelihood 
of default is to some extent based on the risk characteristic of the 
borrower/obligor and the nature of the transaction involved. 
3. ‘Loss’ (L) or (EL): This amounts to economic loss, including 
loss(es) arising from market volatility and direct/indirect costs 
associated with the recovery of debt obligations. 
4. ‘Loss Given Default’ (LGD): This is a measurement representing 
the ratio of the loss on an exposure (arising from the default of the 
counterparty/borrower) to the outstanding amount at the time of 
default’440. This differs from the (PD) in that the (LGD) is dependent 
on the type of the transaction as the magnitude of the loss will 
depend on the type of exposure, (i.e. senior or subordinated)441 
and also on the issue of whether collateral was provided by the 
borrower. 
5. ‘Exposure at Default’ (EAD): This refers to the size or volume of 
a bank’s exposure at the time the borrower defaults. ‘EAD’ for on-
balance sheet transactions is often quite straightforward to 
ascertain, as this information may easily be obtained from the 
balance sheet442. For off-balance sheet transactions, figures 
representing ‘EAD’ will be provided by either the national banking 
supervisor or the bank itself depending on whether the bank uses 
the foundation IRB approach443 or the advanced IRB approach444. 
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6. ‘Maturity’ (M): This is indicative of ‘the contractual maturity of a 
bank’s exposure to a borrower’445 and is generally relevant where 
collateral has been provided by the bank for the exposure or where 
netting is being applied to the on-balance sheet transaction or 
exposure’. Another importance of ‘Maturity’ can be seen where the 
loan is a long-term loan or a short-term loan as long-term loans are 
generally considered to be more risky than short-term loans446. 
Risk-Weighted Assets 
Whereas the risk-weighting of assets and counterparty risks under the 
standardised approach was pre-determined by credit ratings provided by 
ECAIs, the capital charge for risk-weighted assets under the IRB approach is 
set out using the formula: 
RWA = Counterparty risk weight x EAD. 
Thus the capital charge is calculated by multiplying the risk-weight attributed 
to the type of exposure by the value of the bank’s exposure at the point where 
default occurs. The value of the EAD applicable to loans and on-balance 
sheet assets is thus the nominal value configured following the summing up of 
individual risk-weighted assets. 
For off-balance sheet items447, the capital charge is computed by first 
multiplying the counterparty risk weight by a credit conversion factor (CCF) 
the latter value of which depends on the duration448 of exposure applicable to 
the off-balance sheet items. 
4.8 Market Risk 
Although banks had previously applied statistical methodology in their 
assessment of market risk arising from different areas of the trading book, the 
Basel Committee agreed that this approach was not effective enough. 
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The fluctuations in the market prices of equity and debt instruments as well as 
in ‘foreign exchange and commodity positions’449 that banks experienced after 
the introduction of the Basel Capital Accord, prompted the Basel Committee 
to make amendments to the Basel Capital Accord. 
This process was initiated when the BCBS issued a proposal450 in April 1993 
aimed at addressing banks’ exposure to market risks. These markets had 
been identified by the BCBS as comprising of risks emanating from the 
trading book due to shifts in market prices of equity and debt instruments, off-
balance sheet positions and contracts, as well as foreign exchange risk. 
Thus after welcoming participants’ suggestions and opinions, the BCBS in 
1995 accepted that it was logical and prudent to extend the ambit of Basel 1 
to include market risks. This paved the way for the BCBS to introduce the 
Basel Committee’s Market Risk Amendment to the Capital Accord (the 
‘Amendment’) in 1996. 
The rationale for this amendment was to provide in explicit terms, a 
requirement for banks that were engaged to a significant degree in some form 
of business trading to compute a capital charge using the standardised 
approach or the internal models approach. 
This was deemed a necessity by the Basel Committee to address the risk of 
loss a bank potentially faced following a depreciation in value in the market 
prices of its equity and debt holdings. 
The Market Risk Amendment also established a distinction between financial 
instruments that were kept by banks on a short-term basis with the intention of 
gaining profit following a resale. Such assets, constituting the bank’s trading 
book were distinct from assets in the banking book, including off-balance 
sheet items. 
Thus there are two methods that can be employed under the Market Risk 
Amendment, to calculate the capital charge applicable for assets within the 
trading book as well as off-balance sheet items, i.e. the standardised 
approach as already discussed and the Internal Models-based approach. 
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4.8.1 Internal Models-based approach. 
Under the framework for the internal models-based approach, banks 
implementing this process were required to conform to qualitative and 
quantitative standards. The qualitative standard criteria required senior 
management within the bank to set up an independent risk management unit 
whose task it was to be closely involved with the daily risk management 
procedures of the bank. 
These processes were expected to be rigorous and robust and there had to 
be a system in place to ensure independent and regular assessment of the 
risk measurement processes with a view to ensure compliance. 
The quantitative standard on the other hand involved the daily computation of 
the ‘value-at-risk’ which involved using a ‘99th percentile, one tailed 
confidence interval’ measured over a period of 10 days during which the 
instrument or item is expected to be held in the trading book or on-off balance 
sheet. Thus a bank using the internal models-based approach was expected 
to conform to these standards and the capital charge set aside was based on 
data obtained from a ‘historical observation period’ of a minimum of 1 year. 
Applying such data, the capital charge was calculated using the greater value 
of either the previous day’s ‘value-at-risk’ measurement or the average figure 
representing the daily ‘value-at-risk’ figures for each of the previous 60 
business days which is then multiplied by a (factor)451. 
4.8.2 Market Risk Value-at-Risk Model (VaR) 
The rationale behind the introduction of the VaR model stems from the fact 
that exposures in the trading book were not expected to remain in the trading 
book on a long-term basis as the ultimate intention of the bank was to re-sell 
thus raking in some profit. The fact that a bank may hold these instruments on 
a short-term basis and not until maturity implies that the valuation of these 
instruments should not be conducted on a mark-to-market basis to ensure 
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effective management of market risk452. It is the nature of such valuation which 
necessitated the introduction of the VaR model. 
The VaR model was indeed more sophisticated than the standardised 
methodology previously applied and with it came a number of parameters 
within which it could be applied. 
Following the introduction of the VaR model, the Basel Committee 
encouraged banks to implement their own version of value-at-risk (VaR) 
within the parameters set by the Committee. The purpose of the VaR model 
was to ensure a consistent outcome in the calculation (by a bank) of the 
likelihood of loss that a bank could suffer in the entire trading book. 
The likelihood of consistency in outcome was perceived to be characterised 
by the VaR models’ ability to gauge price fluctuations of instruments in the 
respective markets and to measure the extent to which these market prices 
differed with other market prices. There are two types of VaR models 
introduced under the Market Risk amendment of the Basel Capital Accord, i.e. 
the ‘Variance/Covariance analysis’ approach and the ‘Historical Simulation’ 
approach. 
4.8.2.1 Variance/Covariance analysis approach 
Under this approach, historical data accumulated for price fluctuations within 
the market as well as price correlations resulting from market comparisons 
are inserted into a statistical formula which provides an estimation of the value 
of likely loss(es). 
An assumption is created that the normal distribution of price changes 
(fluctuations) allows a confidence level to be calculated for the bank i.e. an 
attempt to predict the value-at-risk figure over a fixed period of time with a 
degree of near certainty (e.g. 95% or 99% likelihood that this confidence level 
would not be exceeded). 
Finally this approach provides a formula for calculating the confidence level by 
multiplying a standard deviation derived from previous price fluctuations453 
with a scale factor. 
                                                 
452
 P Jackson, ‘Risk Measurement and Capital requirement for banks’, Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin May 1995 pp177-184. 
97 
4.8.2.2 Historical Simulation approach 
This approach is based on future potential losses which a bank expects to 
incur through the analysis of data relating to previous price454 fluctuations. 
This data analysis is used to assess the volatility in prices on the assumption 
that the instruments would be kept for the entire duration of two years. 
This method ensures the attainment of a 99% confidence level without 
supporting the assumption that price fluctuations are uniformly distributed, i.e. 
it indicates that loss was never exceeded in 99% of the time. 
A distinguishing feature455 between the two types of VaR approaches is the 
assumption of normal distribution of price changes under the variance/co-
variance approach. The fact that the historical simulation approach does not 
make such assumptions ensures that this approach often results in an 
arguably effective determination of the confidence level by ensuring that price 
volatility is not miscalculated. This is mainly because price volatility can be 
very extreme and as a result an assumption that volatility gives rise to a 
normal distribution is likely to give inaccurate and unreliable results. 
An advantage which the historical simulation approach has over the 
variance/co-variance analysis approach is that the former is able to accurately 
capture the entire risk within the trading book including risks from the option 
portfolio456. 
Although banks can implement either of the two approaches in their quest to 
set aside capital for market risk, the UK banks have been known to favour the 
historical simulation analysis approach.  It is submitted that the analysis of the 
responses provided by the commercial banks that participated in this research 
suggests that most of the commercial banks from both jurisdictions commonly 
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used the standardised approach as opposed to the Internal Models – based 
approach or the Market Risk Value-at-Risk (Model) VaR457 
This may be attributed to the fact that the risk management systems and 
framework in place within these banks are not sophisticated enough to 
support such updated risk management/measurement techniques. 
4.9 Operational Risk 
Operational risk is defined as ‘the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or 
failed internal processes, people and systems, or from external events’
458
. 
Andreas A. Jobst, suggests in his article459 that the definition of Operational 
Risk should include acts (neglected to be undertaken) which heightens the 
risk loss. 
Under the old Basel Capital Framework (Basel 1), the ‘one-size-fits all’ 
approach to risk ensured that capital set aside for credit risks were also 
utilised in respect of dealing with operational risk matters as and when they 
arose. Thus there was no formal recognition of operational risk as a credible 
and real source of risk worth mitigating against. 
However, in 1998, following a survey of the banking industry by the Basel 
Committee, it became evident from the published data, that there was an 
increasing awareness within the banking industry of the growing threat of 
other banking risks such as operational risk and that credit and market risks 
were not the only risks that banks faced. Greuning460 points out that the 
increasing use of sophisticated electronic systems in banking retail 
transactions in addition to the development of efficient and effective 
application of technology within the e-commerce industry (originally designed 
to minimise both credit and market risk) inadvertently played a significant role 
in the increase of operational risk. 
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Basel 2 therefore introduced new and specific provisions461 requiring banks to 
set aside capital for operational risk. This was another positive step462 taken 
by the Basel Committee towards the development of a regulatory framework 
designed to be more risk-sensitive than its predecessor i.e. Basel 1 Capital 
Accord. 
Today, there is a general recognition by all banks that losses suffered by 
banks world-wide may emanate from internal operational inadequacies or 
shortcomings that are usually predictable463 or on the contrary unpredictable 
events which at its most extreme, eg an act of God may be so huge and 
unimaginable. 
Jobst suggests that while losses arising from internal operational risk are due 
to the risk of ‘failure of people, processes and technology’464 during the 
performance of business operations465, losses from external operational risk 
may arise as a result of the entry of a business competitor thus necessitating 
a revision in business plan or strategy, political or regulatory upheaval, acts of 
God, terrorist acts, acts of vandalism and ‘other such factors that are outside 
the control of the firm’466. 
The capital requirement for operational risk is calculated on the basis of the 
measurement of the monetary impact caused by the internal or external event 
giving rise to operational risk467. 
Basel 2 thus introduces three methodological approaches that may be used in 
the calculation of the capital charge for operational risk, i.e. the Basic Indicator 
Approach (BIA); the Standardised Approach (STA); and the Advanced 
Measurement Approach (AMA). 
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4.9.1 The Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) 
The BIA method is the simplest of the three methodological approaches. The 
simplicity of this approach is evidenced by the fact that the banks do very little 
by way of input. This approach was seen as the most appropriate method for 
banks with less sophisticated control processes, board oversight, data 
reporting and audit processes in place for operational risk468. The BIA requires 
banks to set aside a fixed percentage (15%) of their average gross income 
over the previous three years for operational risk losses and where for any 
particular year, annual gross income amounts to zero or a negative figure(s), 
such figure(s) would be excluded. 
The capital charge requirement for banks using the BIA adopts the ‘gross 
income’ as the sole indicator of a bank’s total operational risk exposure. Thus, 
capital is set aside for operational risk based on a ‘time-weighted fixed 
percentage ( ) of gross income’469, with gross income being the sum of net 
interest income and net non-interest income
470
. 
In circumstances where a bank is unable to provide data relating to its income 
from three years, such as where the bank has not been in operation for more 
than three years, such bank may be required to rely on future projections of 
gross income over a three year period or part thereof to compute the 
applicable indicator. On the contrary, a bank may request a waiver of this 
requirement for exceptional reasons such as the sale of one of its major 
source of revenue lines to avoid an incorrect estimate of its operational risk 
capital requirement provisions. 
4.9.2 The Standardised Approach (STA) 
A bank applying the standardised approach is expected to compartmentalise 
its activities into 8 different business lines. For each of these business lines, 
the gross income is used as a common indicator. 
The gross income is determined using an approach similar to that under the 
BIA (i.e. the gross income figure representing the average annual gross 
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income over the previous three year period). To calculate the capital charge 
applicable for each business line, the applicable indicator (i.e. the gross 
income) is multiplied by a percentage capital factor ( ). 
Where negative capital charges arise in respect of any individual business 
line, such negative capital charge is usually off-set (without limitation) against 
other positive capital charges471 calculated for other business lines. 
Notwithstanding this, where the figure amounting to the sum aggregate of 
capital charge for any particular year is a negative figure, such figure would be 
excluded from the calculation of the operational risk charge. 
As the standardised approach is a slightly more sophisticated approach than 
the BIA, there are certain requirements that banks using it must satisfy. 
Eligibility for the use of the standardised approach in the measurement of 
operational risk requires that banks must ensure that: 
 Their operational risk framework benefits from the oversight and 
general involvement of the board of directors of the bank and other 
senior bank management personnel; 
 The management of the bank’s operational risk system is conducted 
with a degree of honesty and openness and that the system in place is 
actually effective and sound; and 
 Sufficient resources are allocated to the smooth running of the 
operational risk system. 
4.9.3 Alternative Standardised Approach 
There are provisions within Basel 2 that allows banks to engage in high-
margin lending to calculate the operational risk charge without using the gross 
income as an indicator. The Basel Committee envisaged that applying the 
normal standardised approach to banks engaged in high-margin lending 
would grossly over-estimate the true level of operational risk472 and would be 
misleading. However, for a bank to implement the alternative standardised 
approach, the bank would be required to prove to the banking regulator under 
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whose jurisdiction it falls that it employs an improved methodology process in 
the calculation of operational risk. 
Although similar in most ways to the standardised approach above, the 
alternative standardised approach differs from the former in that under the 
latter, the business lines i.e. retail banking and commercial banking are 
merged into one business line and accorded a capital factor (ß) of 15%. Here, 
the capital charge applicable to such a merged business line would be the 
multiplication of the sum total value of loans and advances by 3.5%, the value 
of which is then multiplied by the beta value applicable (i.e. 12% or 15%). 
Thus in the computation of the capital charge for operational risk under the 
alternative standardised approach, the average value of the loans and 
advances over the previous three years (in percentage terms) is used instead 
of the gross income figure applicable under the standardised approach. Also, 
where banks are unable to determine the individual gross income of the 
remaining six business lines473 (following the merger of the retail banking and 
commercial banking), such banks may instead incorporate the six business 
lines into one business line. 
Where this occurs, the capital charge for operational risk will be 18% of the 
total gross income for the six aggregated business lines. In such a scenario, 
the likelihood that banks that are capable of determining the gross income for 
individual business lines would opt to merge their remaining six business lines 
would be remote as to do so would imply that they will have to set aside more 
capital towards operational risk. 
4.9.4 Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA)474 
Introduced in 2008, the advanced measurement approach is more 
sophisticated475 than the basic indicator approach and the standardised 
approach or even the alternative standardised approach. 
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The rationale for its introduction was to provide banks with a much wider 
scope to develop and implement their own unique models in the assessment 
of operational risks. Linked to this rationale was the desire by the BCBS to 
allow banks operating the advanced measurement approach set aside capital 
which was characteristically low, thus providing on average a reflection of the 
low level of operational risk such banks had been exposed to. 
Contrastingly, Moosa Imad, suggests that banks using the advanced 
measurement approach were able to set aside regulatory capital in conformity 
with the overall economic capital requirements of banks, thus extinguishing 
any incentives for regulatory arbitrage476. This opinion of his, was somewhat a 
response to the general perception that banks using the AMA, encouraged 
regulatory arbitrage, and further suggested that the general view that AMA 
enabled banks to set aside lower capital charges in comparison to the BIA 
and the STA was not an outcome set in stone but rather an issue worthy of 
further debate477. 
Ironically the ambit of choices that banks using the AMA have, has led to a 
number of disagreements amongst scholars as to what really constitutes 
AMA. These differing opinions have not been helped by the fact that two 
years after the birth of the AMA, the BCBS introduced a capital threshold478 
applicable to both credit and operational risk, the purpose of which was to 
ensure that the computed capital charge did not fall below a minimum 
threshold level following a bank’s transition to the internal measurement 
approach (IMA). 
There is a considerable volume of literature that propagates the different 
views of eminent scholars on what really constitutes the advanced 
measurement approach (AMA). Imad Moosa suggests in his article479 that 
these views, some of which are far removed from the other (or basically 
occupy opposite sides of the spectrum of views) depend on: 
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 How the techniques implemented in the AMA are listed under the AMA; 
 Whether these listed techniques are implemented individually or in 
tandem with each other in the calculation of capital towards operational 
risk thus complementing one another; or 
 Whether the listed techniques are actually different forms/aspects 
relating to the same process or indeed are not linked at all and are 
completely different. 
Notwithstanding the above views of what actually constitutes the advanced 
measurement approach, banks which seek to implement the AMA are 
required to satisfy certain requirements set out in annexures 6 and 7 of Basel 
2480. Firstly, banks implementing the AMA must ensure that its own internal 
operational risk measurement framework or process is represented or 
reflected by the different event types that constitute operational risk481. 
Secondly, the loss(es) a bank incurs as a result of operational risk must be 
capable of falling under the different categories of business lines such as 
retail, banking, trading and sales etc.  
The final but by no means the least requirement, which infact is central to the 
computation of the capital charge for operational risk is that under the AMA, 
banks are under a requirement to calculate the capital charge using its own 
model482 to compute the summation of expected loss (EL) and unexpected 
loss (UL) for all types of operational risk exposure across each business line. 
Where expected loss(es) have already been taken into consideration by the 
bank, then the operational risk charge would be expected to be computed 
based on unexpected loss(es) only.  
Returning to the issue of what constitutes the advanced measurement 
approach, Moosa argues that the definition of AMA as represented by the 
BCBS constitutes the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA); Scenario-based 
Approach (SBA) and the Scorecard Approach (SCA), but excluding the 
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Internal Measurement Approach (IMA). However, he explains further by 
adding that whilst the LDA relies on both internal and external data which are 
historical in nature, the SCA and the SBA on the other hand rely on 
hypothetical data that has been compiled through ‘expert opinion’483 where 
reliance has either been placed on certain scenarios or the outcome(s) 
resulting from the assessment of various drivers of risk as well as indicators 
and control mechanisms484. 
Notwithstanding the requirements that banks implementing the AMA ought to 
satisfy, it is an acceptable fact (even recognised by the BCBS) that banks 
may mitigate against operational risk by taking out risk insurance. Risk 
insurance taken out by banks implementing the AMA allows such banks to 
reduce the charge for operational risk485. Although the BCBS concedes that 
this practice might occur, (even though such measures are undertaken 
probably to counteract the operational risk exposure due to counterparty risk) 
it is submitted that this practice may be questionable on moral grounds as it 
tends to defeat the very essence and purpose for which operational risk 
charge is calculated. 
4.10 Criticism of Risk measuring methodologies/approaches under 
Basel 2 
4.10.1 Credit Risk 
4.10.1.1 Criticism of the standardised approach 
Although the phrases ‘standard approach’ and ‘standardised approach’ 
(representing credit risk measurement under Basel 1 and Basel 2) tend to be 
used loosely and interchangeably, they represent very distinct concepts, with 
the former more associated with Basel 1 and the latter i.e. standardised 
approach linked to Basel 2. 
While the standard approach has already been discussed earlier in this 
chapter, its evolution into the standardised approach was hailed at the time as 
a significant development ushered in by Basel 2. It was complimented as a 
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more robust (though complex) system of risk measurement which provided an 
accurate assessment of the riskiness of an asset, for use by external credit 
assessment institutions (ECAIs). 
However, following the global financial crisis, the role of ECAIs have been 
called into question and infact majority of publications and academic literature 
suggest that they played a significant part in the cause of the global financial 
crisis486. In Europe, legislation authorising credit institutions to obtain and use 
external credit assessments is provided within the framework of EU Directive 
2006/48487. On the contrary, it is submitted that the lack of a similar legislation 
applicable in Ghana and Kenya implies that most often than not, credit 
institutions particularly banks in Africa rely on these ECAIs for risk 
assessments especially in relation to counterparties. Since the external credit 
assessments provided by ECAIs are based on the determination of risk 
weights using the standardised approach, criticism(s) of the standardised 
approach will be discussed in the next paragraph instead of the role of ECAIs 
which has already been discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
The standardised approach applicable under pillar 1 of Basel 2, allows banks 
to use the external ratings assessments from the credit ratings agencies to 
categorise borrowers into seven risk-score categories. Thus the capital that 
banks are required to set aside under the standardised approach is 8% of the 
weighted total exposure488. Deniz Coskun, a critic of the standardised 
approach, described it as: 
‘constituting a mere refinement of the Basel 1 method of measuring 
credit risk via the utilisation of sophisticated and commonly accepted 
credit ratings of (recognised or registered) CRAs’489. 
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While his views may arguably resonate with the views of other academics and 
legal experts490, it does represent a stark reminder of the inherent flaws of the 
credit risk measurement methodology under Basel 2. 
Coskun also suggests491 that the accordance through the standardised 
approach of the responsibility of credit risk measurement to CRAs did not 
necessarily represent a radical overhaul of the way credit risk measurement 
was conducted by banks under Basel 1 but rather it amounted to a ‘mere shift’ 
albeit a slight expansion in the credit risk assessments of assets that were 
undertaken. 
Deniz Coskun points out further, that the standardised approach under Basel 
2 created an environment of perfect opportunity for financial institutions to 
engage in ‘ratings shopping’ in a bid to secure good ratings. Whilst making it 
clear that this practice provided a catalyst for regulatory arbitrage, Coskun 
emphasises that this was compounded by the likelihood of some CRAs 
receiving excessive fees for issuing ratings, thus creating a scenario where 
there is a competitive race to the bottom amongst CRAs492. 
Other critics such as Rolf H. Weber and Aline Darbellay493 have questioned 
the huge responsibility given to the CRAs through the application of the 
standard approach in credit risk measurement. They point out, that with 
capital being very costly to the banks, i.e. due to regulatory capital 
requirements, the attractiveness (to banks) of holding less regulatory capital 
by reason of having obtained a high credit rating from a CRA suggests that 
banks would prefer494 to rely on the assessments of external CRAs. 
Thus when this reliance develops and increases, so will banks continue to 
shirk the responsibility of collecting data on borrowers themselves, resulting in 
less monitoring of their customers. On this latter point, Deniz Coskun 
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suggests that banks may be incentivised to monitor their customers less 
perhaps due to the fact that it may be cost effective economically495 not to 
have a robust internal rating framework in place as opposed to its reliance on 
an external assessment by an external CRA. 
Another reason suggested by Coskun was that reliance on the standardised 
approach as effected by the CRAs was likely to result in a much higher credit 
rating for the bank concerned resulting in the requirement for the latter to hold 
less regulatory capital. Although this suggestion may not be far from the truth, 
it is submitted that since the global financial crisis, attitudes towards the role 
played by the CRAs in the provision of credit ratings have been quite hostile 
especially in the USA which has actually banned the use of CRAs496. 
The UK has not reacted in the same way as the USA, however it has begun to 
scrutinise their role more closely. African countries on the contrary have in 
recent years made attempts to establish CRAs in the region. 
4.10.1.2 Criticism of the Internal Ratings Based Approach (IRB). 
Although the introduction of the IRB approach under Basel 2 was hailed at the 
time as representing a significant step away497 from the broad risk buckets 
under Basel 1, the changes498 that it brought to the banking books especially 
for banks implementing this approach have been cited499 as amplifying the 
possibility of pro-cyclicality in the capital requirement process under the IRB 
approach. 
The Turner Review suggests that: 
‘a capital adequacy regime is pro-cyclical if its operation tends to 
encourage or necessitate business responses that exacerbate the 
strength of the economic cycle’500. 
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Although it is an acknowledged fact that economies are generally inherently 
pro-cyclical (i.e. the tendency of capital requirements falling during periods of 
strong economic growth and rising during periods of recession), the Turner 
Review suggests that this issue is not adequately addressed in Basel 2. 
Turner attributes this to the design of the risk model banks use when 
implementing the IRB approach. Turner clarifies this by adding that the ‘extent 
of pro-cyclicality’ for banks implementing the IRB approach, depends on 
whether the risk models use ‘point-in-time’ or ‘through-the-cycle’ procedures 
to estimate figures of losses from loans that are likely to materialise in the 
different categories. 
This according to Turner is due to pro-cyclicality arising from the use of 
‘through-the-cycle’ estimates being less likely than when ‘point-in-time’ 
estimates are used by reason of the fact that the ‘through-the-cycle’ estimates 
are characterised by the use of historic data (of previous credit loss) of a bank 
implementing the IRB. 
Thus, whilst the ‘through-the-cycle’ approach may be the most ideal approach 
of the IRB implementation process (by virtue of being less pro-cyclical), the 
key issue is how many banks use this approach, since the ‘point-in-time’ 
approach might be the most preferred as it may be simpler to implement. 
4.10.2 Market Risk 
4.10.2.1 Criticism of the Value-at-Risk (VaR) approach. 
Value-at-Risk (VaR) is a risk methodology used to estimate the ‘probability of 
losses which could be incurred before the positions are closed’501. Despite the 
fact that it has over the years achieved prominent status as the leading risk 
measurement methodology used by banks to address market risks, it has also 
come under severe criticism that it is beset with limitations.  These criticisms 
have been echoed in the past by Danielsson et al502 and Hubner et al503. 
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Imad Moosa also suggests504 that the misleading results that VaR 
methodology provides, encourages complacency by the banks, not least 
because the measurement of VaR itself (the figure) is subject to some degree 
of error. 
In the Turner Review, it was suggested that VaR methodology could result in 
pro-cyclical attitude by a bank as it is unable to evaluate the risk of the 
occurrence of low probability but ‘high-impact tail events’505 and can also 
provide individual banks with a false sense of security when in fact the 
aggregate market risk might be quite high. 
The Turner Review, goes further to provide an insight into the fact that while 
the VaR-based approach has been in existence for a considerable period, its 
ability to distort the value of risk was really brought to the fore following the 
Global Financial Crisis. Indeed, the VaR’s inability to capture ‘sudden and 
sharp changes in market conditions’506 due to its disregard for large changes 
in prices was quite evident prior to the global financial crisis. This was due to 
the fact that the rapid and massive changes in asset prices had not been 
captured by the VaR methodology. This deficiency according to Imad A. 
Moosa stems from the fact that there is considerable reliance by this 
methodology on symmetric statistical measures’507that treat upside and 
downside risk in the same way508. 
Since Basel 2 inherited VaR from Basel 1, the deficiencies of VaR are also 
evident in Basel 2. VaR is very simple and provides a ’99 percent confidence 
interval’509 over a fixed trading days period during which an instrument may be 
held in the trading book.  According to Jim Chen, the reliance of VaR on a 
simplified quantile analysis approach implies that any risk beyond the 
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applicable quantile framework is ignored regardless of the magnitude and 
distribution of such risk. This is a view also shared by John Hull510.  
Thus the complete disregard for tail risks by the VaR methodology 
encourages risk-taking at the end of the observation period which at best can 
be described as reckless. This is because the eventual crystallisation or 
materialisation of tail risks renders the VaR methodology unfit for purpose. It 
is this false sense of security that VaR provides which led David Einhorn to 
add his name to the growing list of critics of VaR by suggesting that it 
encourages banks to undertake:  
‘Excessive but remote risks as is potentially catastrophic when its use 
creates a false sense of security among senior executives and 
watchdogs’511. 
Another weakness of the VaR methodology and perhaps one that 
underscores it not being fit for purpose is highlighted by Kevin Shepard when 
he suggests that VaR is ‘subject to both model risk and estimation risk’512. 
Also, Allen Boudoukh and Saunders513 suggest that the simplicity of the VaR 
methodology is to a large extent due to its heavy reliance on the issue of 
assumptions which cannot be backed with empirical evidence514. 
One other criticism of VaR which according to Jim Chen, strikes at the heart 
of this methodology is its inability to measure and/or forecast risk. Jim Chen 
points out that quite apart from the inability of VaR to capture tail risks, VaR 
‘behaves erratically when banks or regulators try to aggregate risks 
associated with different components of a portfolio’515. 
He clarifies this by suggesting that the summation of separate assets or 
groupings within portfolios using the VaR methodology could result in 1 out of 
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2 possible errors or misleading outcomes516. Firstly, a ‘type 1 error’ or a ‘false 
positive’ may be realised, where aggregating individual market risks within a 
portfolio, could lead to a gross risk overstatement of the entire portfolio in 
comparison to the risks of each component of the portfolio517. Such an 
outcome according to Jim Chen could result in a bank taking less risk in the 
erroneous belief that its entire market risk charge has been adequately 
catered for518. 
Secondly, a ‘type 2 error’ or a ‘false negative’ occurs when an under-
statement of market risk occurs following an aggregation of risks from each 
branch and arm of a bank’s operations519. He suggests that the impossibility of 
VaR to ascertain or evaluate the true risk of a ‘bank robbery’ taking place is 
the most appropriate example520. Here, it is submitted that while it is widely 
accepted that VaR is inherently flawed, the inability of a risk measuring 
process to calculate the possibility of an event such as ‘bank robbery’ 
occurring is not a proper way to justify the effectiveness of such a process or 
methodology, as the risk of ‘bank robbery’ is dependent on a much wider 
range of factors which may further differ from location to location and 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
4.10.3    Operational Risk 
4.10.3.1 Criticism of the Advanced Measurement Approach 
Although the root source of the criticisms directed towards the advanced risk 
measurement approach could be traced to the conflicting theories on what 
really constitutes AMA, Chapelle521 suggest that the AMA does really consist 
of the combination of all the individual measurement techniques that result in 
an outcome where an accurate measure of exposure to operational loss may 
be obtained. 
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Notwithstanding this view, Peccia522 suggests that the perception of the AMA 
as either consisting of individual computational methods for regulatory capital 
or procedures that jointly complement one another effectively amounts to a 
‘non-starter’ because the use of supplementary historic date obtained through 
soft data from scenario analysis and scorecards is a frustrating and ‘futile 
exercise’. Whilst Alexander523 shares this perception, he clarifies his position 
by suggesting that AMA consists exclusively of the Loss Distribution Approach 
(LDA) as the Internal Measurement Approach (IMA) is actually a version of 
the LDA. 
Contrastingly, Imad Moosa is of the opinion that the view shared by the BCBS 
is the correct view i.e. that all approaches should be applied jointly. This 
opinion according to Moosa is due to the fact that in the Basel 2 document it is 
stated that: 
‘in addition to using [internal and external] loss data, whether actual or 
scenario-based, a bank’s firm-wide risk assessment methodology must 
capture key business environment and internal control factors that can 
change its operational risk profile’524. 
Regardless of whether the approaches are used in a joint and complementary 
way or not, Aue, F and Kalkbreber, M525 argue that applying the LDA to 
quantify operational risk is a herculean task due to lack of data, the nature of 
the event giving rise to operational risk, and the difficulty in identifying a 
particularly robust measure which is highly sensitive to exposure operational 
risk. 
This view seems to be shared by Allen and Bali526, who suggest that there is 
inadequate reflection of ‘low-frequency’, ‘high-severity events’ – a likely 
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outcome of the reliance on approaches which are not highly risk sensitive. On 
the contrary, Haas and Kaiser527, suggest that it is quite rare to have low-
frequency, high impact events and even if they did occur, are highly likely to 
go unrecorded, or worst of all wrongly classified as losses emanating from 
credit or market risk as opposed to operational risk. 
4.11 Criticism of Basel 1 and Basel 2 
It is submitted that the minimum capital requirement set out earlier by the 
BCBS under Basel 1 is generally regarded as the foundation on which the 
framework for capital adequacy is based and has subsequently given rise to 
Basel 2528, Basel 2.5529 and now Basel 3530.   
Due to the growing disquiet over the inadequacies of Basel 1, the BCBS 
published Basel 2, which noticeably contained provisions for market risk 
unlike its predecessor and in addition to the existing provisions for credit risk. 
The publication of Basel 2 was thus meant to introduce a risk measurement 
and management mechanism which could assist in ensuring that banks could 
set aside capital which was more specific and perfectly aligned to the different 
types of risk a bank became exposed to through its banking activities. 
It is therefore submitted, that Basel 2 represented a departure from the rather 
simplistic and inflexible risk allocation process under Basel 1 to a more risk-
sensitive approach process of the setting aside of capital by banks. Although 
Basel 2 retained the minimum capital requirement of 8% under Basel 1, it 
introduced two internal ratings-based (IRB) systems531 which banks could use 
to estimate the risk they were exposed to using their own mathematical risk 
model.  One irony here was that the type of risk model a bank was allowed to 
use was dependent on the size of the bank.   
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Although criticisms of Basel 2 surfaced long before the global banking crisis, it 
was not until the onset of the crisis that the voices of the critics got louder and 
they could suddenly be heard. 
In 2009, the BCBS made a regulatory change to Basel 2 to address the 
loophole that enabled banks to engage in capital arbitrage and had been 
recognised as one of the causes of the global financial crisis532. This 
unfortunate phenomenon occurred because the Basel 2 provisions imposed a 
greater requirement for banks to set aside higher capital in respect of items on 
the banking book than that required for items on the trading book533. Thus the 
resulting capital arbitrage involved banks recording banking book assets as 
trade book assets in an attempt to avoid having to set aside more capital.  
This loophole triggered a regulatory amendment ushering in Basel 2.5534 
which introduced changes to both Pillar 1 and Basel 2. The changes affecting 
Pillar 1, included an incremental risk charge (IRC) allocated to any particular 
specified risk or credit risk that arose from the trading book. 
Also, there was an increase in the capital charge set aside by banks for the 
securitisation of commercial real estate and an introduction of a capital charge 
for re-securitisation.  With regards to Pillar 2, guidance has been issued by 
the BCBS relating to risk management on a firm-wide basis and extra 
disclosure measures have also been introduced in Basel 2.5 which are 
applicable to both Pillar 1 and Pillar 2. 
4.12 Conclusion 
It is submitted that the deficiencies in the risk management processes under 
Basel 1 and Basel 2 which was somewhat improved under Basel 2.5 still 
remain. Perhaps this might arguably be one of the reasons why the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision have focused more on the quality and 
quantity of capital that banks must possess under the new Basel 3 Accord, as 
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a means of ensuring better risk absorption as opposed to seeking further 
means to improve risk management processes.  
It is further submitted that there is a general consensus within the banking 
industry that not every deposit can be safeguarded535 in the event of bank 
insolvency leading to liquidation (due to the issue of moral hazard amongst 
others). Hence, the key changes introduced by Basel 3 which are discussed 
in the next chapter (particularly in relation to the definition of bank capital), 
when implemented are likely to ensure a heightened level in the loss 
absorbency characteristic of bank capital, thus providing better protection to 
bank depositors and other creditors. 
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CHAPTER 5  
BASEL 3 
5.1 Introduction 
Inspite of the deficiencies of Basel 2, it is submitted that the introduction of 
Basel 2.5 in 2009 only addressed the loophole in Basel 2 that enabled banks 
to engage in capital arbitrage. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
have suggested that the introduction of Basel 3 will be complementary to the 
existing Basel 2. While there remains optimism in relation to the positive 
future impact Basel 3 will have on global banking regulations, it is further 
submitted that this level of optimism is tampered with the knowledge that 
Basel 3 still fails to reform the flawed risk measurement process under Basel 
2. 
5.2 Rationale of Basel 3 
The global financial crisis revealed an urgent need to subject the global 
banking industry to a complete overhaul and in particular create a platform 
from which a renewed drive towards the reform of existing regulatory, 
supervisory and risk management processes could be launched.  
In an attempt to address the task of reforming the global banking industry, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (hereinafter the ‘BCBS’) following a 
series of meetings and deliberations, unanimously acknowledged that one of 
the root causes or underlying factors that caused the global financial crisis 
was the inability of some banks to absorb the losses they accrued. This 
inability was attributed to the fact that the capital that banks held prior to and 
during the crisis was of such poor quality making it unable to absorb any 
losses536.  
After further months of intense negotiations by government representatives 
and leaders of financial institutions of member countries of the G20 and in 
conjunction with the BCBS, two documents were published on 16 December 
2010 i.e. ‘A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and 
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Banking Systems’537 and ‘An International Framework for Liquidity, Risk 
Measurement, Standards and Monitoring’538 and are collectively referred to as 
Basel 3539. 
On 13 January 2011, a third document i.e. ‘Minimum requirements to ensure 
loss absorbency at the point of non-viability’540 was also published and 
annexed to the other two documents. The reforms introduced by Basel 3 are 
categorised under 5 main headings, the implementation of which the BCBS’s 
optimism that they would contribute to the much needed overhaul required in 
the global banking industry is expected to be realised541. Also, the long 
transition period542 during which a gradual phase-in of the provisions of Basel 
3 is expected to take place will hopefully assist in making this a reality. 
5.3 Main provisions of Basel 3 affecting the quantity and quality of 
bank capital 
5.3.1 The Strengthening and Enhancement of the Quality of Capital 
The key changes introduced by Basel 3 under this heading are driven by the 
new interpretation of capital543 that Basel 3 introduces.  Under these changes, 
capital is accorded a new definition which goes further than the definition of 
capital under Basel 2, thus ultimately ensuring a much improved loss-
absorbing quality in qualifying capital instruments. 
This change in the definition of capital is supported by other changes that 
have been carefully designed to further enhance or improve the quality, 
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consistency and definition of a bank’s capital thereby providing an element of 
transparency. 
It is quite ironic that most European and American banks at the time of the 
crisis satisfied the minimum capital requirements of 8% under Basel 2 but yet 
succumbed to the devastating effects of the global financial crisis. 
Indeed, some of these affected banks had a minimum capital which exceeded 
the Basel 1 globally accepted standard of 8% of risk-weighted assets (which 
is the same under Basel 2), however, notwithstanding this fact, the financial 
crisis showed clearly that these increased capital levels were still not enough.  
In recognition of this fact, the BCBS concluded that to strengthen capital, pure 
common equity had to be made up of a larger proportion of Tier 1 capital. This 
recognition and subsequent conclusion by the BCBS largely dwells on the fact 
that common equity, whilst having loss absorption abilities also ensures that 
holders of pure common equity do not qualify for any potential pay-outs as 
such action is likely to ‘eat into’ the bank’s capital base. This quality of 
common equity was aptly summed up in an article544 published by FITCH545, 
where common equity was described as: 
‘….the most effective form of capital for maintaining a bank’s viability given 
its high loss absorption potential as ‘first loss’ capital, full dividend flexibility 
as well as its contribution to maintaining (or at least not harming 
confidence….)’546. 
In a further attempt to re-emphasise this loss-absorption quality that common 
equity possesses, FITCH draws a comparison between common equity and 
hybrids and state that, hybrids are less versatile than common stock547 even 
though they tend to exhibit majority of the salient qualities of common equity. 
Due to these special qualities, the BCBS in September 2010 declared that the 
common equity portion of capital, inclusive of reserves would increase from 
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2% to 4.5%548 and the total Tier 1 ratio would increase from 4% to 6%549.  See 
table 5.1 in Appendix 5. 
This signalled a departure from the Basel 2 framework in which banks were 
capable of meeting the Basel minimum capital requirements of 8% capital by 
ensuring that Tier 1 held capital equivalent to 4% of risk-weighted assets and 
the remaining 4% being met by Tier 2 capital.  
Thus although all seemed well with banks appearing to satisfy the Basel 
minimum capital requirement, it was later discovered that the Basel 2 
framework had inadvertently provided a loophole550 which banks exploited 
with great relish. Not only did the provisions within the Basel 2 framework 
provide for and support a lower capital requirement551 for the trading book 
whilst imposing a higher capital requirement for the banking book, but this 
anomaly was compounded by the fact that under Basel 2, banks could hold 
within Core Tier 1, capital amounting to only 2% of its risk-weighted assets 
with the remaining capital comprising hybrid capital552 and subordinated 
debt553. 
Banks thus took advantage of this by transferring assets meant to be in the 
banking book to the trading book in order to have to satisfy a much lower 
capital requirement554 and also improve their credit ratings555. Hence, the 
submission is made that the changes introduced by Basel 3 will herald a new 
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era where the importance or the function of Core Tier 1 capital has been 
recognised and has now become the pre-dominant form of capital556. 
Contrastingly under Basel 2, Tier 1 capital consisted of Core Tier 1 capital and 
non-Core Tier 1 capital, however under Basel 3, the Core Tier 1 capital has 
been re-named Common Equity Tier 1 and non-Core Tier 1 capital named 
Additional Tier 1 capital respectively. Also, although there has been no 
change to the total capital requirement of 8% under Basel 3, there has been a 
slight shift in the apportionment of capital, in that Common Equity Tier 1 under 
Basel 3 increases from 2% to 4.5% and the total Tier 1 capital also increases 
from 4% to 6%557. 
Basel 3 also introduces changes to Tier 2 of Basel 2. Under Basel 3, Tier 2 
will no longer have the distinctive Upper Tier 2558 and Lower Tier 2559 
category560 but will simply be known as Tier 2 capital. Furthermore, under 
Basel 3, a Capital Conservation Buffer561 and a Counter-cyclical buffer562 have 
been introduced and Tier 3 has been abolished. 
The main changes to capital introduced by Basel 3 include: 
Box 6  
1. Increasing the Common Equity Tier 1 capital from the minimum level 
of 2% under Basel 2 to 4.5% under Basel 3; 
2. Increasing the standards or criteria required for capital instruments 
to be eligible as Tier 1 capital; 
3. The elimination of the distinction that existed within Tier 2 capital 
(i.e. Upper Tier 2 and Lower Tier 2 capital) thus ensuring the same 
set of criteria applies to all components of Tier 2; and 
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4. A re-assessment of criteria that determines which deductions and/or 
regulatory adjustments are made to capital. 
 
It is thus evident that Basel 3 ensures a much more precise and narrower 
definition of regulatory capital which in a way fulfils the pledge by the BCBS to 
strengthen and enhance the quality of capital. It also potentially allays any 
fear that any future financial crisis in which governments inject capital into 
banking institutions will result in a repeat scenario where such quantitative 
easing measures or recapitalisation results in the effect of not only supporting 
ordinary depositors, (which arguably might have been desirable), but also 
supporting investors who had invested in regulatory capital instruments of the 
distressed banks or financial institutions563. 
This capital intervention by governments of financial crisis-hit countries 
prevented components of Tier 2 capital as well as non-Core Tier 1 capital (i.e. 
Additional Tier 1 capital) from performing their required function i.e. absorb 
losses and thus it is expected that changes to capital introduced by Basel 3 
will ensure that the loss-absorbing qualities of both Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital 
instruments will be greatly enhanced. 
Generally, Basel 3 re-affirms the status of common equity as the primary 
regulatory capital whose enhanced loss-absorbing qualities would be 
supported by newly eligible hybrid capital which possess greater loss-
absorbing qualities but without any incentives to redeem. To ensure that 
quality and consistency in capital is maintained, Basel 3 imposes a 
requirement that components of capital within Common Equity Tier 1 (i.e. CET 
1) must consist of common shares and retained earnings.  
Part 1B paragraph 52 of Basel 3 lists the components of Common Equity Tier 
1 (CET 1) Capital as the following: 
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5.3.1.1 Common Equity Tier 1 
5.3.1.1(a) Components of Common Equity Tier 1 Capital 
Box 7  
1. The common shares that a bank issues which satisfy the common 
shares classification criteria for regulatory purposes; 
2. The surplus from stock (share premium) that arise after the 
issuance of instruments including instruments from Common 
Equity Tier 1 (CET 1); 
3. Retained earnings; 
4. Other accumulated banking income and disclosed reserves564; 
5. Certain minority interests, (i.e. common shares that have been 
issued by the consolidated subsidiaries of the bank to third-parties) 
which satisfy the CET 1 criteria for inclusion; and 
6. Certain regulatory adjustments applicable in the computation of 
CET 1. 
Due to the changes introduced by Basel 3, certain capital instruments that 
previously qualified as common equity capital under Basel 2, will no longer 
qualify as such under Basel 3. Under Basel 3, capital instruments may be 
considered as common equity on condition the following criteria565 are 
satisfied: 
5.3.1.1(b) Criteria for inclusion in Common Equity Tier 1 Capital 
Box 8 
1. It must represent the most subordinated claim in any potential 
bank liquidation process; 
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2. It must not be subject to any fixed claim or claim with a capped 
limit, and that in the event of liquidation, it must be capable of 
being the subject of an unlimited and variable claim following the 
prior repayment of all senior claims; 
3. It must be of perpetual nature and should never be repaid unless 
in the event of liquidation i.e. it must have semblance of 
permanence with no step-ups or incentives to redeem; 
4. The bank must avoid creating the impression when the capital 
instrument has been issued, that the capital instrument will either 
be redeemed or bought back or even worse still cancelled; 
5. Any payable distributions must be paid out of potentially 
distributable items and should under no circumstances have any 
bearings on the amount paid for the capital instrument at issuance 
and must not be subject to any cap; 
6. Distributions are no longer classed as obligatory and as a result, a 
non-payment of distribution will not be classed as an event of 
default; 
7. The payments of distributions can only be effected following the 
satisfaction of other more important obligations such as (legal and 
contractual) and payments on other higher ranking capital 
instruments have been made; 
8. The issued share capital must initially and in a proportionate 
manner bear the greatest share of any potential loss(es) as they 
occur566. Thus each capital instrument must be capable of 
absorbing losses on a going concern basis; 
9. The amount of capital that has been paid-in, is regarded as equity 
for the purposes of applicable accounting standards; 
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10. The amount of capital that has already been paid-in, is classed as 
equity capital for the purposes of balance sheet insolvency; 
11. The shares have been directly issued and are paid-up without the 
banks concerned being directly or indirectly involved in the funding 
of the purchased instrument(s); 
12. The paid-in amount has not been secured or guaranteed by the 
issuer or any other entity related to the issuer, such as a parent 
company, a subsidiary or an entity affiliated to the bank in question 
or for that matter, not subjected to any other financial or 
contractual arrangement that elevates the status or hierarchy of 
the claim; 
13. The issued shares will be classed as common shares where the 
approval of the bank owners have been sought and have 
subsequently been granted either directly or indirectly by the 
Bank’s board of directors; and 
14. The capital instrument has been disclosed on the bank’s balance 
sheet. 
5.3.1.2 Additional Tier 1 Capital 
Additional Tier 1 capital under Basel 3 refers to the remaining Tier 1 capital 
that does not fall under the requirements of CET 1. Nonetheless, Basel 3 
imposes a requirement that Additional Tier 1 capital instruments should also 
possess the ability to absorb losses on a going-concern basis either through 
the process of a write-down or a conversion into ordinary shares567. 
In order to possess this quality, Additional Tier 1 capital instruments would be 
expected to be made up of instruments that are subordinated and give rise to 
completely discretionary non-cumulative dividends or coupons which do not 
possess a maturity date or any incentive(s) to redeem. The rationale behind 
the extension of loss-absorbing capacity to Additional Tier 1 capital in Basel 3, 
                                                 
567
 BCBS, ‘The Proposal to Ensure the Loss Absorbency of Regulatory capital at the Point of 
Non-Viability Minimum requirements’ para 1. See http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs174.pdf 
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stems from the fact that during the global financial crisis, the ordinary tax-
payer’s money was used to rescue banks which (even though continued to 
operate as going concerns), were actually no longer viable. 
As a result of such public-sector rescue of non-viable568 banks across Europe 
and elsewhere, the huge losses that these ailing banks had incurred were 
absorbed by the tax-payer’s money without any contribution from investors 
whose capital investment did not constitute common equity. 
5.3.1.2(a) Components of Additional Tier 1 Capital 
Paragraph 54 of the Basel 3 document569 lists the components of Additional 
Tier 1 capital as: 
Box 9 
1. Instruments which a bank issues that satisfy the classification criteria 
for inclusion in Additional Tier 1 capital and are excluded from 
Common Equity Tier 1; 
2. The surplus from stock (share premium) that arise following the 
issuance of instruments included in Additional Tier 1 capital; 
3. Instruments that have been issued by the consolidated subsidiaries of 
a bank to third-parties and satisfy the criteria necessary for inclusion in 
Additional Tier 1 capital; and 
4. Certain regulatory adjustments applicable in the computation of 
Additional Tier 1 capital. 
The ability of Additional Tier 1 capital to be converted into equity capital 
through write-down or a conversion suggests that components of Additional 
Tier 1 capital do possess both equity and debt characteristics. These 
characteristics ensure that apart from CET 1 capital instruments which 
automatically possess loss absorption qualities, Additional Tier 1 capital (i.e. 
                                                 
568
 Non-viability indicates the period, within which banks become financially distressed and 
are no longer profitable however are yet to be declared insolvent.  This attribute may also be 
applicable to a bank that has lost the confidence of its depositors and counterparties and is on 
a downward spiral towards insolvency. In the UK, the Prudential Regulatory Authority (an 
offshoot of the previous FSA) will consider a bank to be non-viable where it fails to satisfy the 
minimum capital level a bank within its jurisdiction must satisfy for authorisation purposes. 
569
 Part 1 B para 54 of Basel 3. 
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non-common equity Tier 1 capital) as well as Tier 2 capital instruments issued 
by banks also have similar loss-absorption qualities by virtue of certain 
provisions570 within Basel 3 conferring such qualities. 
To this effect, the Basel Committee announced on 13 January 2011 that: 
‘The terms and conditions of all non-common Tier 1 and Tier 2 
instruments issued by an internationally active bank must have a 
provision that requires such instruments, at the option of the relevant 
authority, to either be written off or converted into common equity upon 
the occurrence of a trigger event………’571 . 
However, for these provisions to apply, the bank must be confirmed by the 
supervisory authority as having approached or is approaching the point of 
non-viability. Also, the BCBS in recognition of the fact that certain existing 
capital instruments under the Basel 2 framework would no longer qualify or 
possess these loss-absorption features introduced under Basel 3, added a 
caveat that the provisions applied to all capital instruments issued on or after 
1 January 2013, and that any capital instruments issued prior to 1 January 
2013 (or already in existence prior to 1 January 2013) that fell foul of this new 
provision but nonetheless satisfied the criteria for Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 
capital as set out in Basel 3 will qualify or be eligible for limited 
grandfathering572. 
There are certain requirements that capital instruments are expected to satisfy 
to qualify as Additional Tier 1 capital. Generally for example, Additional Tier 1 
capital instruments are expected to possess loss-absorbing qualities on a 
going-concern basis implying therefore that they ought to be subordinated and 
capable of giving rise to dividends or coupons that are completely 
discretionary and non-cumulative and possess neither a maturity date nor an 
incentive to redeem. 
                                                 
570
Sidley Austin LLP publication, (n563). (http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs174.pdf). Accessed 
January 2012). 
571
 ibid. 
572
 Grandfathering refers to the gradual phase-out of capital instruments issued prior to 1 
January 2013 that do not satisfy the Loss Absorption requirements under Basel 3. The phase-
out will last 10 years beginning 1 January 2013, with 10% of such capital instruments phased-
out in each successive year. See BCBS, ‘Basel 3: A Global Regulatory Framework for More 
Resilient Banks and Banking Systems’, December 2010 (Revised June 2011, paras 94, p28-
29). 
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The eligibility criteria573 for Additional Tier 1 capital are set out in paragraph 55 
of the Basel document and are as follows: 
5.3.1.2(b) Criteria for inclusion in Additional Tier 1 Capital574 
In order for an instrument to qualify for inclusion it must be: 
Box 10  
1. Issued and paid in; 
2. Subordinated to depositors, general creditors and subordinated 
debt of the bank; 
3. Is neither secured nor covered by a guarantee of the issuer or 
related entity or other arrangement that legally or economically 
enhances the seniority of the claim vis-à-vis bank creditors; 
4. Is perpetual, i.e. there is no maturity date and there are no step-
ups or other incentives to redeem; 
5. May be callable at the initiative of the issuer only after a 
minimum of five years: 
a) To exercise a call option a bank must receive prior 
supervisory approval;  
b) A bank must not do anything which creates an 
expectation that the call will be exercised575; and 
c) Banks must not exercise a call unless: 
I. They replace the called instrument with capital of 
the same or better quality and the replacement of 
                                                 
573
 There are 14 criteria that a capital instrument ought to satisfy to qualify as Additional Tier 1 
capital. 
574
 The criteria in box 10, has been extracted verbatim from paragraph 55 of Basel 3. 
575
 Where an option to call an instrument is exercised after 5 years, but before amortisation 
commences, this would not be considered as creating an incentive to redeem so long as the 
bank does nothing to create an expectation of an impending call. 
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this capital is done at conditions which are 
sustainable for the income capacity of the bank576; 
or 
II. The bank demonstrates that its capital position is 
well above the minimum capital requirements after 
the call option is exercised577. 
6. Any repayment of principal (e.g. through repurchase or 
redemption) must be with prior supervisory approval and banks 
should not assume or create market expectations that 
supervisory approval578 will be given; 
7. Dividend/coupon discretion: 
a) The bank must have full discretion at all times to cancel 
distributions/payments579; 
b) Cancellation of discretionary payments must not be an 
event of default; 
c) Banks must have full access to cancelled payments to 
meet obligations as they fall due; and 
d) Cancellation of distributions/payments must not impose 
restrictions on the bank except in relation to distributions 
to common stockholders. 
                                                 
576
 Any replacement issue must be done at the same time the instrument is called and not 
after. 
577
 Here, the minimum capital requirement refers to the threshold imposed by the banking 
regulator within a given jurisdiction and may be higher than the Basel 3 minimum capital 
requirement. 
578
 Supervisory approval or consent is required to act as a deterrent for banks that might try to 
use their own shares to fund such a repurchase, which could potentially affect the capital 
adequacy framework. 
579
 Having full discretion implies that ‘dividend pushers’ will be unacceptable. However, any 
capital instrument having a dividend pusher makes it an obligation for the bank issuing the 
instrument to pay dividends or coupons on that instrument particularly where the issuing bank 
has already made a similar payment on a capital instrument or share which is junior in rank to 
the capital instrument under consideration. Thus the full discretion available to the bank to 
cancel the payment of dividends or coupons puts this provision on a collision course with the 
qualities of dividend pushers, hence the prohibition of the latter. 
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8. Dividends/coupons must be paid out of distributable items; 
9. The instrument cannot have a credit sensitive dividend feature, 
that is a dividend/coupon that is reset periodically based in whole 
or in part on the banking organisation’s credit standing; 
10. The instrument cannot contribute to liabilities exceeding assets if 
such a balance sheet test forms part of national insolvency law; 
11. Instruments classified as liabilities for accounting purposes must 
have principal loss absorption through either (i) conversion to 
common shares at an objective pre-specified trigger point or (ii) a 
write-down mechanism which allocates losses to the instrument 
at a pre-specified trigger point. The write-down will have the 
following effects: 
a) Reduce the claim of the instrument in liquidation; 
b) Reduce the amount repaid when a call is exercised; and 
c) Partially or fully reduce coupon/dividend payments on the 
instrument. 
12. Neither the bank nor a related party over which the bank 
exercises control or significant influence can have purchased the 
instrument, nor can the bank directly or indirectly have funded 
the purchase of the instrument; 
13. The instrument must not possess any feature or characteristic 
that has the potential to obstruct recapitalisation e.g provisions 
imposing an obligation on the issuer of the instrument to 
compensate investors where the instrument has been issued at 
a reduced price within a particular time frame; and 
14. If the instrument is not issued out of an operating entity or the 
holding company in the consolidated group (e.g. a special 
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purpose vehicle – ‘SPV’), proceeds must be immediately 
available without limitation to an operating entity580 or the holding 
company in the consolidated group in a form which meets or 
exceeds all the other criteria for inclusion in Additional Tier 1 
capital. 
5.3.1.3 Tier 2 Capital 
One of the main changes to Tier 2 capital structure introduced by Basel 3, is 
the fact that the distinction between upper Tier 2 capital and lower Tier 2 
capital that existed under Basel 2 has been abolished. 
Thus, although capital instruments eligible under the Tier 2 capital structure 
are all now expected to possess the same qualities581, there continues to exist 
a number of upper and lower Tier 2 capital which are no longer Basel 3 
compliant by virtue of the fact that they do not have provisions within their set-
up which allows the process of write-down or conversion into common equity 
to occur should the bank reach the point of non-viability. This implies that for 
all capital components of the single-tiered Tier 2 under Basel 3 to satisfy the 
eligibility requirement, the existing upper and lower Tier 2 capital instruments 
will have to be grandfathered. 
Another change affecting Tier 2 capital under Basel 3 is the reduction in the 
percentage of capital that Tier 2 is required to hold against risk-weighted 
assets from 4% under Basel 2 to 2% under Basel 3. This in effect creates a 
scenario where this new requirement creates a similarity to the hitherto 
existing limit under Basel 2 on lower Tier 2 capital. Thus if the capital 
requirement under Basel 3 can be met with capital from lower Tier 2 under 
Basel 3, then this underscores the importance and emphasis that the BCBS 
has placed on common equity in order to heighten the quality and loss-
absorption characteristics of capital. 
                                                 
580
 An entity established to engage in business deals with clients for the purposes of making a 
profit for itself. 
581
 Capital issued after 1 January 2013. 
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Paragraph 57 of the Basel 3 document582 lists the components of Tier 2 as 
follows: 
5.3.1.3(a) Components of Tier 2 Capital 
Box 11  
1. Instruments which a bank issues that satisfy the classification criteria 
for inclusion in Tier 2 capital and are excluded from Tier 1 capital; 
2. The surplus from stock (share premium) that arise following the 
issuance of instruments included in Tier 2 capital; 
3. Instruments that have been issued by the consolidated subsidiaries of 
a bank to third-parties and satisfy the criteria necessary for inclusion in 
Tier 2 capital and have been excluded from Tier 1 capital; 
4. Certain reserves representing loan loss provisions583; and 
5. Certain regulatory adjustments applicable in the computation of Tier 2 
capital. 
5.3.1.3(b) Criteria for inclusion in Tier 2 Capital584 
For instruments to qualify as Tier 2 capital, Basel 3 paragraph 58 sets out a 
list of eligibility criteria which are as follows. The qualifying instruments must 
be: 
Box 12  
1. Issued and paid-in; 
2. Subordinated to depositors and general creditors of the bank; 
3. Is neither secured nor covered by a guarantee of the issuer or 
related entity or other arrangement that legally or economically 
enhances the seniority of the claim vis-à-vis depositors and 
general bank creditors; 
                                                 
582
 ‘Basel 3: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems’ 
December 2010 (Revised June 2011) p17. 
583
 ibid (paragraphs 60, 61). 
584
 Basel 3 (n582) paragraph 58. 
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4. Maturity: 
a) Minimum original maturity of at least five years; 
b) Recognition in regulatory capital in the remaining five years 
before maturity will be amortised on a straight line basis; 
and 
c) There are no step-ups or other incentives to redeem. 
5. May be callable at the initiative of the issuer only after a minimum 
of five years: 
a) To exercise a call option a bank must receive prior 
supervisory approval; 
b) A bank must not do anything that creates an expectation 
that the call will be exercised585; and 
c) Banks must not exercise a call unless: 
I. They replace the called instrument with capital of the 
same or better quality and the replacement of this 
capital is done at conditions which are sustainable for 
the income capacity of the bank586; or 
II. The bank demonstrates that its capital position is well 
above the minimum capital requirements after the call 
option is exercised587. 
6. The investor must have no rights to accelerate the repayment of 
future scheduled payments (coupons or principal), except in 
bankruptcy and liquidation; 
7. The instrument cannot have a credit sensitive dividend feature, that 
is a dividend/coupon that is reset periodically based in whole or in 
part on the banking organisation’s credit standing; 
                                                 
585
 Basel 3 (n582) paragraphs 60 and 61. 
586
 See (n576). 
587
 See (n577). 
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8. Neither the bank nor a related party over which the bank exercises 
control or significant influence can have purchased the instrument, 
nor can the bank directly or indirectly have funded the purchase of 
the instrument; and 
9. If the instrument is not issued out of an operating entity or the 
holding company in the consolidated group (e.g. a special purpose 
vehicle – ‘SPV’), proceeds must be immediately available without 
limitation to an operating entity588 or the holding company in the 
consolidated group in a form which meets or exceeds all of the 
other criteria for inclusion in Tier 2 capital. 
These new requirements under Basel 3, are in sharp contrast to upper Tier 2 
capital requirements under Basel 2 which included the requirement to be able 
to absorb losses on a going-concern basis thus paving the way for issuers of 
such capital to be able to still absorb losses through deferral of 
coupons/dividends or interests due. 
Also under Basel 2, upper and lower Tier 2 capital had the potential to include 
an incentive to redeem (i.e. a step-up) provision, a situation which has now 
been rectified by the fourth requirement above. Thus, without the incentive to 
redeem, eg through a step-up etc, the availability of such capital to pay out in 
case of insolvency will be ensured. 
The second requirement that Basel 3 Tier 2 compliant capital ought to satisfy 
ensures a contrast to the perpetual nature and characteristic of upper Tier 2 
capital which provides less re-financing opportunities. Having said this, it is 
submitted that an opportunity to replace such Tier 2 capital may arise in 
circumstances where the call gives rise to a replacement capital instrument of 
higher quality. 
It is further submitted that existing components of lower Tier 2 capital under 
Basel 2 are not affected by the Tier 2 requirements imposed by Basel 3, 
simply because lower Tier 2 capital do tend to possess an important feature of 
original maturity i.e. can be called after five years thereby providing issuers 
                                                 
588
 See (n580). 
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with the ability to re-finance such capital instruments provided replacement 
finance is readily available. 
A comparison of the components of Tier 2 capital under Basel 2 and the 
components of Tier 2 capital under Basel 3, suggests that the main change 
introduced by Basel 3 is the prohibition on the inclusion of provisions which 
incentivises investors to redeem. Under Basel 2, Tier 2 capital instruments 
were usually set up with dated maturity of 10 years, however possessing an 
issuer call after 5 years. Also, failure on the part of the issuer to exercise the 
call will automatically trigger589 the incentive to redeem the coupon i.e. (a step-
up). 
Basel 3 on the contrary, prohibits this by eliminating incentives to redeem 
thereby increasing the loss absorbency capacity of Tier 2 capital. The 
introduction of a new restricted definition of capital under Basel 3 was 
primarily aimed at ultimately introducing a much improved and higher loss-
absorbing quality in all qualifying capital instruments. This new heightened 
loss-absorbency quality was seen as absolutely necessary, as a number of 
banks particularly in Europe and America were unable to absorb losses with 
their existing capital during the global financial crisis. 
Loss-Absorbency Features 
For capital to have a loss-absorption feature or not will depend on whether 
capital is to be described either as a Going-Concern or a Gone-Concern. 
Under the provisions of Basel 3, for a capital instrument to qualify as a liability 
for the purposes of accounting principles590, such instrument(s) ought to 
possess principal loss-absorbency through the process of ‘conversion to 
common shares’591 following the occurrence of a pre-determined trigger or 
through a write-down592. 
 
                                                 
589
 This is due to the fact that there is an assumption on the part of the issuers and investors 
that the debt instrument became eligible for a possible refinance in the fifth year, thus 
removing the requirement for the bank to amortise the capital prior to refinancing. 
590
 This requirement is not necessary for equity-accounted capital. 
591
 Sidley Austin LLP publication, (n570) paragraph 3. 
592
 ibid. 
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A trigger event593 is the earlier of: 
• ‘A decision that a write-off, without which the firm would become non-
viable, is necessary as determined by the relevant authority; and 
• The decision to make a public sector injection of capital, or equivalent 
support, without which the firm would have become non-viable, as 
determined by the relevant authority’594. 
Paragraph 6 of the Loss Absorbency Rules defines ‘relevant authority’ as: 
‘the relevant jurisdiction in determining the trigger event is the jurisdiction in 
which the capital is being given recognition for regulatory purposes’. 
On the contrary, where regulatory capital is being issued by a parent bank, 
the relevant authority will be the institution or agency appointed or chosen by 
the jurisdiction in which the parent bank resides. However, where the bank 
issuing the regulatory capital wants the capital to be recognised as such at the 
subsidiary level, the relevant regulatory body in the home jurisdiction of the 
subsidiary would be responsible for determining the occurrence of a trigger 
event. 
Whereas there seems to be a consensus as to the need for a trigger event, 
the same cannot be said in relation to the form it should take. Preference for a 
quantitative trigger is due to the assuredness and tangibility a substantive 
figure may provide, however supporters595 of a ‘non-quantitative’ trigger event 
suggest that a ‘quantitative trigger’: 
• would ultimately become an automatic trigger for the initiation of loss 
absorption without the consideration of other unique contributory 
factors; 
• is unlikely to accurately reflect the point at which a bank would need 
restructuring as such a trigger could ultimately be too high in certain 
cases; 
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 Sidley Austin LLP publication (n570) paragraph 4 or http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs174.pdf 
594
 ibid paragraph 6. 
595
 Such as New Zealand. 
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• may prove challenging to pin-point the exact point of attainment as 
capital ratios tend not to be a very accurate indication of solvency; and 
• brings with it a degree of uncertainty as to when the trigger level is 
really attained, a crucial factor which ultimately affects whether a 
conversion or a write-off should subsequently occur.  This is even ever 
more so important in the case of Tier 2 capital, where such capital 
instruments should not be considered a write-off until insolvency has 
been clearly established. 
The rationale behind this is that a write-down of an instrument results in a 
decrease in the initial value of the instrument, thus allowing the issuer to hold 
onto a non-distributable reserve amount that can be used to absorb losses. It 
is submitted that such a provision may be contrary to certain existing laws in 
jurisdictions such as the U.K. where English Company law for example 
imposes restrictions on the write-down of ‘nominal amount of preference 
shares’596 belonging to a public limited company, unless it has been approved 
by the courts597 as the reduction by a company of its share capital can only be 
agreed upon by the courts598. 
In a paper published by the FSA599, Going-Concern capital (that absorbs 
losses while viability still exists) was described as possessing three 
characteristics, namely; Loss-absorbency; Coupon Flexibility and 
Availability/Permanence whereas Gone-Concern capital was referred to as 
capital which is used to absorb losses where the bank or financial institution 
becomes insolvent. 
Also, the fact that Gone-Concern capital is fundamentally important towards 
the absorption of further losses, and the protection of significant high value 
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 Slaughter & May LLP, ‘Basel 3: A New Capital Adequacy and Liquidity Framework for 
Banks’ June 2011 p14. 
597
 Section 641, U.K. Companies Act 2006. 
598
 ibid. 
599
 Financial Services Authority (FSA), ‘Definition of Capital 08/5 Feedback  Statement on 
DP07/6’, Jul 2008. The Financial Services Authority (FSA) has now been split into two 
regulatory bodies ie. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulatory 
Authority (PRA). 
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creditors, it is imperative that such Gone-Concern capital is not potentially 
subject to a deferral provision600. 
A  Loss-absorbency 
The Loss absorbency provisions of Basel 3601 are applicable to capital 
instruments issued after 1 January 2013 and thus capital instruments issued 
before 1 January 2013, which do not meet the requirements of these 
provisions will be phased out with effect from 1 January 2013. 
The effects of a write-down are three-fold: 
i) It results in a reduction in claim with respect to the capital instrument in 
the event of a liquidation of the issuer; 
ii) It causes a reduction in the amount repaid, when a call on the capital 
instrument is made; and 
iii) Write-downs may either in full or in part reduce the amounts of any 
coupon or dividend pay-outs linked to that instrument602. 
Due to the permanent effect of a write-down, once a write-down has occurred, 
it becomes virtually impossible for the issuer to ‘undo’ the write-down by 
‘writing back up’ the instruments from future profits603. 
The rationale for this conditional requirement to effect a write-down at the 
point of non-viability604, was due to the fact that during the global financial 
crisis, the expectation that losses would be borne by such capital instruments 
did not materialise but rather (and particularly in most European jurisdictions 
affected by the crisis), tax payers’ money injected into the various economies 
                                                 
600
 Although Basel 3 does not make it a requirement for the issuer to defer payments where 
there is a threat of insolvency, Gone-Concern capital ought to be subordinated to enable it 
satisfy the requirement of further loss absorption. 
601
 http://www.bis.org/bcbs174.pdf 
602
 BCBS, ‘Basel 3: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking 
systems,’ (December 2010) Paragraph 55 point 11. 
603
 This is in sharp contrast to the CRD II under the EU capital provisions which allows a 
temporary write-down. 
604
 The point of non-viability may arise in two different ways. i.e. Where depositors and/or 
counterparties lose confidence in an institution which although at the brink of insolvency, is 
still capable of being rescued. In the UK, a bank may be deemed ‘non-viable’ by the 
Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) if it is incapable of satisfying the minimum conditions 
required for authorisation under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 
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by their respective governments, was of direct benefit to Tier 1 and Tier 2 
capital instruments thereby averting insolvency.  
Following the global financial crisis, it was discovered that most governments 
had embarked on re-capitalisation (particularly in the UK) and that a number 
of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments possessed dividend stoppers605 on 
ordinary shares where coupons were not paid. These dividend stoppers in 
effect became a stumbling block with regards to the process of re-
capitalisation. This was due to the fact that the likelihood of private investors 
investing in share capital diminished as the continued payment of distributions 
to bearers of capital instruments that were ranked higher (inspite of non-
payment of coupons) made it unlikely that such potential private investors 
would receive any dividend payments/pay-outs.  
Due to the fact that there was already in existence, capital instruments that 
did not have such a provision linked to their set-up, the BCBS proposed606 that 
the requirement for an instrument to possess the capacity to be either written 
off or converted into common equity607 should be applicable to all capital 
instruments that were issued either on or after 1 January 2013. Further to this, 
all other capital instruments issued prior to 1 January 2013 that do not satisfy 
the new requirement but nonetheless meet the criteria for Additional Tier 1 
and/or Tier 2 capital as introduced by Basel 3 will qualify for limited 
grandfathering. 
Although the BCBS is absolutely committed to ensuring that capital 
instruments in Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 of Basel 3 have heightened or 
principal loss-absorption qualities through the processes of write-down or 
conversion, there are three exceptions where this new requirement for write-
down or conversion is inapplicable: 
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 Dividend stoppers have the effect of preventing payments of a dividend due to an existing 
and continuing obligation for distributions to be made in respect of capital instruments of 
higher ranking status. 
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 On 13 January 2011. 
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 http://www.bis.org/press/p110113.pdf 
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EXCEPTIONS608: 
Box 13 
1. Where the jurisdiction within which the bank is located, has in 
existence regulations which: 
i) Make it mandatory for such Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital 
instruments to be written-off at the point of non-viability i.e. 
when a trigger event occurs; and 
ii) Makes it a requirement for Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital 
instruments to completely absorb all losses before any 
exposure of taxpayers to further potential unexpected losses. 
2. Where such a market-led group review concludes that the jurisdiction 
in which the bank is located actually has regulations (as stated in (i) 
above) in place; and 
3. The relevant regulator in that jurisdiction together with the bank (also 
from the same jurisdiction) issuing such capital instruments, i.e. 
Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments, confirm in any future 
documents relating to such issuance that the issued instruments are 
all fully subject to losses under the first exception above. 
B Coupon Flexibility 
A coupon flexibility characteristic of Going Concern capital introduces an 
element of discretion with respect to coupon payments. The ability to exercise 
discretion regarding payment of coupons allows a bank or financial entity to 
hold onto finances which can ultimately be used to absorb losses should 
coupon payments become subject to cancellation. Dividend pushers or 
stoppers have the tendency to negatively impact any coupon flexibility, 
potentially resulting in non-payment of dividends. 
The concept of coupon flexibility may also be examined under mandatory 
coupon cancellation at pre-determined triggers and also coupon deferral. 
                                                 
608
 See Paragraph 1 [A – C] of the Loss Absorbency Rules. 
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(I) Mandatory Coupon Cancellation 
A bank experiencing a degree of stress, will usually exercise a level of 
restraint before reluctantly exercising609 its discretion on the issue of coupon 
payment. Where the discretion to exercise mandatory coupon cancellation is 
exercised, it is important for the bank or regulator (if involved in the exercise 
of the discretion) to ensure that this discretion is not exercised arbitrarily and 
that there are reasonable grounds for doing so. 
In fact, certain market participants have argued that the existence of the 
prospect of mandatory coupon cancellation at a bank enables investors to 
determine the likelihood of such an event occurring before committing to an 
investment. Market participants who lend themselves to this view also agree 
that the trigger level for the exercise of mandatory coupon cancellation should 
be low enough and furthermore, credible enough to provide a genuine 
alternative loss absorbency process. 
Counter-arguments also exist within the banking industry that suggest that 
although it is absolutely important for coupon flexibility characteristics to be 
retained, the decision to exercise mandatory coupon cancellation must be at 
the discretion of the bank/firm, following consultations with the banking 
regulator within that jurisdiction. It is submitted that regardless of whether 
banks/firms unilaterally exercise full discretion on the issue of payment of 
coupons at all times or whether in consultation with regulators, the ground for 
such exercise of discretion should be a genuine and reasonable one. 
Notwithstanding this view, a justification for the exercise of discretion would 
be unquestionably sound if the bank/firm consults first with its regulators. 
Consultations between bank/firm and regulator should be the norm to justify 
mandatory coupon cancellation, but should not necessarily be held on the 
basis of pre-determined triggers for mandatory coupon cancellations. This is 
because a specially designed pre-determined trigger may not be flexible 
enough to cover all situations in all jurisdictions. 
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In times of severe financial stress. 
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(II) Coupon Deferral 
Although coupon deferral allows banks/firms to accumulate unpaid coupons, 
thus providing some form of liquidity for the banks, it is uncertain whether this 
extra source of liquidity could be explored by banks on a permanent basis 
unless perhaps with the exception where the capital instrument is itself of a 
permanent nature and thus can technically be indefinitely deferred. If the 
capital instrument is perpetual i.e. of a permanent nature, then the liquidity 
benefit it provides the bank will be permanent. 
Coupon deferral has both positive and negative attributes. When the bank or 
financial entity no longer exists as a viable institution, it exists as a Gone 
Concern and as such any coupon deferral would act as a source of ‘loss 
absorption’ since coupon payments made subsequently in a Gone Concern 
scenario would be subordinated in the process of insolvency. Thus the loss 
absorption benefits to be derived from coupon deferral tend to generally 
increase where coupons are deferred for longer periods. 
On the contrary, coupon deferral may act as a disincentive to potential equity 
investors who are keen to make profit on their investments. This implies that a 
bank or financial entity with coupon deferral provisions may struggle to 
recapitalise as potential equity investors would be concerned about the lack of 
future cash outflows expected as a return on their equity investments. 
(C) Permanence 
This characteristic which may be attributable to Going-Concern capital is of 
utmost importance as capital with such characteristic indicates that it would be 
available to the bank or financial entity when required to absorb any 
unexpected losses. Thus any undated capital instrument issued by banks is a 
capital instrument of permanent nature. On the contrary, a dated capital 
instrument which possesses a ‘lock-in’ (i.e. a safeguard mechanism that 
ensures that it cannot and will not be repaid should the bank enter insolvency) 
is capable of being considered to be permanent. 
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5.3.1.4 Tier 3 Capital 
Under Basel 2, Tier 3 capital instruments was only available to cover trading 
book exposures, however the BCBS has decided to abolish Tier 3 capital 
under Basel 3. Tier 3 capital instruments under Basel 2 consisted of short-
term subordinated debt (i.e. debt with a minimum maturity of two years) 
whose repayments was subject to a ‘lock-in’ insofar as repayment at maturity 
is conditional on the bank being able to meet its regulatory requirements 
following repayment. 
Following the provisions under Basel 2.5, the role of Tier 3 capital has 
become redundant, hence necessitating the riddance of Tier 3. 
5.3.2 Introduction of a Capital Conservation Buffer 
During the crisis, it was discovered that capital under Pillar 1 of the Basel 2 
framework lacked in-depth loss-absorbing capacity thus necessitating the 
intervention by certain governments, through acts such as bail-outs and re-
capitalisation. 
Basel 3 thus introduces a new requirement for banks to have in place capital 
buffers which ought to be accumulated during stress-free periods. This capital 
conservation buffer represents extra capital above and beyond the minimum 
regulatory capital that banks are required to hold. Under its predecessor Basel 
2, such a requirement did not exist, however the rationale for the introduction 
of the capital conservation buffer is provided in paragraph 126 of the Basel 3 
document which states: 
‘It is not acceptable for banks which have depleted their capital buffers 
to use future predictions of recovery as justification for maintaining 
generous distributions to shareholders, other capital providers and 
employees. These stakeholders, rather than depositors, must bear the 
risk that recovery will not be forthcoming’610 
Further, 
‘It is also not acceptable for banks which have depleted their capital 
buffers to try and use the distribution of capital as a way to signal their 
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financial strength. Not only is this irresponsible from the perspective of 
an individual bank, putting shareholders’ interests above depositors, it 
may also encourage other banks to follow suit. As a consequence, 
banks in aggregate can end up increasing distributions at the exact 
point in time when they should be conserving earnings’611 
The basis for this rationale, according to the BCBS, is hinged on the fact that 
at the height of the global financial crisis, some banks nonetheless paid out 
dividends and also made distributions612 arising from capital instruments even 
though their individual financial positions were anything but sound. 
The application of the capital conservation buffer is expected to begin on 1 
January 2016 and the proposed figure of 2.5% should be in place by 1 
January 2019613 (See table 5.1 in Appendix 5).  The scope of its application is 
expected not to be limited to the consolidated banking structure only (i.e. 
conglomerate structure only), but will also be applicable to individual614 banks 
or entities within the consolidated structure based on the discretion of national 
supervisors within that jurisdiction. 
While the BCBS, recognises the fact that banks may occasionally have to rely 
on their capital buffer following the erosion of its capital in a period of financial 
crisis, it is expected that once a bank draws on its capital conservation buffer, 
the automatic restrictions on payment of dividends, distributions from capital 
instruments, share buy-back options and bonus payments to members of staff 
would kick-in and these restrictions would increase615 depending on how far 
the crisis-hit bank draws from the capital conservation buffer leaving it 
perilously close to the minimum capital conservation requirement as stated in 
Pillar 1. 
The BCBS has also suggested that the draw-down of capital by banks from 
the capital conservation buffer should only be done in stressful periods as 
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opposed to normal periods of credit growth and also it must be conducted for 
the right reason and not for the purpose of for example giving the ‘drawing 
bank’ an unfair competitive advantage in terms of increased market share nor 
should such capital be used to fund bank acquisitions or any other similar 
projects. 
To avoid any potential abuse by banks of the use of the capital conservation 
buffer capital, paragraph 132(d) of the Basel 3 provisions, empowers banking 
supervisors with the ability to grant any bank relying on the capital 
conservation buffer616 time limits within which to rely on the capital 
conservation buffer. Also, once banks begin to operate within the buffer, they 
will be expected to following normality, avoid undertaking any expansion 
project, however they will be allowed to replenish the capital conservation 
buffer through activities to raise new capital. 
5.3.3 Introduction of measures to improve Counterparty Risk Coverage 
In July 2009, the BCBS introduced a number of changes to the Basel 2 
framework. Central to these changes was the increase in the capital 
requirements for both trading book and securitisation activities. Basel 2.5, as 
these reforms are commonly referred to, introduced capital requirements 
based on a Value-at-Risk (VaR) calculation for market risk617 by incorporating 
a stressed – (VaR) element. Other measures introduced by Basel 2.5 under 
Pillar 1 included a risk charge applicable to either a specific risk or credit risk 
which was calculated using the internal models approach. Thus the value of 
this risk charge was made directly proportional to the applicable risk.  
Also under Basel 2.5, the capital charge required to be set aside for the 
‘securitisation of commercial real estate’618 was increased and a requirement 
for a capital charge for ‘re-securitisation introduced’619. Other new Pillar 1 
measures included the introduction of a stressed-VAR risk measurement 
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approach which is used in measuring the capital charge required for market 
risk. 
The changes also introduced under Pillar 2 included improved risk 
management processes620 however, notwithstanding these reforms under 
Basel 2.5, Basel 3 has subsequently introduced further reforms to the 
computation of the capital requirements that a bank ought to set aside for 
counterparty credit risk (CCR). 
Thus there is now a requirement for banks to use data gathered from ‘stress-
inputs’ to set aside capital for exposures resulting from counterparty dealings. 
The requirement for banks to conduct ‘stress-input’ analysis is according to B. 
Mahapatra to enable banks address the pro-cyclical nature of financial 
systems or the economy particularly inadequate capital that is often a feature 
of a ‘compressed volatile market system’621. 
Basel 3 imposes622 a credit valuation adjustment (CVA) capital charge, the 
purpose of which is to provide some level of protection against any potential 
mark-to-market losses in the event the counterparty experiences a dip in its 
creditworthiness. Other provisions introduced by Basel 3 to improve 
counterparty risk coverage include the strengthening of standards for 
collateral management and initial margining, and higher capital requirements 
for all exposures to OTC Derivatives. 
5.3.4 Reducing or Counteracting Pro-cyclicality 
Although pro-cyclicality is a common phenomenon in arguably every 
economic cycle, this was never addressed nor taken into account in Basel 2. 
It is widely known and accepted that almost every financial crisis is preceded 
with great economic expansion and growth and indeed, banks react to these 
trends by reducing lending during periods of recession and increasing lending 
during periods of growth and economic expansion623. 
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The counter-cyclical buffer introduced by Basel 3 was the result of the 
recognition by the BCBS, that there was a need to curb or curtail this 
phenomenon of pro-cyclicality on a macro-prudential level with a view to 
protecting the banking industry. This counter-cyclical buffer ranges from 0 to 
2.5 percent of Risk-Weighted Assets (RWAs) and is expected to be met with 
CET 1 capital and other capital capable of fully absorbing losses624. 
When in operation, the counter-cyclical buffer will be expected to counteract 
the inherent pro-cyclical effects that the minimum capital requirement 
introduces625. This opinion by Gary van Vuuren, is in reference to an assertion 
by the Bank of England stated in his literature review that: 
‘Every regime that adopted a minimum capital requirement framework could 
stimulate financial pro-cyclicality…………’626 
He also suggests that in the past, ‘academics, practitioners and policy-
makers’ have indicated that the internal ratings-based (IRB) method627 of 
ascertaining capital requirements had the tendency to multiply the effects of 
pro-cyclicality. Other objectives of the counter-cyclical buffer include, to 
‘promote more forward-looking provisions’628 and also retain capital which 
could be used as buffers on a ‘micro-prudential level’ and then drawn on 
during stress-testing situations. On a macro-prudential level, the counter-
cyclical buffer will assist in ensuring the protection of the banking system from 
excessive credit growth periods. 
The pro-cyclical nature of the Basel 2 Capital framework was identified as one 
of the reasons why Basel 2 failed to prevent the global financial crisis. It may 
be recalled, that one main observation prior to the onset of the global financial 
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crisis was that the pre-crisis period was marked with an increase in credit 
growth. 
Historically, periods of excessive credit growth are usually followed by crises 
of varying magnitudes. To prevent any future build-up of excessive credit 
growth, the BCBS has introduced a counter-cyclical capital buffer, which aims 
to correct or adjust the capital buffer, should there be excessive credit growth. 
The BCBS, prior to introducing the counter-cyclical capital buffer 
acknowledged that losses experienced by any banking sector were usually 
more pronounced when the crisis period had been preceded by excessive 
credit growth629; and that the negative impact that such massive losses have 
on the banking sector and/or the real economy necessitated the creation of 
extra capital during periods where ‘the risks of system-wide stress are 
growing markedly’630. 
The counter-cyclical buffer is expected to be introduced alongside the capital 
conservation buffer on 1 January 2016 and is expected to be fully operational 
by 1 January 2019631. National jurisdictions that implement Basel 3 and 
subsequently introduce the counter-cyclical buffer will be expected to rely on 
or utilise this capital buffer, where it has been established632 (by the 
supervisory authorities within the jurisdiction) that the build-up in systemic risk 
on a macro-prudential level, could be linked to the excessive credit growth 
within that jurisdiction. 
If such a link is established, then the counter-cyclical buffer would be 
expected to provide a degree of protection against ‘any future potential 
losses’633.  According to the Basel 3 provisions634, internationally active banks 
will be required to compute their respective counter-cyclical buffers on the 
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basis of where their exposures are located. Thus if a bank is subject to the 
imposition of counter-cyclical buffers in a particular jurisdiction in which it is 
located, that bank will be expected to make provisions for extra capital buffer 
for the purposes of all exposures attributed to the bank in respect of its 
borrowers located in that jurisdiction635. Although Basel 3 puts the onus of 
choosing an authority or supervisory body (which will decide the size and 
implementation of the counter-cyclical buffer)636 on individual member states 
comprising the Basel Committee, it is yet to be determined if non-Basel 
Committee countries would also enjoy such responsibility should they adopt 
Basel 3. With regards to the activation of the counter-cyclical buffer, Basel 3 
sets out conditions on when and how the counter-cyclical buffer provisions 
should be exercised. 
In deciding when a counter-cyclical buffer should be set up, the Basel 
Committee suggested that an appropriate time to set up637 the buffer would be 
when the proportion638 of credit to GDP is higher than the usually recorded 
figure over a long period of time. This method relied on by the Basel 
Committee was questioned in a publication by Slaughter & May LLP639 where 
the authors pointed out that the ratio of credit to GDP in any given jurisdiction 
would not provide a completely accurate measurement of credit growth and in 
their opinion judgement had to be applied640. 
Paragraph 141 of the FSA Policy statement 10/14 Capital Planning Buffers, 
provides that countries implementing Basel 3 will be under an obligation to 
announce the decision to introduce a counter-cyclical buffer up to 12 months 
prior to the actual settings of the buffer. The rationale for this, is to enable 
banks accumulate or gradually set up the buffer without increasing financial 
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stress within the banking industry of that jurisdiction641. It is submitted, that any 
time frame longer than 12 months may be too long for the counter-cyclical 
buffer to take effect. 
However, where a bank fails to set up a counter-cyclical buffer when it is 
under an obligation to do so (after satisfying the applicable requirements), 
such a bank would be subjected to restrictions on distribution pay-outs as well 
as other pay-outs to staff members and the level of restrictions would be 
proportionate to the extent to which the bank concerned has failed to 
accumulate the applicable percentage within the buffer. 
5.3.5 The introduction of a Leverage Ratio 
Basel 3 introduces a new leverage ratio of 3%642 which is expected to be on a 
trial basis until 2018, and if this figure is found to be appropriate, will be 
adopted in 2019. The leverage ratio is expected to act as a backstop to 
existing Basel 2 risk-based framework. In other words, it is designed to keep 
in check the accumulation of excessive leverage643 within the banking system 
as well as offer some sort of ‘in-built’ protection against model risk and any 
potential measurement error.  
This new leverage ratio is expected to consist of Tier 1 capital as opposed to 
the bank’s entire assets which includes some off-balance sheet exposures. 
Prior to the global banking crisis, it was discovered that the leverage of a 
number of internationally active banks had become extremely high and in 
some cases as high as about 50 times644 the value of capital. 
Banks had built up significantly higher levels of leverage which had not been 
disclosed in their capital ratios. This excessive build-up of leverage levels may 
arguably be attributed to the fact that in the past, the banking industry had 
relied on the figures generated by the risk-based capital ratios as a means of 
determining the required amount of capital that a bank needed to have to 
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cover all risks. Banks were thus faced with two options, that is to keep the 
risky assets on their banking books for which more capital will have to be 
held, or transferring risky assets off-balance sheet which had the dual benefit 
of reducing the amount of capital needed to be set aside and also freeing up 
capital in the banking book enabling the bank to undertake other business in a 
fiercely competitive banking industry. 
Thus during the crisis, when the lack of liquidity became so acute, a number 
of banks (particularly in Europe and America) were compelled to deleverage 
in order to create some liquidity. The nature and speed with which these 
deleveraging processes occurred simultaneously resulted in the diminishing of 
asset prices, thus increasing mark-to-market losses and further reducing the 
level of capital. This accentuated further, the lack of credit available in the real 
economy. 
In response to this, the BCBS in 2009, sought to introduce a leverage ratio 
that would: 
‘constrain the build-up of leverage in the banking sector, helping avoid 
destabilising deleveraging processes which can damage the broader 
financial system and the economy…’.645 
Thus following supervisory monitoring of the leveraging ratio646, the BCBS 
imposes647 a requirement on banks to provide a report648 of their leverage ratio 
to their respective banking regulators. The introduction of the leverage ratio, 
according to the BCBS is designed to complement649 Basel 2’s risk-based 
measurements and act as an extra safeguard in addressing model risk and 
any errors in measurement. 
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The leverage ratio implementation process has been designed in such a way 
so as to enable its design and computation assessed with respect to different 
business models operating within a full business cycle. Thus 2011-2012 was 
ear-marked as a monitoring period, whereas 2013-2016 is supposed to 
provide a parallel run prior to full implementation in 2018. 
During the transition period, disclosure of leverage ratio will no longer be 
restricted to supervisors within jurisdictions. Banks will be under an obligation 
to publically disclose their leverage ratios from 1 January 2015 and the mode 
of disclosure will be in conformity with an agreed disclosure template650. 
According to the Basel 3 provisions on leverage ratio, the calculation of the 
ratio will be based on the leverage ratio gathered during each quarter. 
i.e. Leverage Ratio  Tier 1 Capital651   ≥ 3% 
                                    Total Exposure652 
While the purpose of a public disclosure is to enable the BCBS determine if 
the 3% ratio limit is appropriate for all types of business models across a full 
business cycle, it has already become obvious that a decision on a generally 
applicable leverage ratio will be a difficult one for the BCBS. This is because it 
has been reported653 that in the USA, Federal Reserve officials have been 
contemplating a much ‘stricter cap’ on bank leverage ratio with some654 
suggesting that 10% would be ideal whilst others655 are urging the Federal 
Reserve to settle for 8%. 
In contrast in the UK, the Bank of England656 favours a 4-7% leverage ratio. 
Regardless of the differing opinions which are expected to shift yet again by 
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further intense lobbying by experts within the banking and finance industries 
of both countries and certainly elsewhere657, it is expected that the final 
decision on whether 3% would be an ideal leverage ratio and should be the 
same or differ for different types of financial institutions, will be based on a 
final report submitted by the European Banking Authority to the European 
Commission.  
5.3.6 A New Liquidity Risk Management Provision 
Basel 3 also introduces a framework for liquidity risk management which 
never existed under Basel 2. This new liquidity risk framework consists of two 
minimum standards for liquidity risk. These minimum standards are a 30-day 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)658 and a 1–year Net Stable Funding Ratio 
(NSFR)659. 
Under the 30-day LCR, banks are required to hold enough high-quality liquid 
assets which could be utilised in any bank-stress related situation. The 1-year 
NSFR ratio on the other hand, is designed to ensure that banks are able to 
withstand long periods of stress up to 1 year, thereby ensuring greater 
resilience and financial stability. 
There is an added requirement for Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions (SIFIs) to increase capital and liquidity and also implement 
additional supervision policies to curb the wider impact such institutions have 
on the global economic system when they encounter serious financial 
difficulties. The liquidity risk management framework introduced under Basel 
3, will not be discussed any further as this would be outside the remits of this 
thesis.  
5.4 Deductions and Regulatory Adjustments660 
The Basel Committee, in recognition of the fact that some capital neither 
possess the qualities nor the characteristics that enable available capital to 
absorb losses or reduce the impact of any expected or unexpected financial 
shocks, have introduced a requirement that such capital instruments are 
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deducted or undergo regulatory adjustments thus making only the applicable 
capital available to be applied in any given financial crisis. 
Thus the purpose of regulatory adjustments or deductions is only to make 
available, high quality capital instruments capable of absorbing any potential 
loss, thereby enhancing the quality of capital.  This enables the BCBS to 
achieve its overall long-term objective of narrowing the definition of capital 
during the transition phase from 1 January 2013 to 1 January 2023. 
Although regulatory adjustments/deductions were available under Basel 2, the 
regulatory adjustments/deductions applicable under Basel 3, goes above and 
beyond that of Basel 2 especially when the main rationale for the introduction 
of Basel 3 had been the improvement in the quality of capital. Furthermore, 
the resultant redundancy or obsoleteness of certain capital instruments has 
necessitated the introduction of grandfathering provisions by the BCBS during 
the transition period. 
The application of grandfathering provisions will ensure that certain capital 
having peculiar individual characteristics or qualities will gradually be phased 
out during the transition period whilst allowing the newly qualifying capital 
instruments ‘take seed and embed’ itself in the capital framework of the 
financial institution e.g. bank. 
It is important to highlight the fact that the narrower definition of capital 
introduced by Basel 3 is applicable after deductions and/or adjustments have 
been made to total Tier 1 capital (i.e. Core Tier 1 and Additional Tier 1 
capital). This is in contrast to Basel 2 where Tier 1 capital was determined 
before661 the application of deductions thus reducing the size of capital 
available to absorb any shocks. 
The regulatory adjustments/deductions introduced under Basel 3 include: 
5.4.1 Share Premium 
As shares are generally regarded as an important component of common 
equity, the premiums derived from shares are also accorded the same status 
i.e. part of common equity depending on whether the share premium arose 
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from shares that were already a part of common equity662. Thus the 
adjustment applicable in this instance ensures that share premiums derived 
from different types of capital instruments including other shares are allocated 
to the same grouping of capital from which the respective premiums arose 
from663. Whilst different jurisdictions may currently have different regulations in 
place with regards to the treatment of share premiums, it is submitted that any 
country that eventually implements the Basel 3 regulations would have to 
ensure that any prior existing law that goes contrary to the provisions of Basel 
3 is amended to ensure compatibility and consistency. 
In the UK, current FSA regulations allow share premiums derived from 
preference shares to be regarded as Core Tier 1 capital (under Basel 2) 
where the terms contained in the issuance documents of the preference 
shares makes provisions for the non-payment of any premium on redemption 
of the preference shares. Going forward, these provisions will have to be 
amended in the future as it will be contrary to the provisions under Basel 3. 
5.4.2 Goodwill664 and Intangibles 
Goodwill and intangibles (also deducted under Basel 2) are fully deducted 
from Common Equity Tier 1 capital (CET1) net of any associated deferred tax 
liability (DTL) that would be extinguished if the assets became impaired or de-
recognised under the relevant accounting standards665. 
Since these items are not available to the bank when insolvency occurs, they 
are deducted from the calculation of regulatory capital. As CET1 is expected 
to consist of capital with heightened loss-absorption qualities, keeping 
goodwill and intangibles in the CET1 would be unjustified. 
On the contrary, intangibles like Mortgage Servicing Rights (MSRs) are 
allowed limited recognition in the computation of CET1. This implies that 
MSRs are recognised for the purposes of inclusion in the calculation of CET1, 
                                                 
662
 Paragraph 52 of Basel 3. 
663
 Thus for example, stock surplus (share premium or premia) which do not satisfy eligibility 
criteria for inclusion in CET1, will qualify for inclusion in Additional Tier 1 capital on condition 
that the shares from which the stock surplus arise, qualify too be categorised under Additional 
Tier 1 capital – See paragraph 56 of Basel 3. 
664
 The extra value of a business over and above the fair value of each and every asset net of 
all liabilities which may be paid for that business. 
665
 Part 1 paragraph 67 of Basel 3. 
156 
provided they do not exceed 10% of the bank’s common equity. However, 
where the MSRs exceed the threshold deduction level of 10% either as a 
standalone item or exceeds 15% where it is aggregated with significant 
investments in the common shares of unconsolidated financial institutions e.g. 
banks and insurance companies, the bank owning such MSRs is expected to 
deduct the amount beyond 15% of its common equity before 1 January 2013.  
Thus the capital items that remain within the 15% aggregated cap limit will be 
subjected to a full disclosure and will be risk-weighted at 250%666. 
5.4.3 Deferred Tax Assets (DTAs) 
A deferred tax asset may be defined as a type of bank asset whose very 
existence is dependent on the future profits that the bank might make667. As 
there can be no guarantee that the bank would make profits in the future, 
such assets are prima facie excluded in the calculation of CET1668.  
Where taxation laws (within the jurisdiction in which the bank is located) allow 
setting-off, DTAs could potentially be netted against DTLs on condition that 
the DTAs that are being netted have arisen as a result of taxes that have 
been levied by the same tax authorities and also any DTLs that have already 
been applied in the setting-off of goodwill and intangibles have been 
excluded. 
5.5 De-recognitions 
DTAs that arise due to temporary differences in accounting treatment are 
accorded a different treatment. They are de-recognised from the calculation of 
CET1 rather than completely excluding or deducting such items. 
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5.5.1 Cashflow Hedge Reserve 
The previous practice under Basel 2 where cash flows arising from the fair 
value of off-balance sheet derivatives were used in hedging has been 
abolished under Basel 3. This is because this practice created a volatile 
environment of artificial669 instability within common equity capital as it is 
impossible to determine the actual value of common equity through applicable 
accounting practices as future cash flow that had been hedged could not be 
subjected to any fair value adjustments. 
Thus, cash flow hedge reserves which will no longer be recognised as 
common equity under Tier 1 are those relating to the hedging of items that are 
not fair-valued on the balance sheet670.  
5.5.2 Unrealised Gains and Losses671 
The revised and final draft of Basel 3 allows for the recognition of excess 
provisions for Tier 2 capital to a limit of 0.6% of credit set aside for risk-
weighted assets which have been computed using the ‘IRB’ process. This 
maximum limit of 0.6% may be revised downwards and a lower percentage 
applied through national discretion672. 
This is in contrast to an earlier provision under Basel 3 which favoured the 
deduction from the capital of the full amount relating to a shortfall in the stock 
of provisions to expected losses673 
It has been suggested674 that the reason why Basel 3 doesn’t contain any 
provisions requiring unrealised gains or losses to be excluded from common 
equity is to ensure that confidence in Tier 1 Capital is maintained. 
Also, assets held within the trading book are generally held in the short term 
for the purposes of sale and as a result, any proposal to make adjustments to 
such unrealised trading gains and/or losses will create an atmosphere of 
uncertainty and inconsistency which may ultimately impact the size of the 
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common equity capital. Regardless of this fact, there would also be the added 
difficulty of trying to ascertain the relevant data and information that would be 
required to effect the adjustments if full adjustments were applicable.  
5.5.3 Gain on sale from securitisations675 
Paragraph 74 of Basel 3 states that, any gain from a securitisation transaction 
which results in an increase in equity capital should be de-recognised from 
CET 1. Under Basel 2, such item qualified for de-recognition under Tier 1 
capital. 
5.5.4 Changes in own credit resulting in gains and losses 
Where a bank experiences cumulative gains and losses as a result of the 
bank’s individual credit risk position in relation to its ‘fair valued financial 
liabilities’676, such gains or losses will likewise be de-recognised. 
5.5.5 Defined benefit pension fund asset and liabilities 
Basel 3 makes provisions677 for defined benefit pension fund liabilities to be 
deducted from the CET1 capital computation. However, this deduction must 
be done net of any deferred tax liabilities that may be linked to it, the latter of 
which must be completely eliminated following the deduction. 
Thus, where a bank is at liberty to make withdrawals from the pension fund, 
the bank would then be under an obligation to off-set this withdrawal with 
assets that can quickly and without delay or hitch be withdrawn and applied to 
meet its obligation to satisfy the demands of depositors and creditors. 
5.6 Minority Interests 
5.6.1 Common Equity Capital 
The treatment of minority interests under Basel 3 represents a departure from 
what the BCBS originally proposed in December 2009. Initially, the BCBS 
suggested that minority interests should not qualify to be regarded as 
common equity under Tier 1 capital and on this basis ought to be excluded 
from the calculation of consolidated capital. 
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This position by the BCBS was supported by the argument that an equity 
investment in a subsidiary by a third-party entity should be utilised in the 
provision of capital towards the risks from that subsidiary only and must not 
be used to support group-wide risks. However, following interventions during 
the consultation process, the BCBS has made provisions within Basel 3 to the 
effect that any minority interest(s) created by virtue of the issuance of 
common shares by a wholly consolidated subsidiary may be recognised as 
common equity Tier 1 on condition that: 
 The issuing subsidiary (i.e. the subsidiary issuing the capital 
instrument) is a bank; and 
 The capital instrument investment issued by the subsidiary bank and 
from which minority interests arise, satisfies all eligibility requirements 
towards its inclusion as common shares for the purposes of regulatory 
capital. 
Importantly, it is imperative that the minority interest is representative only of 
actual common equity augmentation from the third-party to the subsidiary. 
Thus, the minority interest that qualifies to be included as common equity 
under Basel 3 is the amount of excess common equity (i.e. exceeding 7% of 
the minimum applicable) in the issuing subsidiary multiplied by the percentage 
of common equity possessed by the third-party investors678. 
5.6.2 Additional Tier 1 Capital 
For minority interests679 to be recognised as Additional Tier 1 capital, they 
ought to have arisen from qualifying tier 1 capital instruments that have been 
issued by a fully consolidated subsidiary. On the contrary, any capital 
instrument issued via a special purpose vehicle (SPV) or entity does not 
qualify to be included in consolidated common equity (because it was not 
issued by a bank) however, such capital may still satisfy the requirements to 
be included as Additional Tier 1 capital or Tier 2 capital. 
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A further requirement is that the SPV’s sole asset must be the investment in 
the capital of the bank and must be compliant with the applicable Basel 
provision680. 
(a) Investments in a bank’s own shares681 (Treasury Stock) 
Where a bank has an investment in its own shares, such investment must be 
deducted from CET1 unless it has already undergone de-recognition under 
the applicable accounting regulations. 
Furthermore, netting may be applied within the same exposure where gross 
long positions are deducted net682 of the aggregate of any short positions 
within the same exposure, on condition there are no counterparty risks linked 
to the short position. 
(b) Reciprocal Holdings in Banking, Financial and Insurance entities683 
Reciprocal cross-holdings that banks have in each other’s capital tend to 
provide a misleading picture as to the true capital position of the bank 
concerned. Such holding is thus fully deducted, using the ‘corresponding 
deduction approach’. Under this approach, the investment by a bank in a 
particular component of capital in another bank would be deducted from the 
corresponding component of capital of the investing bank. 
(c) Significant Holdings in Banking, Financial and Insurance entities684 
Significant holding basically refers to an investment of at least 10% of the 
holding bank’s own common share equity. Thus where a bank holds more 
than 10% of its own capital by way of investment in another bank, financial or 
insurance entity, this material holding by the bank would have to be deducted 
where it amounts to more than 10% of the share capital of that entity. 
Paragraph 80 of Basel 3, emphasises that this regulatory adjustment is only 
applicable to investments in the share capital of banking, financial as well as 
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insurance entities that fall ‘outside the scope of regulatory consolidation’685. 
Investments considered as significant or material holdings in such 
circumstances may include direct, indirect686 and synthetic holdings of capital 
instruments687. Material holdings in the banking as well as trading books of 
other banks, financial and insurance entities may also be classed as 
investments for the purposes of this Basel 3 provision. 
Paragraph 81 of Basel 3, states that where the sum total of all the holdings by 
the bank when aggregated exceed 10% of the bank’s common equity, 
(following the application of other regulatory adjustments in full and prior to 
this current adjustment under consideration), then the amount in excess of 
10% of the bank’s common equity will have to be deducted. 
Deductions under this heading as introduced under the Basel 3 provisions are 
undertaken using the ‘corresponding deduction approach’, as already 
described above in paragraph (b). This ‘corresponding deduction approach’ is 
in stark contrast to the approach under previous Basel regulations where 
deductions were applied equally between Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital irrespective 
of the type of capital the investments were held in. 
5.6.3 Threshold deductions 
Paragraph 87 of Basel 3, introduces a provision for certain items to be 
accorded limited recognition when calculating the Common Equity Tier 1 of a 
bank.  It has been suggested by Blair Keefe and Andrew Pfleiderer688 that this 
provision was included in the Basel 3 Agreement as a result of a negotiated 
compromise to satisfy all member states represented at the Basel Committee 
for Banking Supervision.  
Thus the items which may be accorded limited recognition include689: 
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 Significant investments in the common shares of unconsolidated 
financial institutions such as banks, insurance and other financial 
entities; 
 Mortgage Servicing Rights (MSRs); and 
 Deferred Tax Assets (DTAs) that arise from temporary differences. 
The limited recognition attributed to the above capital instruments, stems from 
the fact that each of these instruments is recognised as capital to a maximum 
cap of 10% of a bank’s common equity. However, when all three capital 
instruments are to be consolidated simultaneously, or in an aggregated 
manner, a maximum cap of 15% will be applied. 
This implies that banks will be under an obligation to deduct the amount of 
aggregated capital exceeding 15% of the common equity of the bank where 
the above listed items are simultaneously considered690. Following the 
application of such threshold deduction, any capital included in the 15% 
threshold cap will be included in the calculation of common equity and would 
be subject to a full disclosure691. 
This approach however will change from 1 January 2018. From this date, the 
15% threshold limit would be made to apply only after all regulatory 
adjustments have been made including adjustments to the three above- 
mentioned capital instruments. Under both approaches, capital items within 
the 15% threshold deduction limit will be risk-weighted at 250%692. 
5.7 Disclosure 
When Pillar 3 of Basel 2 was introduced, the rationale for its introduction 
according to the Basel Committee was to ‘encourage market discipline’693.  
Pillar 3 heralded in an obligation for banks to make disclosures to the market 
particularly in relation to a bank’s exposure to banking risks.  
By requiring banks to make such disclosures, the Basel Committee were 
hoping to put market participants in a position to analyse relevant information 
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with regards to the amount of capital, level of exposure to risk, methods 
employed in the identification and subsequent measurement of risk, thereby 
giving them an insight into the capital adequacy position of the bank. 
In introducing the disclosure requirement under Pillar 3 of Basel 2, the Basel 
Committee had to ensure that this requirement was driven by the primary 
need to determine a bank’s capital adequacy and not influenced694 by a bank’s 
equally important accounting requirements. Disclosure under the latter 
requirement i.e. accounting requirement has to be made subject to the 
materiality principle or concept695. Where disclosure is deemed not to be 
mandatory under accounting requirements, it may still be made via other 
obligatory processes introduced by the banking supervisory body(ies) in the 
jurisdiction in which the bank is located. 
During and after the global financial crisis, there was a general recognition 
that the disclosure requirements under Pillar 3 had failed to provide the 
information that investors (both new and old) as well as counterparties 
needed in order to take certain economic decisions. The lack of transparency 
and consistency696 in disclosures by banks ensured that comparisons between 
risk-weighted assets and the internal models employed in assessing them 
could not be effectively made. 
Thus the enhanced disclosure requirements under Basel 3697, attempts to 
address this (i.e. lack of transparency and consistency) by focusing largely on 
capital, i.e. both on and off-balance sheet capital. Basel 3 disclosure 
requirement imposes an obligation on banks to ensure698: 
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Box 14 
1. Regulatory capital elements are fully reconciled back onto the balance 
sheet and represented in the bank’s audited financial statements; 
2. All regulatory adjustments i.e. capital deductions are disclosed 
individually or separately; 
3. Limits and minima699 are adequately described thus identifying both 
the positive and negative components of capital against which the 
limits and minima are applicable; 
4. That the main features of characteristics of issued capital instruments 
are properly described; and 
5. Any disclosure of ratios relating to components of regulatory capital 
(‘Core Equity Tier 1’, Core Tier 1 or Tangible Common Equity Ratios) 
is made in tandem with a thorough explanatory account of the method 
used in calculating these ratios700. 
On the issue of lack of transparency and consistency in the disclosure 
requirements under Basel 2, the establishment of the Enhanced Disclosure 
Task Force (EDTF) by the Basel Committee will ensure that through the 
implementation of the Task Force’s recommendations701, disclosure by banks 
would be greatly improved. 
This view gains support in a Report702 submitted by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision to the G20 leaders. In this Report, the BCBS suggest 
that the enhanced pillar 3 disclosures (under Basel 3) by banks would 
enhance increased ‘market discipline’ and prevent inconsistencies and help 
tackle the different perceptions that exist with regards to the causes and 
extent of risk-weighted asset variations. 
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The author submits that the introduction of standard definitions and the 
creation of a disclosure template by the BCBS to further provide more 
consistency and comparability of disclosures across jurisdictions stands the 
risk of introducing a level of rigidity which would leave no room for 
manoeuvre. This is because there could well be types of assets that qualify as 
components of regulatory capital in certain jurisdictions whilst not being 
recognised as such in other jurisdictions. 
When this occurs, there may be disagreements as to whether disclosure 
ought to be made in those instances.  Notwithstanding this opinion, the author 
further submits that while the disclosure requirements under Basel 3 generally 
enhances capital adequacy transparency, there is no doubt that the evolution 
of capital adequacy will continue to play a significant role in any international 
banking regulatory reform effort, towards the common goal of financial 
stability. 
5.8 Capital Adequacy under Basel 3 
Following the global financial crisis, the BCBS in July 2009, increased the 
capital requirements for specific trading and securitisation in an attempt to 
close the loop that had existed under Basel 2 which allowed banks to transfer 
assets to the trading book mainly because the trading book attracted a lower 
capital requirement.   
The three main changes introduced by the BCBS include firstly, the 
introduction of an incremental risk charge (IRC) the purpose of which was to 
enable a more accurate figure for migration and default risks arising from 
securities703 from the trading book to be measured.  Also a ‘stressed VaR’ 
capital charge was introduced through the use of the stressed VaR 
methodology which was meant to accurately measure the volatile nature of 
the markets thus ensuring that adequate capital had been set aside.   
The rationale for the introduction of the ‘stressed VaR’ charge was: 
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‘… to deliver a capital charge based on a measure of VaR that would 
be applicable to the bank’s current portfolio in a period of stress 
relevant to that portfolio’704. 
Finally, a credit value adjustment charge (CVA) was introduced to cover 
potential counter-party risk of mark-to-market losses. These changes together 
with others are commonly referred to as Basel 2.5. 
The measures introduced by Basel 2.5, impact both pillar 1 and pillar 2 of the 
banking regulatory framework. Under pillar 1, an incremental risk charge 
(IRC) for a particular risk or credit risk arising from a bank’s trading book705 
has been introduced under the Internal Models Approach (IMA).  Also, the 
capital charge for securitisation of commercial real estate has been increased 
and a new capital charge introduced for re-securitisation. 
An enhancement of the VaR method employed in the allocation of capital 
charge for market risk seems to have been achieved through the introduction 
of a ‘stressed-VaR’ element706. This stressed VaR has been specifically 
designed to calculate a capital charge using an aspect of VaR applicable only 
to a bank’s existing asset portfolio during stress periods relating to that 
particular asset portfolio. 
Under pillar 2, Basel 2.5 issues guidelines on micro-prudential risk 
management processes, dealing with reputation and liquidity risk, 
improvement of valuation methods and practices and the implementation of 
effective stress testing methods/procedures. Also, disclosure is greatly 
enhanced through the introduction of certain disclosure requirements to 
complement pre-existing requirements under Basel 2. 
Thus, although the capital requirement for a bank’s trading book is expected 
to increase by approximately three-fold through the implementation of these 
new regulatory requirements under Basel 2.5, it is submitted that the overall 
risk methodology still remains flawed and the potential introduction by the 
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BCBS of the Expected Shortfall (ES) methodology although appealing, needs 
to be carefully considered before widespread adoption. Extreme sensitivity is 
the main characteristic of the ES methodology and this characteristic enables 
‘extreme events’ or ‘tail risks’ to be captured. 
In response707 to a consultative paper launched by the Basel Committee, the 
authors argued that the ES methodology enabled ‘potential risk outcomes to 
be observed beyond the 99th percentile of the expected loss distribution’708. 
Notwithstanding this, it is envisaged that the shortcomings of the VaR are not 
likely to be addressed and effectively rectified by a better risk model in the 
near future particularly where Basel 3 fails to make significant inroads709 in the 
reform of risk measurement methodology. Michael C. Macchiarola710suggests 
that inspite of VaR’s short-comings, it also has benefits. Jim Chen agrees with 
this view and states that: 
‘Despite its flaws and limitations, VaR analysis represents the most 
important tool for evaluating market risk as one of several threats to the 
global financial system’711. 
However, according to the BCBS, the broad spectrum of reforms introduced 
by Basel 3 has been designed to address all the different shortcomings of the 
global banking regulatory framework that the global financial crisis exposed. 
In a discussion paper712, it was suggested that while the capital adequacy 
measures introduced by Basel 3 generally strengthened the global capital 
adequacy framework, there were other provisions such as the introduction of 
a leverage ratio which were introduced to provide a supporting role to the 
existing capital adequacy ratio, through the provision of a non-risk based 
capital back-up framework. 
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While this provision could potentially amount to a masterstroke by the BCBS, 
it is submitted that the adoption of a globally consistent leverage ratio may still 
be a couple of years away, a situation further undermined by the ever-present 
threat of regulatory capture. 
The capital adequacy framework under Basel 3 retains the existing framework 
in Basel 2, i.e.: 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)  Capital (Qualifying Capital) ≥ 8% 
                                               Risk-Weighted Assets 
However, it is submitted that the capital adequacy measures under Basel 3 
adds another dimension to the level of complexity that the banking regulatory 
framework is already famed for. While the main provisions under Basel 3 
arguably relate to the quality of qualifying capital and the total availability of 
capital, i.e. with respect to the capital conservation buffer, there are other 
provisions within Basel 3 such as the countercyclical buffer and also new 
liquidity provisions713 which enhance financial stability within the overall 
banking system. 
The capital adequacy framework under Basel 3 is thus underpinned by a 
renewed focus on the role of common equity, evidenced through the narrow 
and strict capital definition that Basel 3 introduces which completely 
overshadows the limited inroads it makes with regards to risk measurement. 
Thus notwithstanding the Basel regulatory reforms that preceded Basel 3, it is 
fair to say that the nature of capital still remained unchanged; a crucial factor 
that affected the loss-absorbency ability of capital that banks had available 
during the global financial crisis. 
Inspite of this renewed focus on the narrow and strict definition of capital, 
certain changes have also been introduced to the definition and method 
employed in the calculation of risk-weighted assets (RWA). These changes 
introduced under Basel 2.5 and Basel 3 as mentioned earlier above, mainly 
affect banks involved in investment banking activities. When the BCBS 
introduced these changes it was generally acknowledged that for the capital 
adequacy framework to be effective in a given financial institution, it was 
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imperative that risks undertaken by the financial institution would be 
commensurate to the latter’s ability to bear that magnitude of risk. 
While the provisions under Basel 3 effectively introduces a revised definition 
of capital, i.e. capital that possesses a heightened form of loss absorption, it is 
submitted that large commercial banks (perhaps with the exception of some 
universal banks) are likely to be unaffected by the changes introduced to the 
calculation of RWA primarily because there is an assumption that true 
commercial banks do not engage in investment banking activity(ies). If this is 
really the case, then commercial banks will generally continue to be affected 
by the risk methodology applicable under Basel 2 for credit, market and 
operational risks which could best be described as anything but perfect. 
There is however, an element of hope that the introduction of a non-risk 
based leverage ratio would be effective in mitigating against the inadequacies 
in the risk methodology(ies) inherited from Basel 2. It is expected that the 
leverage ratio would have both micro-prudential and macro-prudential impact 
through the provision of a fall back process which compensates for inherent 
risk measurement errors still present under the Basel 3 Framework. 
In retrospect, perhaps the reason why Basel 3 does not introduce significant 
changes in the risk methodology processes under Basel 2 and virtually adopts 
it in its entirety, might be for the simple reason that attempting to implement a 
consistent approach towards RWA will be a herculean task indeed. Vanessa 
Le Lesle and Sofiya Avramova suggest714 that a total harmonisation of RWA 
methods and practices globally is unlikely to ever be achieved. 
Infact, Sonali Das and Amadou N.R. Sy emphasise715 the importance of risk-
weighted assets in the calculation of the capital adequacy ratio. They suggest 
that banks may increase their capital adequacy ratios in either of two ways: 
 By increasing the amount of regulatory capital held, which boosts the 
numerator of the ratio; or 
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 By decreasing risk-weighted assets i.e. the denominator of the 
regulatory ratio716. 
Inspite of the relevance of the value of RWA in the calculation of capital 
adequacy ratio, the difficulty in achieving global harmonisation of RWA 
methods probably reveals the reason for the Basel Committee opting for the 
increase in the quantity and quality of regulatory capital i.e. the numerator. 
Infact, such is the uncertainty surrounding the future pathway of RWAs that 
Lord Turner suggests that the different methods employed by countries 
worldwide in the computation of risks and the evaluation of risk-weighted 
assets had the potential to derail the benefits to be gained from Basel 3717. 
5.9 Conclusion 
With the emphasis of Basel 3 being on the strengthening of the quality and 
quantity of bank regulatory capital as opposed to risk measuring methodology,  
an attempt has been made in this thesis to investigate the likely implications 
of capital adequacy on the respondent banks under the Basel 3 framework. 
Inspite of South Africa’s implementation of Basel 3, there still remains 
unfortunately, scepticism718 as to the usefulness of Basel 3 to banks in African 
countries.  Notwithstanding this, Arnout Wellink719 earlier in a speech 
presented in South Africa on 27 January 2011 said: 
‘...... the central element of the Committee’s response is Basel 3.  Our goal 
is to enhance bank and banking sector resilience to unexpected shocks 
and thereby promote financial stability......’. 
‘...... among the components of the new framework, I would like to mention 
the following that are fully relevant for African banks and banking systems.  
These elements should protect against the types of internal and external 
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shocks banks and banking systems often face regardless of the state of 
development or complexity......720’. 
On the basis of this quote, it is submitted that although the Basel Committee 
did not explicitly suggest that African countries ought to also adopt Basel 3, 
there is a likelihood that within a decade or so, Basel 3 will follow the same 
‘path’ as its predecessor i.e. Basel 1 and Basel 2 in that it would also become 
a requirement for all banks in the world to adopt. 
When this occurs, there will be no doubt that the future implementation of 
Basel 3 in Africa would have been facilitated by its early adoption by South 
Africa and for which there will be implications for large commercial banks.   
On the contrary, it is also submitted that there will still be implications for large 
commercial banks in Africa (particularly Ghana and Kenya) even if a future 
implementation of Basel 3 does not occur in these two jurisdictions or 
elsewhere within the African continent.  
In the next chapter, the author presents a thorough analysis of the 
questionnaire which has been designed specifically to assist in answering the 
research questions posed at the beginning of this thesis. Following this, the 
final chapter, i.e. chapter 7 will discuss the implications of the capital 
adequacy provisions of Basel 3. 
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CHAPTER 6  
ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
PART A 
6.1 Research Findings 
Although Basel 3 has not yet been implemented in Ghana and Kenya, an 
overwhelming majority of respondents i.e. approximately 91% believe that 
future implementation of Basel 3 in their jurisdiction is inevitable.  
A very important issue which the author addresses in the questionnaire is the 
issue of universal banking. Although all respondent banks were commercial 
banks, there was also the recognition that a number of these commercial 
banks could be engaged in universal banking.  
The universal banking model provides a ‘one-stop-shop’ for bank customers 
as banks operating such a model are able to provide a much wider range of 
other services721 and not just purely retail banking services. Inspite of these 
attributes, the universal banking model is dissimilar to the financial 
conglomerate model common in Europe, eg the UK, where banks set up 
subsidiaries to provide other financial services. 
It is submitted however, that a common similarity between the universal 
banking model and the financial conglomerate model is that both tend to 
exacerbate the issue of systemic risk and in relation to the latter, provided one 
of the catalysts for the global financial crisis through the ‘too-big-to-fail’ 
concept. 
As mentioned earlier on page (xxvii) of this thesis, the total number of banks 
from both Ghana and Kenya that responded to the questionnaire was 22, of 
which 16 are located in Ghana and 6 in Kenya. Of the 22 respondent banks, 3 
banks are deemed to be global banks, 5 banks – regional or Pan-African 
banks and the remaining 14 banks consisted of both local and foreign 
commercial banks. 
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 Asset and wealth management, payment services and insurance services. 
173 
Whilst it was important to highlight that a number of respondent commercial 
banks were likely to engage in universal banking activities, there is no 
evidence in the author’s opinion to suggest that such a practice would affect 
the responses provided. 
Universal Banking (Ghana) 
Thus out of the 16 respondent banks from Ghana, 13 described themselves 
as universal banks. Of this number claiming to be universal banks, 4 were 
local and 9 foreign banks. Nigerian banks accounted for a greater percentage 
of foreign banks in Ghana engaging in universal banking. This outcome may 
be attributable to the fact that Ghana has only recently embraced the concept 
of universal banking. There was a surprising revelation, where a respondent 
bank claiming to be a universal bank did not engage in insurance activity 
which in the author’s opinion is one of the commonest services provided by 
universal banks. 
Universal Banking (Kenya) 
Out of the 6 respondent banks from Kenya, 5 were universal banks. Of this 
number claiming to be universal banks, only 1 was local and 4 were foreign 
banks. The other bank claiming to be a non-universal bank was a local bank. 
Thus, out of the 22 respondent banks from both jurisdictions, 18 were 
universal banks and 4 non-universal banks. Below is a graphical illustration of 
the number of respondent universal/non-universal commercial banks from 
Ghana and Kenya. 
Fig 1 
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Of the 18 universal banks from Ghana and Kenya, 13 are foreign universal 
banks and 5 are local universal banks. The total number of foreign/local 
universal banks from both jurisdictions is represented in a pie chart below. 
Fig 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus out of the remaining 4 non-universal respondent banks, 3 are local 
banks and 1 a foreign bank. Having established which of the respondent 
banks were universal banks and distinguishing them from those that were not, 
it was important to return the focus of this questionnaire analysis to the 
research questions which this thesis from the outset sought to provide 
answers to. 
Research Question 1: Is the international convergence of capital adequacy 
regulations desirable? 
Although Archya722 finds that international convergence of capital adequacy 
regulations enhances financial stability as opposed to guaranteeing it, the 
general nature of his finding and the very wide range of jurisdictions from 
which participants to his research originated from, suggests that such a 
finding cannot necessarily be adjudged to be reflective of African countries 
specifically. After all, in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis, 
the general view amongst African countries had been that the crisis was a 
European problem and had to be solved by the European countries involved. 
In other words the crisis had nothing to do with Africa. 
While this African perception of the cause of the global financial crisis may be 
true, the ramifications were felt all over the world including Africa. Indeed, 
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financial globalisation, as well as ever-increasing cross-border banking 
transactions and the establishment of banking and financial branches and 
subsidiaries (made possible as a result of favourable investment policies 
implemented by a growing number of countries worldwide) have ensured that 
the stark reality of crisis transmission through various channels is never far 
away. 
On the question of whether the international convergence of capital adequacy 
regulations was desirable, all respondent banks from both jurisdictions agreed 
that the international convergence of capital adequacy regulations was indeed 
desirable. Indeed as mentioned earlier, one respondent was of the view that 
convergence of capital adequacy regulations would ‘prevent a systemic 
failure’. While this view represents the classic view or oft-cited reason for the 
rationale behind international capital adequacy regulations, the author is of 
the opinion that the sources or causes of a systemic banking failure or 
collapse are numerous and are capable of individually or collectively 
threatening the financial stability of any economy. 
Thus the international convergence of capital adequacy regulations in the 
author’s opinion would not necessarily eliminate future systemic failures. On 
the contrary, it would continue to play a significant role individually or 
collectively within the acronym CAMELS to ensure financial stability in any 
economy. Notwithstanding this view, it is submitted that the global application 
of international capital adequacy regulations has been fraught with challenges 
for all, particularly the BCBS, not least because different jurisdictions have 
different interpretations of what constitutes capital adequacy, which ultimately 
affects its uniform and consistent application on an international level723. 
Irrespective of this, it is hoped that the renewed efforts by the BCBS in 
ensuring consistency in the application of capital adequacy would yield 
results. 
Another very ‘interesting’ reason for the desirability of international capital 
adequacy regulations suggested by one respondent was that ‘it reduced the 
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 IOSCO Report, ‘Guidance to Emerging Market Regulators Regarding Capital Adequacy 
Requirements for Financial Intermediaries – Report of the Emerging Markets Committee of 
the International Organisation of Securities Commissions,’ December 2006 p7. 
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impact of insolvency in the banking sector due to lack of sufficient capital 
adequacy and liquidity’. 
It is submitted that, on face value this statement by the respondent seems to 
make little sense. Notwithstanding this, the author suggests that the 
respondent might have implied that international capital adequacy regulations 
were desirable because such regulations reduced the instances or 
occurrences of bank insolvency which would otherwise occur as a result of 
insufficient bank capital or liquidity. 
The impact that an insolvent bank could potentially have on other banks and 
the overall financial stability of that jurisdiction may vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction and that impact can be mitigated, depending on the existence of 
appropriate national banking insolvency regulations. Whilst jurisdictions may 
have adequate national banking insolvency regulations that effectively deal 
with local bank insolvencies and potential systemic crisis that arise from such 
failure, the same cannot be said of bank insolvency that has cross-border 
repercussions and implications. 
This is due to the fundamental reason that national bank insolvency laws tend 
to be generally applicable within borders of jurisdictions and are often 
subjected to legal challenges when an attempt is made to apply them beyond 
the borders. The impact of a cross-border banking insolvency can only be 
reduced in my opinion through the establishment of an international banking 
insolvency model applicable to international banks, or banks with cross-border 
subsidiaries, branches and other interests. 
 
Research Question 2: Will Basel 3 be relevant for African banks? 
The question of the relevance of Basel 3 for African banks was to ascertain 
whether the respondent banks believed that the Basel 3 Accord will be useful 
to their banks and African banks in general. Although Arnout Wellink 
suggested in his speech that Basel 3 would be ‘fully relevant for all African 
banks and banking systems, regardless of the state of development or 
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complexity’724, the author submits that it was also important to directly seek 
the opinion of the respondents on the issue of relevance. 
This question was answered by all 22 respondent banks and an opportunity 
was provided to the respondents to qualify their responses using a sliding 
scale of 5 to 1, where 5 represents the highest level of certainty of the 
relevance of Basel 3 and 1 representing least certainty. This opportunity was 
provided after the respondents had indicated using a yes/no response to the 
question of the relevance of Basel 3. 
Although this thesis seeks to investigate the implications of the capital 
adequacy provisions under Basel 3 on large commercial banks in Ghana and 
Kenya, it would have been virtually impossible for the author to determine the 
implications without providing the participants/respondents an opportunity to 
express their personal views on the relevance of the entire Basel 3 regulation. 
The views of the industry participants in Africa, particularly Ghana and Kenya 
are therefore necessary and important and perhaps more important than 
views from individuals outside the continent. Earlier in this thesis, under 
preliminary findings, it was established that 11 out of 16 respondent 
commercial banks in Ghana believed725 that Basel 3 would be relevant for 
their banks, representing a percentage of approximately 69%. It was also 
established that 5 out of the 6 respondent commercial banks from Kenya 
believed that Basel 3 would be relevant, representing approximately 83%. 
Thus when both jurisdictions are considered, 16 out of 22 banks believe that 
Basel 3 will be relevant for African banks, a combined percentage of 
approximately 73%. Thus of the 11 commercial banks from Ghana that 
answered this question in the affirmative, the number of banks indicating a 
level of agreement of a scale of 5 was 7 suggesting that respondents from 
these 7 banks were absolutely convinced that Basel 3 would be relevant to 
their banks. 
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 There is an assumption here that respondents who selected a scale factor of 2 and below 
were least certain of the relevance of Basel 3 to African countries and thus ultimately 
disagreed on the issue of relevance of Basel 3. 
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Out of the 5 respondent commercial banks from Kenya that suggested that 
Basel 3 would be relevant for African banks, only 1 respondent was absolutely 
convinced of the relevance of Basel 3 and chose a scale of 5. 1 respondent 
Kenyan bank indicated they did not know if Basel 3 would be relevant for 
African banks. 
Thus out of 16 banks from both jurisdictions that believed that Basel 3 would 
be relevant for African banks, only 8 chose a scale factor of 5 indicating that 
50% were absolutely convinced of the relevance of Basel 3. Respondent 
banks from both jurisdictions that agreed that Basel 3 would be relevant for 
African banks but chose a scale factor of 4 perhaps indicate a smaller degree 
of uncertainty in comparison to those banks that chose a scale of 3. 
For those banks that chose a scale of 2 and below, it was assumed that they 
did not believe that Basel 3 would be relevant for African banks. Only 2 
respondent banks out of a total of 22 banks indicated that they did not know if 
Basel 3 would be relevant for their bank and 1 bank strongly disagreed on the 
issue. 
The total number of respondent banks from both jurisdictions that chose a 
scale of 2 or below amounted to 6, i.e. 5 from the jurisdiction of Ghana and 1 
from Kenya. See table 1.3 in Appendix 1 which shows the scale factor chosen 
by the respondent banks. 
It is quite clear from table 1.3 that those respondents that chose a scale factor 
of 1 or 2 do have varying degrees of uncertainty. Although the level of 
uncertainty applicable to this group of respondents could be attributable to a 
host of factors, the author in his analysis has tried to establish if one of the 
reasons for the choice of a scale factor of 1 or 2 could have been due to 
medium or low level of awareness of Basel 3 by these banks. 
On the issue of Basel 3 awareness, respondents were asked about their level 
of awareness of Basel 3 prior to completing the questionnaire. With South 
Africa being the only African member country of the BCBS and the G20 and 
having already begun the implementation of Basel 3 on 1 January 2013, it 
was important to assess the awareness of Basel 3 in other African countries 
179 
i.e. Ghana and Kenya and in particular within the banking industries of both 
jurisdictions. 
Below is a pie-chart indicating the level in awareness of Basel 3726 in 
respondent banks in Ghana and Kenya. 
Fig 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Combined Jurisdictions 
Banks in Ghana generally fared better in terms of their level of awareness of 
Basel 3. Although the outcome from Kenya might not necessarily be a true 
reflection of overall industry-wide awareness of Basel 3 in Kenya (since the 
number of commercial banks in Ghana represented in the data is more than 
twice the number of respondent commercial banks from Kenya) it is rather 
surprising that not even 1 bank from Kenya could boast of having a high 
awareness of Basel 3. 
The number of banks in Kenya with a low level of Basel 3 awareness was 
also surprisingly high. Thus if majority of the respondent banks from Kenya 
admit to having a low level of Basel 3 awareness, i.e. 4 banks out of 6 banks, 
then the question could potentially be asked that how can an accurate 
assessment of the degree of relevance of Basel 3 to African banks/countries 
be provided when there is a low level of awareness of Basel 3 within the 
Kenyan banks. 
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 As at end of August 2013. The author submits that determining the level of awareness of 
the respondents of Basel 3 was crucial in ascertaining whether the respondents had their own 
prior knowledge of Basel 3 before the distribution of the questionnaire and its explanatory 
note took place. 
GHANA KENYA 
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Of the 16 respondent commercial banks from Ghana, 6 admitted to having a 
low level of awareness of Basel 3. Thus in sharp contrast to the position of 
respondent banks from Kenya, the 6 respondent banks from Ghana, despite 
their low level of awareness of Basel 3 still generally recognised the relevance 
of Basel 3 to African banks and countries. In other words, even though 6 
commercial banks from Ghana indicated a low level of Basel 3 awareness, a 
further 6 commercial banks in Ghana indicated a medium level of awareness 
of Basel 3. There were also 4 commercial banks from Ghana that indicated a 
high level of awareness of Basel 3. 
Of the 6 banks from Ghana that indicated a medium level of awareness, 3 had 
indicated that they believed Basel 3 would not be relevant to African banks 
and countries. The respondent bank from Ghana that had indicated that it did 
not know if Basel 3 would be relevant for African banks also indicated a low 
level of awareness of Basel 3. 
From the information provided above, it is indeed uncertain if the respondent 
banks that indicated medium and low level awareness of Basel 3 and believed 
that Basel 3 was irrelevant to Banks in Africa would have formed a different 
opinion had they had a high level of awareness of Basel 3. 
Notwithstanding this, the author is of the opinion that any future 
implementation of Basel 3 in Ghana and Kenya would have to be preceded by 
a sustained dissemination of Basel 3 information in these 2 jurisdictions 
during which the merits of Basel 3 implementation should be explained. 
Returning to the issue of whether Basel 3 will be relevant for African 
countries, the author gauges the attitude of the respondent banks towards 
international banking regulations particularly the Basel regulations, by 
examining the compliance history of the respondent banks in relation to Basel 
2. This was achieved by trying to determine how many of the respondent 
banks that believed Basel 3 would be relevant for African countries had 
themselves implemented Basel 2 either in full or in part or on the contrary, not 
at all. 
There is no intention to suggest that evidence of prior compliance to a Basel 
regulation i.e. Basel 2 is sufficient grounds to predict a future implementation 
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of Basel 3. Also, non-compliance by a respondent bank to Basel 2 regulations 
does not imply that a future implementation of Basel 3 in that jurisdiction is 
unlikely. This is because the cost of compliance and the lack of human 
resources and personnel who have to be trained and expected to oversee the 
compliance of Basel 3 could have a detrimental impact on compliance. 
Thus, as mentioned earlier, out of the total number of 16 respondent banks 
from both jurisdictions that believed that Basel 3 would be relevant for Africa, 
11 are from Ghana and 5 from Kenya. 10 had already begun the 
implementation of Basel 2 and 6 had yet to do so. Of the number (10) that had 
begun the implementation of Basel 2, 3 had fully implemented and 7 had 
partially implemented. Of the number that had partially implemented Basel 2, 
6 were foreign banks and 1 was a local bank. Thus of the 11 banks that had 
indicated that Basel 3 was relevant, 10 had either partially or fully 
implemented Basel 2. 
Of the 5 Kenyan banks that believed that Basel 3 would be relevant to African 
countries, 4 of them had already implemented Basel 2 (albeit all in part). The 
fifth bank, although believing that Basel 3 would be relevant for African banks 
had not implemented Basel 2. The sixth bank which had stated it did not know 
the relevance of Basel 3 to African countries had itself also not implemented 
Basel 2. Of the 4 Kenyan banks that have already implemented Basel 2, 2 are 
foreign banks and 2 are local banks. 
Research Question 3: What are the likely implications of Basel 3 on large 
commercial banks in Ghana and Kenya. 
It may be recalled that in Chapter 5, the author discussed different provisions 
under the Basel 3 regulations that were likely to have an impact on the capital 
adequacy of banks generally. Broadly, the provisions under Basel 3 which 
affect capital adequacy are those relating to: 
• the strengthening and enhancement of the quality of capital; 
• the introduction of a capital conservation buffer; 
• the introduction of measures to improve counterparty risk coverage; 
• the reduction or counteracting of pro-cyclicality; and 
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• the introduction of a leverage ratio. 
These above listed provisions of Basel 3 which individually and collectively 
affect the capital adequacy of banks, were included in a supplementary 
document by way of explanatory notes and attached to the questionnaire 
given to participant banks to help clarify and facilitate the easy comprehension 
of the issues for which the opinions of the respondents were being sought. 
However, prior to evaluating the responses provided by the respondents in 
relation to this research question, it is important that we consider the fact that 
regardless of whether banks within Ghana and Kenya adopt Basel 3, either of 
their own accord (i.e. through subsidiaries or branches in other countries that 
have already adopted Basel 3 or have plans to do so soon) or through a 
directive from their central banks i.e. Bank of Ghana (BoG) and Central Bank 
of Kenya (CBK) respectively, or not, there will be implications for all within the 
banking industry of these 2 jurisdictions, bank customers and in fact the 
African continent at large. 
In view of this fact, the respondents were asked if they thought the future 
implementation of Basel 3 in their jurisdiction was inevitable. In response to 
this question, 14 of the respondent banks from Ghana answered in the 
affirmative that Basel 3 implementation in Ghana was inevitable. Of this 
number, 5 are local banks and 9 foreign banks. Of the remaining 2 
respondent banks that disagreed that implementation of Basel 3 in Ghana 
was inevitable, 1 is a local bank and the other a foreign bank. 
All 6 respondent banks from Kenya also answered this question in the 
affirmative of which 2 are local banks and 4 foreign banks. Thus, of the 22 
respondent banks from both jurisdictions, 20 banks believe that the 
implementation of Basel 3 is inevitable. Although none of these banks gave 
reasons why they believed the implementation of Basel 3 was inevitable, it 
may be fair to say that this overwhelming view may be attributed to the way in 
which the predecessors of Basel 3, i.e. Basel 1 and Basel 2 have found their 
way into the regulatory banking framework of these 2 jurisdictions. 
Also, the presence of foreign commercial banks in both jurisdictions may be a 
factor. These foreign commercial banks may have subsidiaries in other 
183 
jurisdictions and not necessarily in Africa alone that might have already begun 
the adoption of Basel 3. Also, another factor, perhaps an overwhelming one is 
the fact that South Africa having begun the implementation of Basel 3, is 
bound to influence other African countries within the continent to follow suit 
and it is only a matter of time before Basel 3 becomes widely adopted. On the 
question of whether they were actually in favour of a future implementation of 
Basel 3 in their jurisdiction 12 of the respondents from Ghana said they were 
in favour and 4 said not in favour. Of the 12 who were in favour of Basel 3, 2 
suggested that even though they were in favour, they were of the opinion that 
Basel 3 implementation in their jurisdiction was not inevitable. 
Of the 4 banks from Ghana that were not in favour of Basel 3 implementation 
in Ghana, all 4 concluded that Basel 3 was still inevitable despite not being in 
favour. 
All 6 respondent banks from Kenya on the other hand suggested that they 
were in favour of Basel 3 implementation and again all 6 respondent banks 
agreed that Basel 3 implementation was inevitable. 
Returning to the responses provided by the respondent banks to this research 
question on ‘implication’, it may be fair to say that the responses727 were quite 
mixed. Even though an information fact sheet on Basel 3 was supplied to the 
respondents in addition to the questionnaire, 2 respondents from Ghana said 
they did not know what the implications would be and 1 respondent failed to 
provide a response to this question. With respect to the respondents from 
Kenya, 3 out of the 6 banks did not provide an answer to this question. 
Thus, out of a total of 22 respondent banks, 2 respondents admitted not 
knowing what the implications of an implementation of Basel 3 would be for 
their jurisdiction and a total of 4 respondent banks failed to answer the 
question. This implies that 16 out of 22 banks provided an answer to this 
crucial question i.e. a response rate of approximately 76%. Out of the various 
responses provided, the author has identified 6 issues which the respondents 
believe would be the implications of a Basel 3 implementation in these 2 
jurisdictions. 
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RESPONSE 1:  
‘Due to cost implications of raising higher capital, shareholders may have to 
either invest more capital or rely on mergers and acquisitions’. 
It is a well established fact that regulatory reforms always give rise to cost 
implications and an implementation of Basel 3 in Ghana or Kenya would be 
no exception. In other developed countries, particularly members of the G20 
that have begun the adoption of Basel 3, banks in those jurisdictions have had 
to raise capital through mergers and acquisitions and also through increased 
shareholdings of existing shareholders or new shares being issued by banks 
to the general public to attract new investors. 
The latter, although it brings in much needed capital is usually not favoured by 
the existing shareholders as it tends to dilute their existing shares. In the case 
of Ghana and Kenya, more costs would even have to be incurred to train 
personnel and update systems to ensure a smooth implementation should 
these jurisdictions decide to adopt Basel 3. 
RESPONSE 2: 
‘Increase the volume/value of business; some banks may have to merge thus 
losing its own identity’. 
This response, although suggesting a merger as a possible implication, also 
introduces other interesting issues. While there is some degree of uncertainty 
on the part of the author as to whether the volume and value of business 
transactions would increase as a result of implementation of Basel 3, the cost 
of business transactions may increase due to a likely increase in 
implementation costs. There is absolutely no doubt in the author’s mind that 
any costs incurred by the bank would be recouped by the bank, at least a 
substantial part of it. These costs would largely be recouped through 
increases in costs of banking transactions, levies or the introduction of bank 
charges for transactions that were previously free to the bank customer. 
While the loss of a bank’s individual identity may be a significant issue for any 
bank, and perhaps its customers, it might be deemed as a small price to pay 
in order to remain competitive in an increasingly competitive banking industry. 
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RESPONSE 3: 
‘It will encourage longer-term deposits, so that the long-term lending of banks 
is better matched by longer-term funding’. 
It is a well-known fact, particularly in Ghana and Kenya that long-term lending 
by the banks is virtually non-existent, even in the mortgage industry. The main 
reason for this is due to the history of high non-performance loans that have 
blighted the banking industry in the past and continues to remain a real threat. 
While long-term deposits are encouraged by any banking industry, bank 
customers are usually driven to deposit funds in banks due to the attraction of 
high deposit interest rates. It is thus the author’s opinion that such incentives 
encourage longer term deposit of funds by bank customers, and that any 
attempt by banks to recoup the costs of implementing Basel 3 through 
measures such as increased cost of banking transactions and perhaps 
lowering the relatively high interest rates payable to long-term deposits may 
compel bank customers to switch banks in search of a better deal elsewhere. 
Bank lending in Africa, particularly Ghana, is often available on short-term 
basis and with extremely high interest rates payment obligations attached. 
Long-term lending especially on the scale seen in the mortgage industry e.g in 
the UK where a loan can be secured on property for up to 25 years is virtually 
unheard of in Africa and it is very doubtful in the author’s opinion that 
implementation of Basel 3, would incentivise banks to lend funds for a longer 
period. 
RESPONSE 4: 
‘Corresponding banking lines may be difficult to find, and this would affect the 
smooth financing of international trade, which may not auger well for the 
economies of African Countries’. 
It is an established fact that the banking and finance industry in Africa is not 
as well developed as that of advanced European countries and the U.S.A., 
and there are a number of banking assets and financial products still not 
available within the African Continent, let alone Ghana and Kenya. 
Notwithstanding this, there are a number of assets types within banks in 
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Ghana and Kenya that are common to the asset portfolios of the advanced 
European Countries, such as deferred tax assets and hybrid capital. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the intention of the BCBS to strengthen the quality 
of capital through the relevant provisions within Basel 3, will ensure the 
gradual phase-out of hybrid capital over a 10-year period as this type of 
capital does not possess enough loss-absorbing qualities. Also under Basel 3, 
certain provisions ensure that not all deferred tax assets may be recognised 
as assets depending on the nature of the deferred tax. 
Thus the scenario may arise where banks in Ghana and Kenya may no longer 
have a market for these banking products in jurisdictions that have begun the 
implementation of Basel 3, and as a result have already begun the phasing-
out of these banking products. This would undoubtedly negatively impact 
international banking and finance as well as international trade. 
RESPONSE 5:  
‘Impact on the different transactions that banks in Ghana and Kenya and in 
the African region as a whole engage in with corresponding banks from those 
jurisdictions’. 
While this response may be similar to response 4, it is obvious that the nature 
of the impact on transactions being referred to in response 5, encapsulates a 
host of other potential ramifications whereas response 4 deals specifically 
with the availability of certain banking products. The transactions that banks 
engage in are numerous and varied and the likely impact on these 
transactions following the implementation of Basel 3 would be discussed 
much further in Chapter 7. 
 
 
RESPONSE 6: 
‘Implementation will definitely be conditional for IMF/World Bank loans, 
increasing capital requirements and its associate costs’. 
It may be recalled that in Chapter 3, the author discussed peer pressure and 
conditionality clauses being inserted into loan approval documentation issued 
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by the IMF and World Bank. The fact that this has been repeated by a 
respondent clearly makes a complete nonsense of all attempts by finance 
institutions such as the IMF and World Bank to suggest that African countries 
have never been compelled to adopt the Basel 1 & 2 Banking Accords but 
that adoption of these Accords had always been optional or a matter of choice 
for them. 
It is thus submitted, that this perception may have played a significant part in 
the answer provided by respondent banks to the question of whether 
implementation of Basel 3 in their jurisdiction was inevitable. While it may be 
further submitted that a formal adoption of the Basel 3 banking regulations by 
Ghana or Kenya may make it obligatory for the respondent banks to adopt the 
regulations, a potential argument could be made highlighting the fact that an 
unofficial adoption of Basel 3 could also potentially take place where it has 
been made a condition for an IMF/World Bank loan application by either the 
central bank of Ghana and Kenya, or directly by any of the respondent banks. 
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PART B 
6.2 Analysis of the responses directly impacting the capital adequacy 
of respondent banks 
A better understanding of how the capital adequacy provisions under Basel 3 
would impact on the respondent banks in my opinion can only be properly 
discussed following a detailed analysis of the responses provided by the 
respondent banks to questions that directly relate to the components of capital 
adequacy. 
In Chapter 4, the author introduced the components of capital adequacy as 
broadly capital and risk management framework. Thus, in the ensuing 
paragraphs, the author analyses the responses to key questions such as: 
what constitutes capital? (i.e. components); what loss-absorption provisions 
has the respondent bank got in place?; which banking risks are of greater 
significance to a respondent bank and also what efforts are being made to 
establish an effective risk management system. 
While there hasn’t been much change in the risk methodology applicable 
under Basel 3 from that of Basel 2, except for perhaps the introduction of 
(stressed VaR and incremental risk charge), the emphasis of an increase in 
the quantity and quality of capital, i.e. the latter referring to loss absorption 
quality of capital under Basel 3 suggests that the responses provided by the 
respondents to these key questions will be vital in determining the likely 
impact of the capital adequacy provisions of Basel 3 on the respondent banks. 
Thus the purpose of Part B of this questionnaire analysis is to analyse the 
responses provided by the respondents which in the author’s opinion will 
provide an insight as to the perception of the concept of capital adequacy in 
the jurisdictions of Ghana and Kenya. 
It was envisaged that to ask the respondents their opinions on the ‘capital 
adequacy implications of Basel 3’ on their banks would have perhaps been 
unwise as none of the respondents might have fully comprehended the 
question in order to provide appropriate answers. Thus the research question 
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3 was drafted in such a way as to welcome all responses and from which 
responses relating to capital adequacy issues will be analysed. 
The author was also firmly of the opinion that including specific questions in 
the questionnaire was likely to solicit answers that would assist in the analysis 
of the existing capital adequacy position of a respondent bank and from which 
the implications of the capital adequacy provisions of Basel 3 on that 
particular respondent commercial bank could be deduced. Thus the analysis 
provided in Part A is aimed at providing answers to the research questions 
posed by this research, whereas Part B is aimed at seeking an insight into the 
issues surrounding capital adequacy in respect of each respondent bank and 
for which the capital adequacy provisions under Basel 3 are bound to impact, 
thereby giving rise to implications. Furthermore, the combined analyses in 
Part A and Part B of this Chapter will hopefully provide comprehensive 
answers to the research questions posed. 
Through these analyses, any similarities or differences in the definition of the 
components of capital adequacy in both jurisdictions will be highlighted. 
These similarities and/or differences would also provide an insight into the 
degree of consistency in the concept of capital adequacy within these two 
jurisdictions. From the outset, the minimum capital required to operate as a 
commercial bank is understandably different in both Ghana and Kenya, 
although it must be acknowledged that both countries have recently increased 
their respective minimum capital requirements. 
Minimum Capital Requirement 
The Central Bank of Ghana (Bank of Ghana) in 2007 increased the minimum 
capital requirement for both foreign-controlled banks and local banks. Both 
foreign and local banks were asked to increase their capital base to GHCedis 
60 million (US$ 41 million) to improve solvency in the banking industry728. 
Although this decision by the Bank of Ghana had the overall effect of 
increasing bank capital adequacy from an average of 15.7% in 2007 to 19.1% 
in 2010, the volume of non-performing loans still increased. 
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 Foreign-controlled banks were required to meet this new requirement within 2 years as 
opposed to a 4/5 year compliance period for local banks. Most of the local domestic banks 
had to engage in mergers and acquisitions in order to satisfy this requirement. 
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A year later in Kenya in 2008, the Central Bank of Kenya also increased the 
minimum capital requirement. This requirement was introduced by the 
Finance Act of 2008 and made it a requirement for both existing and newly 
formed banks to possess a minimum of KES 1 billion (approximately US$ 12 
million) by December 2012. The previous amount was KES 250 million (US$ 
4 million) in 2008. 
Minimum Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Although respondent banks from Ghana confirmed the minimum capital 
adequacy ratio to be 10% in their jurisdiction, their individual capital adequacy 
ratios were well in excess of this figure i.e. ranging from 10.2% to 25%. 
Respondent banks from Kenya on the contrary, confirmed the minimum 
capital adequacy ratio to be 8% in their jurisdiction. Again, the respondent 
banks declared that they actually held capital adequacy ratios well in excess 
of the minimum, i.e. ranging from 8.2% to 15.2%. 
While these capital adequacy ratios are significantly high, even higher than 
those of global banks located in advanced countries, the impression is given 
that this should make these banks very secure. On the contrary however, the 
argument is often put forward that such higher capital adequacy ratios are 
necessary, particularly for African countries as these high capital adequacy 
ratios can easily be eroded by ever-increasing incidences of non-performing 
loans, currency fluctuations, concentration risks etc which are amongst the 
commonest risk issues facing commercial banks in Africa. 
BANK CAPITAL 
Definition of Capital 
As expected, although there were similarities in the nature of items classed as 
capital by the respondents, there were also a number of differences. The 
items classed as capital ranged from: paid-up capital; disclosed reserves 
(including statutory reserves, statutory reserve fund and income surplus 
account); total shares (ordinary and preference shares); investments in 
subsidiary(ies); retained earnings; capital revaluation reserves; revaluation 
reserves; subordinated term debt; subordinated long-term debt; stated capital; 
undistributable reserves and deferred tax assets. 
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While not a single respondent bank possessed all the above listed types of 
capital, there were certain types of capital, such as paid-up capital, retained 
earnings and statutory reserve fund that were often present in the description 
of capital assets by most of the respondent banks. 
Two respondent banks from Kenya mentioned deferred assets as part of their 
capital assets. This will undoubtedly give rise to implications for the banks 
concerned as Basel 3 contains provisions and criteria which deferred tax 
assets need to satisfy prior to its inclusion as capital. 
Prior to this research being undertaken, recognition was given to the fact that 
although the respondent banks were commercial in nature, some of them 
offered other services thus making them universal banks or a ‘one-stop shop’ 
where other financial services could be provided by one bank. In addition to 
this, some of the respondent banks were also expected to have investments 
in other entities, which could be considered as capital assets subject to 
certain criteria under Basel 3. 
Investments in subsidiary(ies): 
In Part A of this analysis, it was established that out of the 22 respondent 
banks that participated in this research, 18 were universal banks of which 13 
are located in Ghana and 5 in Kenya. Of the 13 respondent universal banks in 
Ghana, 7 of them have investments in another entity. Out of this number (i.e. 
7), 4 have investments of more than 10% of equity and 3 have investments of 
less than 10% of the total assets of that entity.  
Of the 4 respondent banks that had investments of more than 10% in another 
entity, 3 stated that the bank (it) had issued the shares in that entity. However, 
of the 3 respondent banks that had investments of less than 10%, only 1 had 
issued the shares in that entity themselves; the second had not issued the 
shares in the other entity and the third did not answer the question of whether 
the shares they had in the entity had been issued by them. 
Out of the 5 respondent banks from Kenya, only 1 indicated that they had 
investments in another entity. The investment this bank had in another entity 
was more than 10% and it was also responsible for issuing the common 
shares in that entity. Part 1 paragraphs 78 to 90 of Basel 3, sets out criteria 
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which banks must satisfy to either include or exclude certain investments as 
capital. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7. 
BANK RISKS: 
The risks faced by the banking industry although generally the same may vary 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This suggests that the management of bank 
risks which is a vital component of a bank’s capital adequacy framework is 
really about choices and what the bank’s management perceive to be the 
most important or least important of the risks within its risk profile. 
While the kinds of risks banks face globally are varied and high in number, 
there are a few notable risks which continually recur in the risk profiles of 
almost every bank, regardless of its location: such as credit risk; market risk 
and liquidity risk. Notwithstanding this observation, there are also certain 
types of banking risks that are unique to the African continent. 
In the Financial System Stability Assessment Update of Ghana conducted by 
the IMF729, it was concluded that non-performing loans (NPLs) was still high730 
and there had been an increase in the number of under-capitalised banks731. 
Another potential source of bank risk which the publication identified was risk 
due to cross-border contagion732. The report specifically stated that the 
presence of foreign banks in Ghana, particularly of (British origin) and the 
combined influence of Pan-African banks and other banks largely domiciled in 
other countries within the African continent posed a threat to financial stability 
within Ghana733. 
Concentration risk was also identified in the report as a real and significant 
risk emanating from credit risk. This was because large exposures due to the 
advancement of huge loans to single borrowers or a group of individuals 
working together e.g. a consortium was still a common occurrence. Needless 
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 Jose Vinals and Antoinette M Sayeh, ‘Financial System Stability Assessment’ Update 
prepared by the Monetary and Capital Markets and African Departments, published on 2 May 
2011. 
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 It was established within the Report that although 46% of the NPLs in March 2010 were as 
a direct/indirect result of Government arrears which had since been settled, the level had 
since risen again due to more borrowing and failure to repay by the Government. 
731
 Vinals and Sayeh (n729) 5. 
732
 ibid 9. 
733
 ibid. 
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to say that such large exposures exposed the bank to potential collapse 
should the borrowers default in their obligation to pay thus affecting financial 
stability within the economy of that jurisdiction. 
Another potential source of bank risk mentioned in the report was operational 
risk arising as a direct result of increased use of information technology to 
facilitate banking transactions and services. 
Although the risks Kenya’s commercial banks are exposed to, are generally 
the same type of risks inherent in any banking system, the IMF Country 
Report on Kenya734 highlighted political risk as significant in Kenya. This 
finding as presented in the Report may have been influenced by the fact that 
there had been political violence following the 2008 presidential elections and 
that made political risk and interference by the Government the most 
significant threat to financial stability in Kenya. The Report also mentioned 
that NPLs although still generally high, had actually decreased by 1.4% to 
KSh 57.5 billion in June 2012 from an amount of KSh 58.3 billion in June 
2011735. 
Bearing in mind that banks generally had different risk profiles, the 
questionnaire invited the respondents to choose from a list of banking risks, 
the risk that was of most concern to their management in order of priority. The 
list that the banks had to choose from were as follows: credit risk; market risk; 
political instability; liquidity risk; market risk; NPLs; inflation; operational risk; 
and lack of corporate governance. 
The respondents had to indicate using a numbering scale of ‘1 to 10’ to 
indicate which risk (type) was of the highest concern or least concern with ‘1’ 
representing the risk of most significance and ‘10’ representing risk of least 
significance. It must be pointed out though, that a risk adjudged by a bank to 
be of most significance in a particular year, might not necessarily remain at 
that level in the bank’s risk profile the following year. 
                                                 
734
 Kenya: Request for Disbursement Under the Rapid Access Component of the Exogenous 
Shocks Facility – Staff Report; Staff Supplement; Press Release on the Executive Board 
Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Kenya. IMF Country Report No 
09/191. 
735
 Kenya Banking Sector Annual Report, 2012. 
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A breakdown of the responses is as follows: 
Ghana 
Only 1 out of the 16 respondent banks located in the jurisdiction of Ghana 
failed to answer the question of which banking risk was of the highest 
significance and which posed the least threat to financial stability within their 
bank/jurisdiction. Thus of the remaining 15 respondent banks from Ghana, 14 
identified credit risk (also emanating from NPLs) as posing the most 
significant threat to financial stability. Out of this 14, 7 banks identified credit 
risk as the number one risk facing their banks and 5 banks ranked it their 
number two risk. The only respondent bank that did not identify credit risk as a 
significant threat was the Bank of Ghana (BoG) i.e. the Central Bank. In fact 
the BoG specifically stated that ‘there was absolutely no threat to it from 
‘Liquidity risk and Credit risk’. 
From the responses provided, operational risk was identified as the next most 
significant source of risk as 9 out of the 15 respondent banks including Bank 
of Ghana ranked operational risk within rank 1 to rank 3. The threat of 
financial instability arising from market risk followed a close third behind 
operational risk with 7 respondent banks ranking it as either the second or 
third most significant risk. 
According to the responses provided, liquidity risk was the fourth most 
significant risk that posed a threat to financial stability, with 5 banks giving it a 
ranking of between rank 1 and rank 3. In relation to the risks posed by foreign 
exchange fluctuations and inflation, 11 respondent banks gave foreign 
exchange fluctuations a ranking between rank 1 and rank 5 and only 4 
respondent banks ranked inflation risk within its top 5 risk threat to financial 
stability. 
One interesting observation was the significance of the potential threat to 
financial stability arising from liquidity risk. Whilst liquidity risk is recognised as 
a very real and significant threat to any banking system, the number of 
respondent banks that identified it within their top 5 threats was 11, i.e. 
equalling the same number that ranked foreign exchange fluctuations within 
their top 5 threats to financial stability. Notwithstanding this, the threat posed 
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by liquidity risk in the author’s opinion was of greater significance compared to 
the threat arising from foreign exchange fluctuations as it had a higher 
number of respondent banks ranking it within the top 3 risk threats. That is to 
say, five respondent banks ranked liquidity risk within the top 3 significant 
sources of risk as opposed to two respondent banks which ranked foreign 
exchange fluctuations within their top 3 banking risks that posed a threat to 
financial stability. 
Although inflation is notoriously high in African jurisdictions, generally in 
double figures as opposed to single low figures in Europe, it was indicated by 
the respondent banks to be the sixth most significant threat to financial 
stability. The banking risks that posed the least significant threat to the 
respondent banks from Ghana were corporate governance and political 
instability. Eight respondent banks accorded corporate governance either rank 
7 or 8 in terms of significance whereas only three respondent banks accorded 
political instability the rank of 7 or 8. As if to emphasise the insignificance of 
financial instability arising from political instability, 10 respondent banks 
ranked political instability in position 8. 
The low ranking of corporate governance and political instability as the least 
significant of potential threats to financial stability in the jurisdiction/bank is 
potentially good news. This is because it suggests two things. Firstly, that 
corporate governance practices have improved736 hence its ‘high ranking 
number’ and secondly the political stability that Ghana has enjoyed since 
1981 has ensured financial stability; stimulated economic growth and 
enhanced investor confidence. 
Thus the order in which the respondent banks in Ghana recognise banking 
risks that threaten financial stability are in the order: (i) credit risk (including 
NPLs); (ii) operational risk; (iii) market risk; (iv) liquidity risk; (v) foreign 
exchange risk fluctuations; (vi) inflation; (vii) corporate governance; and (viii) 
political instability. 
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 Although corporate governance practices have generally improved within Ghana, the 
threat of concentration risk still remains and it is believed that efforts are continually being 
made to address this issue. 
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It must be re-emphasised at this point that the identification and analysis of 
the banking risks faced by the respondent banks (in order of significance) had 
to be separately considered as the level of significance accorded to each 
banking risk was expected to differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
KENYA 
The analysis of the responses provided by the respondent commercial banks 
from Kenya suggests that the emphasis on political instability as the most 
significant threat to bank stability has shifted since the IMF Country report was 
published. All six respondent banks from Kenya answered the question on 
ranking and listed the banking risks in order of significance. 
Out of the six respondent banks, three ranked market risk as the number one 
most significant risk threatening financial stability in Kenya. Two respondent 
banks ranked credit risk (including NPLs) as the most significant source (rank 
1). With five respondent banks out of six banks according market risk the 
ranking of 1 to 3, suggests that market risk undoubtedly poses the most 
significant threat to financial stability in Kenya. 
Also, a total of three respondent banks out of six banks ranked credit risk 
(including NPLs) from 1st to 3rd ranking, which suggests that credit risk is the 
second most significant risk faced by banks in Kenya. Interestingly, two banks 
each ranked operational risk, inflation risk and political instability as their top 
three significant sources of threat to financial stability. To distinguish the 
difference in significance between these sources of risk, a further analysis 
was made of the number of occurrences of these three sources of risk within 
the first 5 ranking positions.  
Following this exercise, it was found that five out of six respondent banks 
ranked operational risk within the top 5 ranking position; three ranked inflation 
risk within the top 5 ranking position and two ranked political risk within the top 
5 ranking position. Although only one respondent bank ranked liquidity risk 
amongst the top 3 ranking positions, three respondents overall ranked it 
amongst their top 5 sources of threat. Notwithstanding this it is submitted that 
liquidity risk posed the fourth most significant risk, after market risk, credit risk 
(including NPLs) and operational risk. This is because two respondents 
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accorded liquidity risk a ranking of 4th as opposed to only 1 respondent 
according inflation risk a ranking of 4th. 
Even though 2 respondents each ranked political instability and foreign 
exchange fluctuations within the top 5 significant risks, a further two 
respondents also ranked political instability as the second most significant 
source of threat, whilst two other respondents accorded foreign exchange 
fluctuations the ranking positions of 3 and 5. Corporate governance appeared 
to be the least significant source of threat to the financial stability of banks in 
Kenya – one bank ranked it 6th; two banks ranked it 7th; and the remaining 
three banks ranked it 8th. 
Thus, the respondent banks from Kenya acknowledge the following banking 
risks as threats to the financial stability of Kenya in the order: (i) market risk; 
(ii) credit risk (including NPLs); (iii) operational risk; (iv) liquidity risk; (v) 
inflation; (vi) political instability; (vii) foreign exchange fluctuations; and (8) 
corporate governance. 
Thus a comparison of the analysis of respondent banks from both jurisdictions 
confirms that the most significant risks faced by banks are usually the top 3 
i.e. credit risk, operational risk and market risk but in no particular order. 
Liquidity risk surprisingly ranked 4th in both jurisdictions. Corporate 
governance seems to pose the least significant risk to financial stability in both 
jurisdictions due to its 7th or 8th ranking position, which is quite surprising. 
One can only assume that corporate governance compliance in Africa may be 
stronger within the banking industry in comparison to other sectors of the 
economy, with particular reference to Ghana and Kenya. 
RISK METHODOLOGY: 
An accurate assessment of capital adequacy of any given bank ultimately 
depends on the risk methodology used. The risk management processes 
implemented by any bank is to some extent dependent on a host of factors 
such as the size of the bank and the standard of the bank’s own internal 
systems used in the risk assessment processes. 
Thus it is acknowledged that risk methodologies implemented in the 
assessment of banking risks i.e. mainly credit risk, operational risk and market 
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risk may vary depending on the size and complexity of the bank’s internal 
model system. As a result, large banks with advanced internal model systems 
often use either the foundation IRB (FIRB) or the advanced IRB (AIRB) in the 
calculation of capital required to be set aside for credit risk. Banks whose 
systems are not as advanced as that of large global banks often use basic 
risk methodology approaches such as the standardised approach for credit 
risk. 
Of the 22 respondent banks, only two respondents stated that their banks 
used the IRB methodology for credit risk assessment. Even though a number 
of respondents failed to answer the question on which risk methodology was 
used by their banks in the measurement of credit risk, majority of the 
respondents (i.e. 68%) indicated that the standardised approach was the 
method used. This outcome is not a surprising one, considering the fact that 
although the respondent banks are large banks, they are definitely not as 
large as global banks and do not generally possess highly developed internal 
banking processes in comparison to global banks. Another issue is that banks 
in Africa often lack the expertise and technical framework required to validate 
complex models such as the FIRB and the AIRB models and to monitor their 
application 
LOSS ABSORPTION: 
During the global financial crisis, it was discovered that the regulatory capital 
banks possessed, particularly capital that was recognised under the Basel 2 
framework did not have loss-absorption characteristics. As a direct result of 
this, in the UK, tax payer’s money was used to bail-out a number of UK banks 
while the banks concerned continued to pay dividends to their shareholders. 
There was no banking insolvency law in the UK to ensure that banks 
experiencing financial difficulties and were on the brink of insolvency were 
actually allowed to fail safely, thus safeguarding depositor’s funds as well as 
tax payer’s money. Although banks that choose to adopt Basel 3 will 
ultimately have to ensure that the capital they possess will conform to the 
Basel 3 requirements, it is quite important for there to be other loss-absorption 
mechanisms such as banking insolvency laws within any country’s regulatory 
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framework to ensure banks considered to be no longer viable as a going 
concern are allowed to fail safely. 
While it is arguable that a global banking insolvency regulation model is a long 
way off, the banking industry in jurisdictions such as Ghana, should consider 
establishing an effective bank insolvency framework; not least because of the 
absence of a deposit insurance framework. Kenya on the contrary has a 
deposit insurance protection framework however, that does not make the 
requirement for a bank insolvency framework any less important. In view of 
this, respondents were asked if their banks had any loss-absorption 
mechanisms in place should bank insolvency occur. 
Only four out of 16 respondents for commercial banks in Ghana indicated they 
had loss adoption mechanisms in place which in my opinion is an issue of 
some concern. This might be mainly because Ghana still has no formal, 
explicit depositor protection scheme in place and this state of affairs arises 
because the Government of Ghana considers the statutory reserves that 
banks operating in Ghana are required to hold at the central bank as monies 
that could be used to return depositor’s funds following a financial crisis. 
The commonest form of loss-absorption mechanism adopted by these four 
banks was through insurance. Another respondent stated that it employed 
loss absorption mechanisms such as hedging, voidance of complex 
transactions and setting limits. Whilst these processes may be helpful in 
absorbing or reducing losses, it is submitted that voiding of complex 
transaction is dependent on the stage of the transaction since there will be 
legal obligations and cost implications to satisfy. Setting the limits does not 
necessarily provide loss absorption measures, because it merely reduces the 
size of any potential loss the bank might incur through financial activity. 
Out of the six Kenyan respondent banks, three indicated they had loss 
absorption mechanisms in place, whilst the remaining three banks, failed to 
answer the question. Failure to provide an answer might suggest that the 
respondents did not know of any loss absorption mechanism operating within 
their banks or at worst did not have any such processes in place within their 
own bank. 
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Nonetheless, of the remaining three that had loss absorption mechanisms in 
place, two suggested that their losses were absorbed through the legal 
process and the third suggested it absorbed losses through the sale of foreign 
currency and the imposition of high interest charges for loans. It is important 
to distinguish between loss prevention methods and loss absorption 
mechanisms. It is submitted therefore that losses are completely unavoidable 
and it is the mechanisms in place to absorb losses that is the crucial issue 
here since minimising losses ensures that depositor’s funds will at least be 
safe and would not be eroded by the losses. 
The sale of foreign currency to cater for losses may be undertaken with 
caution, as a bank really must rely on such reserve(s) as a matter of last 
resort. It is submitted that charging of high interest rates amounts to a loss-
absorption process, as the borrower being charged high interest is more than 
likely to be a risky borrower with a high probability of default737. 
Thus of the 22 respondents, only seven indicated they had loss absorption 
mechanisms in place i.e. a percentage of approximately 32%. The two 
respondents that indicated that they applied the legal process in the loss-
absorption mechanism process did not elaborate on the nature of the legal 
process. Notwithstanding this, the respondents were asked whether they were 
subject to any insolvency regulation within their jurisdictions. The responses 
were interesting and varied. One respondent for a foreign bank in Ghana 
stated that the Financial Services Authority (FSA, as it was previously known) 
regulations/guidelines were applicable to them. 
Other respondent participants from Ghana cited: Insolvency Act 1962 (i.e. Act 
153); Bodies Corporate (Official Liquidations Act) 1963 (i.e. Act 180); the 
Banking Act 612 (2002); the Banking Act 673 (2004), Banking (Amendment) 
Act 2007, i.e. Act 738; and Insolvency Act (2006). While it beggars belief that 
the responses were not consistent, none of the legislations mentioned above 
have provisions specifically aimed at bank insolvency which underscores the 
urgent need for a bank insolvency Act in Ghana. 
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 On the contrary, a borrower repaying a loan at a high interest rate may not necessarily be 
a risky borrower if such high interest margins are common place within the banking industry of 
the jurisdiction in which they reside and to which their repayment obligations are due. 
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Respondents from Kenya on the other hand cited the Central Bank of Kenya 
(CBK) guidelines and the Bankruptcy Act 1930 (as amended). 
Conclusion: 
The analyses provided in Part B of this Chapter 6 thus gives an insight into  
existing capital adequacy frameworks in both Ghana and Kenya and the 
nature of the impact the capital adequacy provisions under Basel 3 will have 
on large commercial banks (particularly the respondent banks) in both 
jurisdictions. Although the responses provided by the respondents to research 
question 3 in Part A were adequate, the author believes that the analysis in 
this Part B will ensure that every possible and likely implication, (specifically of 
the capital adequacy provisions under Basel) 3 will be thoroughly addressed 
in the final chapter, i.e. Chapter 7. 
Appendix 6 is an exact copy of the questionnaire sent to the respondents and 
contains the questions that were posed to the respondents the answers of 
which have greatly assisted the author in providing a detailed analysis. The 
rationale for attaching the questionnaire template is to assist anyone reading 
this piece of scholarly work, develop a better understanding of the nature of 
the questions asked and the reasons why certain questions have been asked. 
 
202 
 
CHAPTER 7  
THE IMPLICATIONS OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY  
PROVISIONS UNDER BASEL 3 
7.1 Introduction 
The implementation of Basel 3 by South Africa it is submitted, paves the way 
for other African countries to follow suit in the near future. While it may be 
virtually impossible to predict a date at this point (and understandably so), the 
author suggests that other African countries are likely to follow in the footsteps 
of South Africa in a decade or so from now. 
There are and will undoubtedly be critics738 who may not share this view. Their 
contention that banks in Africa generally hold capital in excess of the Basel 
Accord capital requirement and as a result, reforms introduced by Basel 3 
would not apply739 to African countries is deeply flawed. This submission is 
made due to high incidences of non-performing loans, concentration risks, 
inflation etc which are banking risks normally prevalent in Africa.  
This flaw in the critics’ argument is further exposed by the increase in 
systemic banking risk contagion which financial globalisation introduces and 
requires addressing as discussed in Chapter 3. 
7.2 Relevance of Basel 3 to African Countries 
Following the analysis provided in the previous chapter i.e. Chapter 6, it is 
submitted that the role played by financial globalisation and cross-border 
inter-bank transactions (as discussed in Chapter 3) underscores the need and 
importance of a harmonised approach towards global banking regulatory 
standards. 
A careful analysis of Arnout Wellink’s statement740 and a subsequent 
observation of the pace of financial deepening and globalisation in Africa 
should draw attention to the veracity of his statement. In contrast however, 
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 I Salami, ‘International financial standards and the application of Basel 3 in Emerging and 
Frontier Markets’ (2012) Law and Financial Markets Review Volume 6 336,339.  
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Louis Kasekende et al741 suggest in their paper that the scope of the impact of 
Basel 3 provisions on Africa is limited only to the macro-prudential measures 
therein, and that the provisions within Basel 3 were incapable of mitigating the 
systemic risks that arose from the cross-border movement of capital through 
cross-border inter-bank financial transactions. 
They suggest further, that African countries faced banking regulatory 
challenges742 which required ‘a wider array of instruments than those 
presented in Basel 3’743. While admittedly some of the banking risks faced by 
African banks are uncommon to banking systems in Europe and perhaps 
elsewhere, it is submitted that the regulatory challenges highlighted by 
Kasekende as unique to Africa ought to be addressed within the framework of 
local banking laws across the African continent. The fundamental reason for 
this submission is that such regulatory challenges are not common to all 
banks globally and as such it would be a complete nonsense to insert a 
provision within a global banking regulatory framework that seems to address 
a banking regulatory issue, characteristic of African banks. 
It is therefore submitted that the Basel 3 provisions will impact African 
countries in diverse ways to the extent that its effect on banks in one 
jurisdiction may be different to that occurring in other jurisdiction. Thus there 
will be implications for all commercial banks in Ghana and Kenya regardless 
of whether both countries subsequently implement Basel 3 or not. These 
implications are set out within this chapter 7. 
While the author’s view stands, notwithstanding the fact that no formal request 
has yet been made by the BCBS or the G20 to African countries (particularly 
Ghana and Kenya), there is independent evidence though, that each 
jurisdiction has independently had discussions on Basel 3 within their 
respective banking industries744. Indeed approximately 91% of respondents to 
                                                 
741
 Louis Kasekende, Justine Bagyenda and Martin Brownbridge, ‘Basel 3 and the Global 
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Perspective’ (2012), Global Economy Journal Volume 12 1. 
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the questionnaire have concluded that the adoption of Basel 3 would become 
an inevitable requirement for African countries with time. 
In Arnout Wellink’s statement reiterating the relevance of Basel 3, he identifies 
3 broad components of Basel 3 which in his view will be completely relevant 
for African banks and banking systems: 
Firstly, that the provisions under Basel 3 that increase the quality and quantity 
of capital through its heightened emphasis on common equity will be 
beneficial to banks in Africa, as better capital quality was likely to enhance 
loss – absorption. 
Secondly, that the leverage ratio introduced by Basel 3 provided a non-risk 
based backstop to the existing risk-based measures which were all but 
perfect. 
Thirdly, the introduction of a conservation buffer and a counter-cyclical buffer 
was relevant for African countries and even more so Emerging countries. 
Even though global systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) are 
usually found in large European developed countries, he suggests that the 
Basel 3 provisions addressing systemic importance will still be relevant to 
African banks. 
Another reason cited by Wellink, which will be relevant for Africa, i.e. global 
liquidity standards is outside the remits of this thesis and so will not be 
discussed. The final provisions of Basel 3 which he cites as fully relevant to 
Africa are the Trade Finance ‘concessions under Basel 3’. While the 
relevance of the above provisions to Africa will each be addressed in turn and 
thoroughly analysed, it is imperative that Iwa Salami’s contrasting views on 
the relevance of Basel 3 to African countries are also analysed. 
Iwa Salami argues745 that since Basel 3 provisions focused on ‘the regulation 
of leverage, capital and liquidity’746 all of which are common to financial 
institutions located in advanced countries, such provisions were incapable of 
being relevant to African countries. Salami attempts to clarify this view by 
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suggesting further that most African banks usually held capital levels higher 
than that suggested under the Basel Accord and that Basel 3 was ‘less 
relevant for African economies whose banking systems do not share the 
same characteristics and challenges as those in Advanced markets’.747 
The author disagrees with Salami’s view, in that while it is admitted that 
African financial institutions generally hold higher capital748 than required 
under the Basel 1 Accord, the high incidence of non-performance loans 
(NPLs), concentration risk and the lack of effective credit reference agencies 
compounded by largely ineffective bank supervisory structures suggest that 
an even higher capital adequacy requirement may be necessary. Also, with 
the rate of inflation often considerably high in Sub-Saharan Africa, an even 
higher capital adequacy ratio is arguably likely to protect banks from losses 
arising from interest rate fluctuations. 
Another point raised by Iwa Salami on the issue of irrelevance of Basel 3 to 
African countries, is her suggestion that ‘questions of relevance of 
international standards are raised when 80% of countries of the world cannot 
effectively apply them’749. Here, it is submitted that Salami seems to be 
confusing relevance with applicability. The fact that the application or 
implementation of an international financial standard proves challenging does 
not necessarily imply that the provisions relating to that international standard 
are irrelevant to that jurisdiction. 
It is thus submitted that the capital adequacy provisions under Basel 3 will 
remain relevant to all banks regardless of their level of complexity and the 
suggestion is made that African countries ought to be provided with 
assistance750 in relation to the future implementation of Basel 3. This view is 
further strengthened by quantitative empirical evidence obtained from the 
analysis of the responses provided by participant banks to the questionnaire. 
With 17 out of 22 respondent banks believing that Basel 3 would be relevant 
for Africa, is of itself symptomatic of a broader opinion for which critics of the 
relevance of Basel 3 to African economies should take note of.  
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7.3 Implementation of Basel 3 by African Countries 
While there is absolutely no doubt that legal obstacles would have to be 
surmounted in future in order to integrate Basel 3 provisions into African 
national banking regulatory frameworks (on the assumption that African 
countries decide to adopt Basel 3), South Africa’s ability to meet the 1 
January 2013 deadline imposed on member states of the G20, suggests that 
determination and the strength of political will, will be a key factor751 in any 
future implementation of Basel 3 by Ghana and Kenya. Although the author is 
not familiar with the legal processes and stages involved in the adoption of 
Basel 3 by South Africa, it is fair to say that South Africa’s Bank Amendment 
Bill752 which preceded the formal adoption of Basel 3 provisions contained 
new definitions, expressions and provisions that either mirrored the provisions 
within Basel 3 or at least conveyed the meanings and/or intentions behind the 
Basel 3 provisions753. 
If Ghana and Kenya decide to adopt Basel 3 in future, they may have to adopt 
either of two forms of implementation. The process of implementation may be 
initiated through a complete or partial overhaul of existing banking regulatory 
framework to incorporate provisions of Basel 3, or via the creation of an 
entirely new banking regulatory framework that will supersede previous 
regulations. It is submitted however, that the process of implementation 
undertaken by either jurisdiction would undoubtedly be influenced by the then 
existing individual legal and political environment, the efficiency of legislative 
processes, the political will to implement Basel 3 and the availability of 
resources. 
In Chapter 3, attitudes of African countries towards the compliance of Basel 
regulations in Africa were discussed and it was suggested that inspite of firm 
commitments previously made by Ghana and Kenya in respect of a full 
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adoption of Basel 2754, there remains a possibility that the authorities in these 
jurisdictions may eventually decide to side-step a full implementation of Basel 
2 as they adopt a ‘wait and see’ attitude with the ultimate intention of adopting 
Basel 3. 
Regardless of whether or not Ghana and Kenya fully adopt Basel 2 prior to an 
adoption of Basel 3, evidence from the analysis of the questionnaire suggests 
that out of the 16 respondent banks from Ghana, 10755 had implemented 
Basel 2 and of the six respondent banks from Kenya, four756 had partially 
implemented Basel 2. Further analysis of the responses provided in the 
questionnaire suggests that 12 out of 16 respondent banks from Ghana are in 
favour of a future implementation of Basel 3 in their jurisdiction i.e. 75%. Thus, 
even though there seems to be credible evidence pointing to the likelihood of 
a future adoption of Basel 3 by Ghana and Kenya757, there is no indication as 
to how soon this might be and also whether any future adoption of Basel 3 
would be somewhat patchy and inconsistent (i.e. where different parts of 
Basel 3 are adopted) or indeed whether they will even ever be adopted758. 
Notwithstanding whether future implementation of Basel 3 occurs in Ghana 
and/or Kenya, one thing is certain; there will be implications for all commercial 
banks in Ghana and Kenya. In view of this, the ensuing discussion on the 
implications of the capital adequacy provisions of Basel 3 has been set out 
under two scenarios. The immediate implications i.e. where Basel 3 has not 
yet been implemented by Ghana and Kenya and also future implications (i.e. 
where preparations are being made to adopt Basel 3 and its subsequent 
adoption). It is important to clarify that this discussion will not be on the 
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implications of the entire provisions of Basel 3 on large commercial banks in 
Ghana and Kenya, as such emphasis would be outside the scope and remits 
of this thesis and indeed would merit a separate academic research in the 
future. 
7.4 Characteristics of the Ghana and Kenyan Banking Sectors 
7.4.1 Ghana Banking Sector 
The banking reforms of 2003 implemented through the Financial Sector 
Strategic Plan (FINSSP) played a significant role in the development of 
Ghana’s banking system. Today, Ghana’s banking system is well developed 
with a modernised banking trade and inter-bank settlement infrastructure. This 
has enabled the banking system to process an ever-increasing number of 
banking transactions and as a result facilitate a much wider range of financial 
services than previously possible. 
Within the last decade, the number of commercial banks in Ghana has 
steadily risen. Prior to that, Ghana’s banking system had consisted of fewer 
commercial banks and the subsequent increase in number has largely been 
due to the influx of foreign-owned commercial banks. The dominance of 
foreign-owned banks within Ghana’s banking system is replicated through the 
profiles of the respondent commercial banks that participated in this research. 
Out of 16 respondent banks from Ghana, six were local banks and 10 
foreign/international banks. Thus the representation of foreign banks in this 
research was approximately 62.5%. This relatively high figure is a reflection of 
the huge presence of foreign-owned banks in Ghana. In Ghana’s Financial 
System Stability Assessment Update Report in 2011, it was suggested that of 
the 26 Commercial banks present in Ghana, 13 were subsidiaries of foreign 
banks which had a combined market share of 51%759. Also, even though 
individual market share was dominated by British banks such as Barclays and 
Standard Chartered Bank, the combined market share of foreign banks of 
African origin was considerably bigger. 
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Out of the remaining 13 local banks, the State banks760 which comprise five 
commercial banks held 29% of the remaining 49% market share of banking 
assets. Another feature characterising Ghana’s banking system is the 
increase in the number of universal banks. While the extent of universal 
banking may be difficult to ascertain, its popularity in Ghana is on the rise. As 
at the end of April 2011, a minimum of nine universal banks761 had been 
identified by the Report as accounting for 53% of the country’s banking 
system assets. Although the Report does not state how many of the universal 
banks are foreign-owned banks, results762 from the analysis of the 
questionnaire suggest that most of the universal commercial banks operating 
in Ghana are foreign-owned banks which also suggests that local banks 
account for a comparatively small amount of banking system assets. 
It is submitted, that within the last decade or so, following the establishment of 
subsidiaries of foreign banks (both African and International), total assets 
within the banking system have increased considerably. Accompanying this 
increase has been the increase in inter-banking relationships and transactions 
resulting in the magnification of the existing threat of local and cross-border 
risk contagion. 
In Chapter 6, the risks faced by commercial banks in Ghana were thoroughly 
discussed and as such would not merit another discussion here. However 
following analysis of the responses, credit risk was identified as the main risk 
for commercial banks in Ghana. This was thus consistent with the findings of 
the Ghana FSAP Report in 2011. 
Nonetheless, other traits of Ghana’s banking system have been identified 
which renders the entire banking system vulnerable. The unavailability or 
scarcity of long-term finance ensures that interest rates on loans remain 
astronomically high. Even mortgage loans are unlikely to be guaranteed over 
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a period exceeding 15 years which implies an even higher monthly 
repayment. 
The recent establishment of a credit check system763 in Ghana is limited in its 
effectiveness as shared information is not readily available and as a result, a 
borrower in default could still apply for a number of loans from different banks 
thereby increasing the risk of further default. The high interest rates also 
ensure that borrowers are faced with a high cost of financing/borrowing. 
Although banks in Ghana are generally well capitalised, corporate governance 
malpractices often ensures that this counts for nothing. In some cases, large 
loan concentrations exist within a bank’s portfolio – a blatant disregard for 
existing safeguarding measures. 
The inability of the Bank of Ghana to provide an effective supervisory role has 
continued to undermine the banking system and made malpractices such as 
this increasingly likely. The Financial System Stability Assessment Report 
2011 also uncovered a lack of an effective bank resolution procedure and a 
virtually non-existent framework for robust systemic risk analysis. An even 
more shocking observation is the fact that Ghana’s recent Insolvency Act 
2006 (Act 708) does not address the issue of bank insolvency. 
7.4.2 Kenya Banking Sector 
Although the total number of commercial banks in Kenya amounted to 43 
commercial banks as at 31 March 2013, majority of these banks declined to 
participate in this research hence the author’s ability to obtain responses from 
only six commercial banks from this jurisdiction. 
The Kenyan banking system consists of a substantial number of foreign-
owned commercial banks. These foreign-owned banks were largely 
responsible for the increase in overall banking asset size which as at 31 
March 2013 stood at Ksh 2.4 trillion764 compared to Ksh 1.9 trillion765 in June 
2011. Out of the six commercial banks that took part in this research, four 
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were foreign-owned banks thus highlighting the dominance of foreign-owned 
banks in this jurisdiction. 
Such is the influence of foreign-owned banks in Kenya that the Central Bank 
of Kenya granted permission in November 2011 to First Rand Bank of South 
Africa and in June 2012 to Bank of China Limited to set up representative 
offices766 in Kenya. While the presence of universal banks in Kenya is not in 
doubt, there is some level of uncertainty as to the actual figure. 
Notwithstanding this, out of six respondent Kenyan banks, five described 
themselves as universal banks. 
Although risk management seemed to have been overhauled following the 
publication at the end of 2012 of a revised prudential and risk management 
guideline(s) by the Central Bank of Kenya, the volume of non-performing 
loans still increased from Ksh 61.6 billion in December 2012 to Ksh 70.3 
billion in March 2013 (representing an increase of 14.1 percent)767. This 
increase was attributed to the effects of the high interest rates for 2011 and 
2012 and non-sharing of information within the Kenyan banking sector. 
Inspite of the challenges768 faced by the Kenyan banking industry in the past, 
huge strides seem to have been made in the innovation of financial services 
available to the people of Kenya. Apart from the provision of automated teller 
machines (ATMs), the introduction of the M-PESA769 has also literally brought 
banking and financial services to the doorstep of millions of Kenyans thus 
significantly reducing the number of Kenyans without access to any form of 
banking services. 
7.5 Establishing a case for the need to increase the quality and 
quantity of bank capital in African Banks (Ghana & Kenya). 
While the aim of this thesis is not to provide an estimate of the optimal level of 
regulatory capital requirement for African banking systems, the author is of 
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the opinion that compliance on the part of banks to the capital adequacy 
requirements under Basel 3 will play a key role in enhancing financial stability 
in African jurisdictions. In relation to Ghana and Kenya, it is submitted that the 
quality and quantity of bank capital in these two jurisdictions need to be 
improved for the following reasons: 
 Non-performing loans 
The high incidence of non-performing loans in both Ghana and Kenya is a 
real cause for concern. With the occurrence of NPLs not limited to local 
banks, any rise in non-performance loans particularly in domestic systemically 
important banks and subsidiaries of foreign and international banks will 
arguably have a potential impact on the financial stability of that jurisdiction. 
 Lack of an effective corporate governance framework 
The lack of an effective corporate governance framework and good 
supervisory processes implies that banking malpractices will continue to 
undermine the gains that the banking industries have struggled to make thus 
far. Concentration risk770 continues to cause problems as some management 
figures continue to flout basic banking rules and procedures. Also, the lack of 
an effective centralised credit reference agency capable of identifying 
potential loan defaulters is likely to make the issue of high non-performing 
loans a challenging one. 
 Ownership structure 
In Ghana, a substantial amount of the non-performing loans can be attributed 
to the inability of the Government to pay its outstanding debts to a number of 
state-owned banks. In most cases, the Government only pays up following 
months and even years of bad publicity in the press and in most cases will 
return to borrow more after settling the initial debt. This results in a never 
ending cycle of debts attributable to non-performance loans, not to even 
mention the interest that is likely to accrue as a result. Where privatisation of 
certain state banks have occurred, there have been accusations of unethical 
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underhand dealings taking place where the accepted offer bids have generally 
not been the highest. 
In Kenya, where a greater percentage of the banking industry consists of 
foreign banks, an increase in the incidence of non-performing loans will pose 
a direct threat to the financial stability of the country. 
 Unreliable financial soundness indicator data 
Procedural inadequacies often associated with the compilation of financial 
data often provide misleading information relating to the financial health of 
certain banks. In Ghana, non-performing loans are sometimes incorrectly 
classified under a different grouping thus resulting in banks not setting aside 
the requisite amount to cater for such losses. Also, the tendency for some 
existing loans that have undergone restructuring to be treated as new and 
current loans should be avoided. 
 Ineffective risk management and supervisory processes 
The increase in automated banking services and other financial services 
heavily reliant on the use of IT makes cyber-crime a source of risk that banks 
need to invest in to counter its menace. Thus banks will need to have effective 
risk management systems and practices in place which are easily adaptable 
to the ever-changing nature of banking risks. 
 Financial globalisation 
Although there are benefits to be derived from financial globalisation, it must 
be recognised that the growth of Pan-African banks in Africa could be a 
potential source of financial instability. Notwithstanding the increase in the 
array of banking services that Pan-African banking usually brings thus 
providing healthy competitive banking, it is submitted that they are also of 
domestic importance systemically and therefore need to be adequately 
capitalised and also have a robust risk management framework in place. 
Without such measures in place, there is a risk of such institutions availing 
themselves inadvertently as conduits for risk contagion. 
214 
 Lack of an effective Bank Insolvency framework 
The lack of an effective bank insolvency framework raises questions as to 
how loss-absorption will be undertaken by the bank. Even though Ghana has 
no depositor protection scheme in place, banks in the jurisdiction are required 
to retain some funds with the Bank of Ghana purposely for covering any 
potential losses. However, such a fund will be insufficient towards the return 
of depositors’ monies particularly when the bank suffers a potentially large 
loss. Thus an increase in the quality and quantity of capital will ensure that a 
fall back system remains in place should it be required. 
Although Kenya has a depositor protection scheme in place, such a scheme 
will in my opinion be largely ineffective for the purposes of returning 
depositor’s funds as the amount depositors become entitled to following a 
banking crisis is arguably small. 
7.6 Type of Bank Capital held by the respondent banks 
Following the analysis in Chapter 6, the types of bank capital held by the 
respondent banks were found to be of a wide range. While there was some 
level of consistency in the types of capital held by the respondent banks, 
some differences771 also existed which were all too conspicuous. 
Examples of the types of capital that were relatively consistent across 
respondent banks were: paid-up capital; disclosed reserves; current year’s 
unaudited profits; share capital; undistributable reserves and other reserves. 
Other types of capital not commonly held were hybrid capital, deferred tax 
assets and a number of convertible bonds. 
On the basis of the above observation, there will be implications for the 
respondent banks where the nature of capital held is concerned and the 
extent of the implications will be dependent to a substantial degree on the 
provisions of Basel 3 affecting them. Banks that have among their asset 
portfolio, hybrid capital and deferred tax assets may become subject to the 
grandfathering and de-recognition provisions of Basel 3 should they 
eventually adopt Basel 3. Also, banks intending to adopt Basel 3 will be 
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required to hold more common equity. To do this, they may have to issue 
more shares – a decision not likely to be favoured by existing shareholders as 
it may result in the dilution of their existing shares. 
On the issue of the risk management processes undertaken by the 
respondent banks, it is suggested that since most of the respondent banks 
implemented the standardised approach to credit risk measurement they are 
unlikely772 to be significantly affected by the Basel 3 risk management 
provisions. However, as banks move away from the standardised approach to 
more sophisticated risk measurement approaches in the future so will the 
Basel 3 risk management provisions become more applicable. 
7.7 The impact and implications of the capital adequacy provisions of 
Basel 3. 
It must be acknowledged that since the central theme of this thesis (i.e. the 
implications of the capital adequacy provisions of Basel 3) is based to some 
degree on the responses provided by the respondent banks to question 3 
posed773 at the beginning of this thesis, it would be absolutely necessary to 
analyse the responses provided by the respondent banks to this question 
prior to examining the wider implications. 
The responses provided by the respondent commercial banks provide an 
interesting insight into the likely implications of implementation or non-
implementation of Basel 3 in their respective jurisdictions. Below are extracted 
quotes of participants from the respondent banks which have been replicated 
to provide a general view of their opinions774 to the final question this thesis 
poses and for which this research paper seeks to answer. 
Thus the responses provided by some of the respondent banks to the final 
question posed by this thesis were as follows: 
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Bank 1: ‘Basel 3….however, this may also crowd out smaller banks, since 
they may find it difficult to raise the required capital’; 
Bank 2: ‘It will compel shareholders to invest more capital or it will result in 
mergers & acquisitions’; 
Bank 3: ‘Regardless of whether central banks adopt the implementation of 
Basel 3 in Ghana or Africa, the adoption by the G20 and the E.U. will have 
implications for our jurisdiction in terms of the transactions with our 
corresponding banks in those jurisdictions. This is because we will be 
counter-parties in our relations with them’; 
Bank 4: ‘Where the large banks are subsidiaries of major international banks, 
compliance will be dictated from the Head-office, irrespective of the Central 
Bank’s (Ghana) actions’; 
Bank 5: ‘The Central bank will be forced to adopt it in the near future, since 
most of the counter-party/corresponding banks are in the G20 countries’; 
Bank 6: ‘Corresponding banking lines may be difficult to find and this would 
affect the smooth financing of international trade which may not auger well for 
the economies of African countries’; and 
Bank 7: ‘It will encourage longer-term deposit, so that the long-term lending of 
banks is better matched by longer-term funding’. 
7.7.1 Immediate impact and implications on respondent banks 
Although the above responses reflect different opinions, it is submitted that 
each response highlights an aspect of the numerous implications that the 
respondent banks could potentially experience as a result of implementation 
or non-implementation of Basel 3. Admittedly, there are other and much wider 
implications which will also be the subject of the discussion in this chapter. 
However, this needs to be preceded with a reflection on the fundamental aim 
of Basel 3. 
In Chapter 5, the rationale for the introduction of Basel 3 by the BCBS was 
discussed and from which the 2 main objectives for Basel 3 could be summed 
up as: 
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‘to strengthen global capital and liquidity regulations with the goal of 
promoting a more resilient banking sector and to improve the banking 
sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic 
stress’775. 
While one might conclude that the implications for large commercial banks in 
Ghana and Kenya may be predictable or unpredictable, it is submitted that the 
uniqueness of this research is hinged on this very issue and that there is 
currently no other academic research or study which addresses the 
implications of the capital adequacy provisions of Basel 3 on large commercial 
banks in Ghana and Kenya. 
Swati776 suggest that the differences in the nature of the impact of Basel 3 on 
Emerging markets are attributable to the micro-prudential777 and macro-
prudential778 components of Basel 3. They further suggest that the impact that 
Basel 3 will have on Emerging markets will result in implications for the 
‘financial flow channel’ as a result of a decline in lending and also fluctuations 
in interest rates. 
According to Swati, the financial flow channel is affected by interest rate 
fluctuations, the volume of bank lending779 provided by banks located in 
advanced countries and counter-party risk assessment. 
Even though the implications that Swati highlight are in respect of Emerging 
markets, it is submitted that the immediate implications for respondent banks 
in Ghana and Kenya will be similar. This is largely due to the fact that Ghana 
and Kenya are home to a number of the subsidiaries of foreign and 
international banks whose parent banks may be head-quartered in 
jurisdictions that have already begun the implementation of Basel 3. 
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The response provided by Bank 3 reiterates how banking transactions are 
likely to be affected through banking relationships with other banks located in 
jurisdictions which might have begun the implementation of Basel 3. It is also 
submitted that the nature of the implication will undergo a twist should the 
subsidiaries of the global banks present in Ghana and Kenya be directed by 
their parent banks (often located in Europe to immediately begin the 
implementation of Basel 3780. Another immediate implication of Basel 3 
particularly as a result of the capital adequacy provisions is reflected in the 
response provided by Bank 6.  
The potential lack of correspondent banking lines may arise as a result of the 
grandfathering and de-recognition provisions under Basel 3. In other words 
commercial banks in Ghana and Kenya may find it impossible to trade in 
banks’ assets or make use of capital that might have already been 
grandfathered or de-recognised in the jurisdiction in which the counter-party 
bank may be located. 
7.7.2 Likely impact and implications for Commercial Banks should Ghana 
and Kenya implement Basel 3 
Following the responses provided by the respondent banks to the question of 
the likelihood of Basel 3 being adopted by African banks; the desirability of 
Basel 3 implementation in Africa and whether the respondent banks will 
implement Basel 3, the question that remains to be asked is when (rather than 
if) will Basel 3 be adopted by Ghana and Kenya and infact by other African 
countries as a whole? 
The adoption and implementation of Basel 3 by Ghana and Kenya will to a 
very large extent depend on the legal and legislative processes currently in 
place in both jurisdictions. Unlike in the UK where Basel 3 has been 
incorporated into European Union Law (EU Law) i.e. the Capital Requirement 
Directive (IV) (CRD IV), which immediately became applicable as of 1 January 
2014, Ghana and Kenya may need to make the necessary amendments to 
their respective banking regulations before transposing the provisions of 
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Basel 3. South Africa successfully incorporated Basel 3 into its banking 
regulations following the publication of the South Africa Banks Amendment 
Bill in the official gazette781and there is no doubt that the legal frameworks 
existing in Ghana and Kenya will support the smooth transposition of this 
global regulatory framework when implementation becomes a reality. 
When adoption and implementation does occur, it is expected that the BCBS 
will assist both Ghana and Kenya with the acquisition of human and technical 
expertise which will be consolidated by increased co-operation between home 
and host bank supervisors. The impact that implementation of Basel 3 would 
have on banks in Ghana and Kenya is likely to cause upheaval within their 
respective banking industries and as stated by the respondent banks, some of 
the immediately expected implications are: 
[i] Existence of some banks will be under threat 
The additional capital requirement under Basel 3 implies that banks will need 
to raise more capital, particularly equity capital in order to meet the 
requirements. Whereas some banks, particularly the extremely large ones will 
be in a position to raise capital, the banks that are either unable to raise new 
capital or finding it quickly enough may either be compelled to enter into a 
merger and acquisition resulting in the loss of individual identity. 
[ii] Reorganisation of the Legal Entity and Business Model Restructuring 
Banks that choose not to enter into a merger and acquisition may have 3 
options available to them where satisfying the requirement of higher capital 
ratios is concerned. 
 The issuance of new equity782 
The issuance of shares either to existing shareholders or to new investors 
represents the most ideal means of raising equity capital which under Basel 3 
is the most important783 form of capital. 
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Notwithstanding this, the issuance of more equity capital through the issuance 
of new shares may incur the displeasure of existing shareholders as it has the 
detrimental effect of diluting the value of existing shares which they already 
possess. This displeasure could potentially disappear if existing shareholders 
contemplate the potential benefit of a greater protection by virtue of their 
higher ranking as creditors should insolvency occur. 
Where banks decide against this option and rather, favour other options which 
increase their capital ratios, they stand the risk of allowing their already high 
leverage to potentially get worse. 
 Through an increase in retained earnings 
Higher capital ratios may also be attained by banks through the 
implementation of drastic measures such as the reduction or suspension of 
dividend payments to shareholders; increasing lending rate margins to boost 
profit levels, introducing fees/charges payable by customers/borrowers for 
certain banking transactions. 
The streamlining and restructuring of operational strategies within a bank to 
enhance efficiency may have the overall effect of increasing profits of the 
bank. 
It must be borne in mind that the likely effect of implementing such drastic 
measures will be the desertion by existing bank customers and also the 
bank’s image and reputation may be tarnished as potential customers and 
investors are driven away784. 
On the contrary, an increase in retained earnings achieved through 
undertaking increased risky banking ventures may be realised through higher 
profit margins but could potentially leave the bank vulnerable. 
 Decrease in size of loan portfolios 
Banks may decrease the size(s) of their loan portfolios by ridding both their 
on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet items of risky assets. This may be 
achieved through the sale of assets that are not tied down as a loan and the 
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ultimate acquisition of assets with much lower risk-weighting. Achieving this 
implies that the bank will not have to set aside relatively more capital for its 
risk-weighted assets. 
[iii] Bank Business Models 
The impact that Basel 3 implementation will have on the business models of 
the respondent banks will be profound. Whilst the traditional role of banks is 
unlikely to undergo any drastic structural change, the services provided by 
commercial and universal banks will most likely need to undergo a complete 
overhaul. 
Eckhart Tolle785 suggests that banks implementing Basel 3 will be under 
considerable pressure to revise business strategies, models and overall 
operating structures. While this may imply devising other avenues through 
which profit levels are sustained or even increased, it is submitted that the 
extent to which business models of participant commercial banks are affected 
will depend on whether they engage in universal banking or not. This is 
because commercial banks engaged in universal banking will be under 
considerable pressure to sustain their profitability, and may have to embark 
on an overhaul of their business structure to achieve this outcome. 
Irrespective of whether respondent banks are purely commercial/retail or 
commercial/universal banks, the need to still change their business models 
may still be required, not least because of the multiple requirements786 under 
the capital adequacy provisions of Basel 3. Even though commercial/retail 
banks typically rely on the maturity transformation of their loan to borrowers 
and also on depositor’s funds to provide bank income with the view to 
profitability, these processes are unlikely to be sufficient hence such banks 
may consider other means787 of acquiring more money. 
A change in business model could potentially consist of an enhancement in 
risk management; undertaking cost-cutting measures to off-set the cost of 
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implementing increased capital requirement; the introduction of new banking 
products and services; introducing fees for certain banking products and 
transactions; or re-pricing existing products and services and finally 
concentrating on key areas or functions that are likely to generate more 
income or profit for the bank. The provisions relating to the treatment of 
minority interests and financial investments under Basel 3 may also initiate a 
structural re-organisation process through which banks affected by these 
provisions may dis-associate themselves from other financial entities through 
the disposition of their interest holding(s). 
Notwithstanding the above, the over-riding factor here is the need for 
commercial banks in Ghana and Kenya to adopt a business model which 
would be considered to be the best, considering the requirements of Basel 3. 
It is thus submitted that an optimum model should exclude the practice of 
universal banking in both jurisdictions where applicable. It is ironic, that even 
though universal banking has been banned in Nigeria, its popularity in Ghana 
has increased dramatically and that is mainly attributable to the influx of 
foreign banks particularly Pan-African banks. 
Where the practice of universal banking cannot be banned, a ring-fencing of 
all investment banking activities undertaken under the universal banking 
model will be a welcomed proposition for banking regulators and supervisors 
in these 2 jurisdictions to contemplate. This would ensure that all risks 
emanating from such banking activities would effectively be contained thus 
minimising the possible contagion of banking risks. 
[iv] Implications of Restructuring Business Models 
 Profitability 
Since banks generally make profits from the difference in margins between 
income generated from their assets and the liabilities they are exposed to, a 
fundamental shift in their business model will undoubtedly affect profitability in 
one way or another. 
Banks in Africa are well known to have very high interest margins and 
typically short-term funding. Thus the impact on profitability that banks 
experience (which often results in a re-structuring of business models) is 
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largely dependent on how sensitive the lending rates are or will be to the 
capital portfolio the bank possesses and also the effect a growth in the 
economy will have on lending rates. 
 Lending 
Jonathan Bridges788 suggest that the effect capital requirements have on a 
bank’s lending behaviour is hinged on 2 broad concepts, i.e. the impact on 
lending due to changes in capital resources of the bank and the impact on 
lending due to changes in capital requirements. For the purposes of this 
thesis, only the second concept will be discussed and appropriately so. 
Also, in a study undertaken by Noss and Toffano789 to investigate the 
mechanics involved in the relationship between bank capital and lending at 
the consolidated level in the UK, it was concluded790 that bank lending 
potentially declined by up to 4.5% after there had been a 1% point hike in 
capital requirements ‘during a period of credit growth’. 
Although the impact that changes in capital requirements have on bank 
lending may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, depending on whether the 
banks are consolidated or not and also whether the nature of the impact being 
investigated is macro-prudential or micro-prudential, there are other factors in 
the author’s opinion that also need to be taken into consideration. 
Factors that need to be taken into consideration include: 
1. Whether lending is secured or unsecured; 
2. Whether lending is to the corporate sector (i.e. corporate lending) or to 
individual borrowers; 
3. The size of the commercial bank in terms of total assets and also 
where there is an expectation that the total size is unlikely to remain 
the same over a period of time; 
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4. The kind of business environment that prevailed at the time changes in 
capital requirements were introduced; and 
5. The percentage size of the applicable capital buffer. It is expected that 
where banks have a smaller capital buffer, its capacity to lend will be 
curtailed as opposed to banks with a much larger capital buffer. 
While lending by banks in Africa particularly Ghana and Kenya is often on a 
short-term basis and characterised by very high interest margins, it is 
submitted that with NPLs still relatively high, any future increase in capital 
requirements through implementation of Basel 3 would result in even higher 
interest margins payable by borrowers. Policies regarding the use of collateral 
to secure funds through long-term borrowing are also likely to be re-worded to 
maximise profits, potential benefits or options available to the lending bank 
when default occurs. 
Swati Ghosh, Sugawara and Zalduendo791 suggest that the effect of an 
implementation of Basel 3 on banks will be of both a direct and indirect 
nature. They clarify this by adding that a direct impact on bank lending would 
occur when banks in advanced countries reduce their lending to non-banks in 
Emerging countries whereas an indirect impact on lending would occur when 
banks in advanced countries reduce their lending to banks in Emerging 
countries. Although South Africa is perhaps currently the only African country 
capable of being described as an Emerging country, it is submitted that this 
conclusion by Swati et al may be extended to Frontier countries such as 
Ghana and Kenya. This is because African banks are known to constantly 
seek loans from advanced countries and are therefore bound to be affected 
should lending to Emerging countries be reduced by advanced countries. 
 Costs 
Although banks will naturally wish to maintain cost-effective business models 
purposely to maintain previous levels of profitability or augmenting their profit 
margins, or to counter the cost of funding and or implementing Basel 3, 
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Eckhart Tolle792 suggests that for a bank to embark on cost-cutting measures, 
they may wish to ensure that all processes are efficient, including their IT and 
data management systems.  
Thus it is submitted that banks in Ghana and Kenya when considering the 
cost implications of implementing Basel 3 may wish to undertake or embark 
on certain cost-cutting measures or policies to mitigate the cost of adopting 
Basel 3. These cost-cutting measures must take into consideration the needs 
and general demography of the customers or potential customers within their 
jurisdiction. 
B. Mahapatra793 suggests that banks must consider the substantial overall 
long-term benefits of a reduction in the probability of banking crisis when 
contemplating the cost of implementing the new capital requirement. Thus, 
whether or not the cost implication of an increase in a bank’s capital 
requirement was foreseeable by the Basel Committee, it is submitted that it is 
an unavoidable consequence of implementing new banking regulation. While 
it is inevitable that implementing the new capital requirements under Basel 3 
will be costly, it is the method(s) by which these banks may seek to recoup 
these costs that is likely to become an issue of concern amongst borrowers. 
Ever since Basel 2 was first introduced, the general perception has always 
been that when a revision in a law results in banks or lenders having to incur 
extra costs in implementing that law or provisions therein, such banks or 
lenders would be allowed to insert increased costs provisions following 
negotiations which allowed them to recoup the costs incurred. 
In recognition of this, the Loan Market Association (LMA) incorporates 
provisions applicable and generally incorporated in all UK loan documentation 
subject to English law which permits lenders to make claims for various types 
of costs. For the purposes of this thesis, examples of costs that may be 
recouped may include costs incurred following the implementation of 
legislation and the compliance with it thereof. 
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Thus certain loan transaction documentation would be expected to contain 
provisions794 which would allow lenders to make cost claims. It is thus 
expected that should Ghana and Kenya adopt Basel 3 (subject to the 
existence of similar legal provisions within their respective legislative 
frameworks), banks within these two jurisdictions would be expected to 
increase their capital charges particularly for corporate loans to bank 
corporate borrowers795 and as a result recoup some of the costs incurred 
through the implementation of Basel 3. 
On the contrary, borrowers (particularly corporate borrowers who are likely to 
be impacted greatly) may insist through negotiations on the insertion of 
certain provisions preventing any future cost claims being made following the 
future implementation of any legislation more specifically in relation to 
banking. 
 Type of transaction/business lines 
It is submitted that the provisions under Basel 3 relating to de-recognitions, 
deductions and grandfathering are all likely to affect the business lines of 
majority of the banks in Ghana and Kenya.  Where an investor has an 
investment in a minority interest, the immediate and future impact that de-
recognitions etc has will make such a product less attractive to a potential 
investor even during the period of transition. 
As mentioned earlier, the expectation is that there will be an immediate impact 
due to existing banking relationships between banks yet to implement Basel 3 
and counter-parties (other banks) which are located either within the same 
jurisdiction or cross-border that have already begun the implementation of 
Basel 3 by virtue of being subsidiaries of foreign banks. 
Although Basel 3 made no specific provisions within the capital framework for 
trade finance, it is submitted that this may be due to the fact that the BCBS 
had recently made provisions for trade finance under the Basel 2.5 
framework. 
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There are two main provisions796 introduced by the BCBS which are 
applicable to the treatment of trade finance, however it is submitted that only 
one of them is likely to be applicable to Ghana and Kenya (particularly 
Ghana). Under the applicable provision, the 1 year maturity ‘sovereign floor 
for trade finance related claims on banks using the standardised approach797 
for credit risk’ has been waived. This implies that bank finance instruments 
such as confirmed letters of credit which are commonly used in jurisdictions 
like Ghana and Kenya for the importation of goods would attract less capital 
requirements when used in trade finance transactions. 
This is a departure from the provisions under Basel 2 where counter-party risk 
weights were typically determined by external credit ratings. 
Because banks from Ghana and Kenya are unlikely to have a risk weighting 
based on an external credit rating agency, such banks will be considered as 
unrated and thus any claim against them cannot be lower than the risk 
weighting of the sovereign from where the issuing bank has been 
incorporated which is usually 100%. Thus the rationale behind the BCBS’s 
decision to dispense with this requirement is to encourage the importation of 
goods (using trade finance) through the reduction in the capital requirements 
associated with such transactions. 
[v] (a) Implications of the new definition of Bank Capital 
 Quality of capital 
The various responses provided by respondents to the question of what 
constitutes bank capital suggests that what may be considered as capital in 
one jurisdiction may not necessarily be recognised as such in another 
jurisdiction. Hence, the renewed effort under Basel 3 which highlights the 
need for capital to have greater loss-absorbing qualities thus increasing the 
significance of common equity, suggests that banks in Ghana and Kenya will 
have to significantly increase their common equity.  
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Thus in both jurisdictions, common equity and retained earnings will assume 
greater significance. Also, the de-recognition and deduction provisions under 
Basel 3 will imply that the respondent banks that included hybrid capital and 
deferred tax in their components of capital will have to either de-recognise or 
deduct these components from their capital base in accordance with the 
applicable provision(s). Thus banks possessing hybrid capital or deferred tax 
assets (DTAs) may either immediately eliminate them from their asset 
portfolio or apply grandfathering provisions to allow for a slow phase-out of 
these types of capital. It is submitted though, that the impact on DTAs will 
depend on whether the DTAs are of the kind that rely on the future profitability 
of the bank concerned or rather the type that arise as a result of ‘temporary 
differences’. 
Since the reduction of future tax liabilities of a bank can never be guaranteed, 
let alone the future profits that could possibly be realised following such 
reduction in future tax payments, reliance on DTA’s that depend on future 
profitability is completed excluded from a bank’s assets. On the contrary 
however, DTA’s arising from temporary differences will be subjected to a 
threshold deduction approach.  
Thus where the DTAs have accrued as a result of excessive pre-payment of 
tax by the bank to their respective Government or through a tax receivable 
from the applicable tax revenue authorities, such DTAs will be subjected to 
risk weighting commensurate798 to that of a claim from the relevant 
Government and will not799 be deducted from a bank’s capital. 
Where banks adopting Basel 3 become obligated to deduct or de-recognise 
DTA’s and hybrid capital, they may seek to compensate for this ‘loss’ by 
replacing and augmenting their common equity through the issuance of share 
capital and bonds. They may also seek to deliberately suspend or reduce the 
dividends payable to shareholders with the view to strengthening the equity 
component of the bank’s capital base. It is submitted though that the latter 
option is likely to prove very unpopular amongst shareholders.  
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Also, the relevant provisions under Basel 3 relating to a bank’s investment in 
another financial entity will be applicable as set out in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
In Chapter 5, it was highlighted that under Basel 3, investments by a bank 
either in its own common shares and whether directly or indirectly held, must 
be deducted from the computation of Common Equity Tier 1 Capital, i.e. (CET 
1). It must be pointed out though, that since the treatment of investments by 
banks in other banks under Basel 3 is considered on a consolidated basis as 
opposed to individual banks having financial investments in other banks, it 
has been suggested that the principle800 under Basel 3 will still be applicable. 
However, the banking supervisory authorities in the respective jurisdictions 
will be expected to issue guidelines as to what threshold of deduction will be 
applicable for each size of investment for individual banks. 
In respect of implications for other bank capital i.e. Additional Tier 1 capital 
and Tier 2 capital, it is submitted that since respondent banks from Ghana 
and Kenya both included subordinated debt as part of their capital base, only 
the short-term subordinated debt will be impacted as they do not possess 
long-term subordinated debt. Also, it is submitted that the amount of capital 
that banks in Ghana are required to hold as reserve at the Central bank, 
ensures its future potential utilisation when an ailing bank assumes a Gone 
Concern status. 
 Quantity of capital 
The introduction of the capital conservation buffer under Basel 3 ultimately 
increases the overall capital requirement that banks implementing Basel 3 
would have to adopt. It has been suggested by Louis Kasekende, Justine 
Bagyenda and Martin Brownbridge that because African countries generally 
make it a requirement for their banks to hold a Tier 1 capital ratio of at least 
6% of RWA, African countries ought not to adopt this Basel 3 requirement. 
It is submitted that this conclusion is flawed because it is inconceivable that 
the BCBS intended the 2.5% of RWA buffer size to be capped at this figure 
and as such, this figure in my opinion should be used as a guide. Thus African 
banks should be required to accumulate a capital conservation buffer during 
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good stress-free times even if this results in total tier 1 capital exceeding 6% 
of RWA. 
Considering the tendency of the value of assets to easily dissipate in African 
countries due to high rates of inflation, a decision by a bank to accumulate 
capital conservation buffer which results in Tier 1 capital exceeding 6% of 
RWA will not be misplaced. Thus large commercial banks in Ghana and 
Kenya will find it useful implementing the capital conservation buffer and this 
process needs to be orchestrated by the banking supervisors in the respective 
jurisdictions. 
Although the impact that the Basel 3 provisions on the quality and quantity of 
bank has on banks may be described as micro-prudential, there are other 
implications for banks arising from the macro-prudential capital adequacy 
measures that are also contained therein. 
(b) Counter-cyclical Measures 
The introduction of a counter-cyclical buffer provision within Basel 3 marks an 
attempt by the BCBS to address the threat of pro-cyclicality within banking 
systems globally. Although pro-cyclical behaviour is a common feature of 
most banking systems, the provisions of Basel 2 failed to address this 
problematic issue and critics801 of the Basel 2 framework have often 
suggested that pro-cyclicality on the contrary thrived under the Basel 2 
framework. 
Louis Kasekende et al802 suggest that African countries tend to have fiscal 
policies in place that are pro-cyclical. They further suggest that these fiscal 
policies negatively impact the long-term growth of African economies and as 
such ought to be abandoned. To address this issue of pro-cyclicality in African 
banking systems, Kasekende et al suggest that African countries ought to 
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undertake measures to counter the inherent pro-cyclical nature of their 
banking frameworks. 
The author concurs with the views of Kasekende et al especially when it 
became evident in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis that a 
number of African countries, i.e. Frontier and developing countries lacked the 
fiscal space, international reserves and other relevant economic tools and 
mechanisms to undertake measures to counter the threat of pro-cyclicality to 
systemic stability. 
In light of these observations, the suggestion by Kasekende et al that African 
countries need to undertake measures to counter the inherent pro-cyclical 
nature of their banking frameworks is an important one indeed. One of the 
measures they proposed includes the build-up of sufficient reserves during 
the periods of excessive credit growth which is identical to the counter-cyclical 
measures provided under Basel 3. 
While counter-cyclical policies are important in any given economy, it is 
submitted that any current national counter-cyclical policy framework that 
Ghana and Kenya has should be revised to incorporate provisions that give 
effect to or adopt the counter-cyclical buffer introduced under the Basel 3 
framework. Thus the incorporation of provisions to counter pro-cyclicality will 
have to address the excessive credit growth associated with booms in the 
economy while addressing also the lack of credit when the economy 
experiences a downturn. 
Whereas the author suggests that future implementation of a counter-cyclical 
buffer in Ghana and Kenya is important and highly relevant, a proposal is 
submitted that rather than adopt the 2.5% that Basel 3 proposes, national 
regulators803 in Ghana and Kenya should be allowed to impose804 a counter-
cyclical buffer of 2%. This proposal is suggested for the simple reason that 
Banks in these two jurisdictions are not as big as banks in Europe. Also, these 
banks in Ghana and Kenya are generally not internationally active banks, 
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perhaps with the exception of subsidiaries of international banks present in 
these two jurisdictions e.g. Barclays and Standard Chartered Bank. 
Also, the nature of the exposure that commercial banks in Ghana and Kenya 
have with counter-parties is not as ‘deep’ as exposures that internationally 
active banks are usually exposed to. Notwithstanding this, the presence of 
Pan-African banks and the size of their combined assets by way of combined 
share suggest that a surge in pro-cyclicality due to credit growth will be largely 
attributed to these (Pan-African) banks and such a counter-cyclical buffer will 
be relevant for commercial banks in Ghana and Kenya to rein-in such credit 
cycle phenomenon. 
(c) Leverage ratio 
Although the rationale behind the leverage ratio provision is to prevent banks 
from assuming more liabilities than they can afford to safely manage, some 
critics have continued to question its merits. It is submitted that a case which 
underscores the importance of a leverage ratio could easily be made on the 
basis that the risk weighting system/measurement changes under Basel 3 is 
largely applicable to banks exposed to risks from financial derivatives and 
other securitised products (i.e. investment banks), whilst retaining the 
imperfect risk weighting methodology under Basel 2. 
Hence, with the participant banks (of this research) being generally 
commercial in nature, suggests that the risk weighting methodology under 
Basel 2 would continue to be largely applicable to them. While it may be 
argued that the impact the global financial crisis had on Ghana and Kenya 
was via transmission mechanisms already discussed and not as a result of 
off-balance sheet securitisation activity which led to excessive leveraging, this 
does not in the author’s opinion diminish or lessen the counter-argument that 
the leverage ratio will still be relevant to commercial banks in Ghana and 
Kenya. 
Although securitisation is not a common banking activity within these two 
jurisdictions, a leverage ratio in my opinion is still relevant. However its 
implementation in Ghana and Kenya should in my opinion be for the purpose 
of acting as a backstop to counter concentration risk and NPLs. Furthermore, 
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the continued retention of the Basel 2 risk-based methodology under Basel 3 
implies that the commercial banks will continue to be exposed to its inherent 
flaws. As a result, a leverage ratio will act as a backup to an otherwise flawed 
risk methodology framework. 
Another fundamental reason why a leverage ratio is important is deposit 
protection. Although Kenya has a deposit protection scheme in place 
implemented through the Deposit Protection Fund Board (DPFB), the amount 
of money that each participant to this scheme805 contributes to the Fund by 
way of deposit is meagre, i.e. (KES 100,000) for each account held as at 
2012. While this contribution per account held is evidently insufficient, a 
leverage ratio will undoubtedly ensure that the temptation to embark on an 
excessive leverage build-up is always kept in check. 
Thus, a successful implementation of a leverage ratio in Ghana and Kenya 
needs to be preceded by an assessment of the different accounting principles 
that may be applicable in both jurisdictions and more so the banks therein. It 
is submitted though, that due to renewed efforts being made by the BCBS 
towards consistency in the application of the IFRS accounting principles, a 
consistent application of the leverage ratio may in the future be easily 
attainable across all jurisdictions. 
The BCBS recently issued a document i.e. ‘Basel 3 Leverage ratio framework 
and disclosure requirements’ which outlines the scope806 of an application of 
the leverage ratio and the issues to be considered in determining the size of 
the leverage ratio. To address the uncertainty that may arise as to the type of 
capital required to constitute the leverage ratio, it is submitted that the 
composition of the leverage ratio should comprise of capital within Additional 
Tier 1 as opposed to Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital. 
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[vi]  Tax implications 
The tax implications807 that will arise from a future implementation of Basel 3 
were with hind sight not intended to be a potential outcome of Basel 
adoption808. 
The unintended nature of possible tax implications resulting from 
implementation of Basel 3 is described as such due to a lack of foresight on 
the part of the BCBS in appreciating the fact that different jurisdictions 
engaged in different accounting regulatory practices which affected the way 
assets and liabilities were valued. Due to the emphasis that Basel 3 places on 
the quantity and quality of capital, any other processes (such as accounting 
regulatory processes) impacting the way assets and liabilities are valued are 
likely to affect the overall quantity and quality of capital within that jurisdiction. 
It is on this basis that it is submitted that accounting standards applicable in 
Ghana and Kenya are likely to impact the computation of assets and liabilities 
and hence capital adequacy in both jurisdictions. Ahmed Al-Darwish et al809 
suggest that banks value their liabilities by using either the amortised cost 
process or the fair value basis approach. As these processes produce 
different outcomes, the computation of a bank’s financial liabilities will depend 
on the method used by the bank. The different outcomes arise because the 
amortised cost approach results in financial liabilities that are considered to 
possess greater stability than those arising following the implementation of the 
fair value basis approach, whose value changes with interest rate fluctuation. 
While it would be outside the remits of this thesis to discuss the 
advantages/disadvantages of either the amortised cost method or the fair 
value method, one fact is certain that all the banks that participated in this 
research indicated that financial reporting by their banks was consistent with 
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the guidelines of the IFRS Reporting Framework810. This overwhelming 
admission to the adoption of the IFRS Reporting Framework, may well 
suggest that the practical challenges811 identified by the Ghana Banking 
Survey 2009 might have now long been rectified. 
Notwithstanding the fact that all participant banks conducted their financial 
reporting according to the IFRS framework, inconsistencies could possibly still 
exist depending on the way their assets and liabilities are valued, and whether 
they are regarded as on or off-balance sheet items. Furthermore, banks and 
their subsidiaries may have the unenviable task of implementing different 
accounting and tax regulatory obligations depending on where they are 
located. This ultimately results in the unwelcome scenario where banks may 
be under an obligation to file their financial reports in accordance with say 
Basel 1812 or Basel 2 obligations in one jurisdiction and in accordance with 
Basel 3 regulations in another. 
Recent accounting regulatory changes introduced by the IASB further 
increases the scope for ‘asset type’ and ‘capital’ arbitrage. This is because 
there remains a level of uncertainty as to the extent to which the IFRS 9, a 
new accounting regulatory standard813 will be relevant or applicable in Africa, 
particularly Ghana and Kenya. 
[vii] Implications of Basel 3 on Financial Stability 
When Basel 3 was first introduced, the BCBS stated that its fundamental 
purpose was to ensure the existence of a ‘more stable and resilient banking 
sector’814. It is therefore submitted that to ascertain whether the provisions of 
Basel 3 collectively ensure the achievement of this goal, it is important for an 
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assessment to be made of the impact the provisions of Basel 3 will have on 
the overall financial stability of banks and banking systems. 
An assessment of whether Basel 3 enhances financial stability will depend to 
a large extent on whether Basel 3 eliminates or reduces systemic risks in 
banks or banking systems. Whilst it would be outside the remits of this thesis 
to determine the extent to which each provision under the entire Basel 3 
(either individually or collectively) contributes to the enhancement of financial 
stability, the author recognises that the regulation of capital is not of itself 
sufficient to ensure financial stability. 
Regardless of this, it must be recognised that the capital adequacy provisions 
within Basel 3 collectively play a significant role in the mitigation of systemic 
risks within banks and banking systems, and they represent a piece of the jig-
saw puzzle, slotting alongside other parts or provisions to ensure the final 
desired outcome – financial stability. 
Giovanni Caggiano and Pietro Calice suggest in their paper815 that the micro-
prudential and macro-prudential provisions of Basel 3 will be beneficial to the 
entire African Continent. They further suggest that the benefits to be derived 
arise from the ‘macro-prudential approach’ that Basel 3 adopts towards the 
management of systemic risk. 
It is submitted that even though there are macro-economic and macro-
prudential benefits to be derived by Ghana and Kenya should they adopt 
Basel 3, the emphasis here is on the macro-prudential benefits or implications 
i.e. financial stability of commercial banks within these two jurisdictions. While 
systemic risk is a common feature of every banking system, its nature and 
depth arguably varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even continent to 
continent. 
In a paper816 by Cedric Mbeng Mezui, Stefan Nalletamby and Hugues 
Kamewe, the authors rely on findings by Laeven and Valencia (2010) to 
conclude that three main sources of systemic risk were identified in Africa in 
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the period of 1970-2009. Even though the authors identified currency crisis as 
the most common source of systemic risk out of the three, they submitted that 
all three sources of systemic risk were inter-linked and caused banking crises 
through ‘negative fiscal balances, current account deficit devaluation, high 
inflation and high interest rates’817. 
The authors added that the negative impact of these systemic risks were 
made worse as a result of a lack of adequate macro-prudential supervision 
which contributed to increases in non-performing loans, undue significant 
bank exposure through concentration risk and lack of adequate bank capital. 
Thus the capital adequacy provisions of Basel 3818 alongside the relevant risk 
management provisions819 in my opinion will collectively enhance financial 
stability in Ghana and Kenya thereby reducing the likelihood of banking 
crises820. 
The fact that banks in Ghana already possess higher capital ratios than their 
counterparts in Europe and possibly elsewhere does not detract from the 
need to have an adequate capital framework in place to cater for all banking 
risks. This need is even more important due to the significance of the 
increasing role(s) of foreign banks in African countries, particularly Pan-
African banks. This is because these Pan-African banks arguably represent a 
source of systemic risk contagion by virtue of their cross-border financial 
activities. 
It is for this latter reason that the author submits that the financial stability 
implication of Basel 3 could be enhanced further through an extension of the 
BCBS’s principles on systemic risk and interconnectedness to a domestic 
level. Thus the requirement for globally systemic banks to have additional loss 
absorbency821 in my view should be extended to domestically systemic banks 
therefore making it a requirement for Pan-African banks and other large 
                                                 
817
 ibid 3. 
818
 As discussed earlier above. 
819
 Particularly those affecting trade finance under Basel 2.5. 
820
 It is submitted that the likelihood of banking crisis in any jurisdiction can never be 
completely eliminated but could ultimately be minimised. 
821
 See the assessment methodology rules for globally systemic important banks (G-SIBs) 
which were issued by the BCBS in November 2011. See http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207.htm  
238 
foreign banks within Ghana and Kenya to maintain extra capital to cater for 
additional loss. 
While Pan-African banks may not be as large and ‘international’ as global 
banks, they still possess the ability to positively or negatively influence their 
respective domestic financial systems as a result of their cross-border 
financial activities. It is the existence of such influential capacity which in the 
author’s opinion highlights the significance of the collaboration and 
subsequent joint decision by the BCBS and the FSB to extend the globally 
systemic principle to domestic systemic banks. To apply this principle to 
domestic systemic important banks (D-SIBs), national banking supervisory 
authorities will be expected to identify the banks that are domestically 
important within their respective jurisdictions using 12 principles. These 12 
principles making up the D-SIB framework822 collectively provide the basis for 
which a financial institution may be declared a D-SIB and represents a 
reflection on the potential impact the failure of a D-SIB could have within the 
local jurisdiction. 
The magnitude of the impact a failure of a D-SIB is likely to have within a 
jurisdiction, would be dependent on the size of the financial institution, the 
interconnectedness, the infrastructure of the financial institution(s) within the 
banking industry and the level of complexity in relation to the cross-border 
dealings of that financial entity. 
It is submitted that the applicability of the D-SIB framework to financial or 
banking consolidated groups and their respective subsidiaries suggests that 
financial stability will be greatly enhanced823 should Pan-African banks be 
made to comply with the Higher Loss Absorbency requirement under the D-
SIB framework. It is further submitted that the application of the D-SIB 
principles to Pan-African banks should be supervised by national banking 
supervisory authorities who should also have the right to extend its ambit to 
other domestic systemically important banks (which might not necessarily be 
Pan-African in nature) where applicable. 
                                                 
822
 See ‘Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: A Framework for dealing with domestic 
systemically important banks’, October 2012, BIS. 
823
 Through a reduction in systemic risk contagion from cross-border financial activities. 
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In view of this, it would be absolutely crucial for there to be consistency in the 
application of the D-SIB framework to Pan-African banks and other potential 
D-SIBs as this strengthens the resilience of the banking industry within the 
jurisdiction and the wider African region and does not make one Pan-African 
bank any less competitive than another.  
7.8 Conclusion 
Although implementation of Basel 3 by members of the G20 is in the very 
early stages, this thesis has attempted to highlight its relevance and 
implications for large commercial banks in Ghana and Kenya. It would be 
completely wrong for the assumption to be made that since the global 
financial crisis originated in Europe and America and had nothing to do with 
Africa, any attempts by Europe to introduce global banking regulations with 
the intention of impacting African banks should be resisted at all cost or 
simply ignored. 
The pace of financial globalisation, although slower in Africa in comparison to 
Europe and elsewhere is steadily picking up. As a result of the continued 
innovation of financial products globally and the ever-increasing cross-border 
financial transactions between and amongst States, banking regulations 
(whether on a national or global level) should be seen as having the capacity 
to cause reverberations within and beyond the borders of jurisdictions. 
The findings in this thesis, suggest that although the international 
convergence of capital adequacy regulations is a goal shared by an 
overwhelming majority of commercial banks in Ghana and Kenya, the 
compliance statistics do not necessarily reflect this. Whereas this anomaly 
may be attributable to the lack of funds and technical expertise to facilitate 
adoption, there is also evidence to the contrary that the adoption and 
implementation of Basel 2 in Africa, has in the past largely been secured 
through other less dignified means. 
It would thus be fair to suggest that should African countries be provided with 
the funds and the technical backing e.g. personnel and IT systems, there 
would be a significant leap in compliance statistics for Basel 3. 
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Another finding of this thesis which is backed with substantive empirical 
evidence is that majority of the respondents (industry participants themselves) 
recognise that Basel 3 is and would be relevant for African countries. This 
finding is particularly of such huge significance, as it undermines the views of 
some academics who have questioned the relevance of Basel 3 to African 
countries without supporting their views with quantitative or qualitative 
evidence. 
Finally, this thesis has attempted to show that due to the global nature of 
banking today, an introduction of a global banking regulatory framework is 
bound to have far-reaching consequences and implications for banks world-
wide irrespective of the jurisdictions in which they are located. These 
implications, some foreseen and others unforeseen are bound to occur as a 
direct result of how globalised the banking industry has become today. Infact, 
such is the extent of cross-border banking transactions that there will be 
implications for majority of banks in Africa (Ghana and Kenya) even before a 
formal requirement is made for African banks to implement Basel 3. 
While there will be implications arising from the application of the entire 
provisions of Basel 3, this thesis has only highlighted one aspect of it – capital 
adequacy. The liquidity provisions under Basel 3, inasmuch as will result in 
implications for all banks is not discussed herein as it would be outside the 
remits of this thesis and will require a separate analysis in a future piece of 
scholarly work. 
On the basis of the above submissions, the relevant authorities in Ghana and 
Kenya and perhaps the African continent at large, are encouraged to take the 
immediate necessary steps in anticipation of a formal request for the 
implementation of Basel 3 being made by the BCBS. These steps should 
include requesting financial and technical assistance from the World Bank, 
IMF and BCBS if required and an implementation phase-in period framework 
drawn which does not need to mirror the current transition period being 
adhered to by members of the G20. 
Thus although Basel 3 is relevant for African countries regardless of the level 
of development of their banking industries, its implementation in Africa should 
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in the author’s opinion be closely aligned to the level of financial development 
of that jurisdiction’s banking industry. However, as different African 
jurisdictions are at different stages of financial development it is further 
submitted that certain aspects of the Basel 3 framework must be regarded as 
fundamental to any banking system world-wide and that the phase-by-phase 
implementation of the remaining aspects of the framework should be guided 
by the level of financial development. 
It is admitted though, that these submissions would only be effective where 
appropriate supervisory mechanisms have been put in place to ensure 
consistency in their application. This entire thesis thus adds to the body of 
legal knowledge as it represents the first time an empirical analysis of the 
implications of Basel 3 capital adequacy has been undertaken for Ghana and 
Kenya. It does not by any means represent a template describing what the 
capital adequacy implications of Basel 3 are likely to be for banks in African 
countries generally, as implications may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 
depending on the characteristics and extent of development of their 
respective banking industries. 
 
242 
 
Appendix 1   
Table 1.1 
Data below represents the approximate size of the assets held by respondent 
banks as at 31 December 2012. 
Commercial Banks 
Local and Foreign 
(Ghana) 
 
ASSET SIZE (As at 31/12/2012) 
Greater 
than 
$1 Billion 
More 
than 
$500m 
but less 
than $1B 
More 
than 
$400m 
but less 
than 
$500m 
More 
than 
$300m 
but less 
than 
$400m 
More 
than 
$200m 
but less 
than 
$300m 
Less 
than 
$100m 
Bank of Ghana        
Barclays Bank        
Ecobank Ghana Ltd        
Standard Chartered 
Bank        
Ghana Commercial 
Bank        
SG-SSB Limited        
Unibank Ghana Ltd        
Stanbic Bank        
Access Bank Gh Ltd        
Zenith Bank        
Guaranty Trust Bank           
United Bank for Africa 
Gh Ltd 
          
Bank of Africa – Ghana           
HFC Bank            
Fidelity Bank           
The Royal Bank Ltd             
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Table 1.2 
Data below represents the approximate size of the assets held by respondent 
banks as at 31 December 2012. 
Commercial 
Banks Local 
and Foreign 
(Kenya) 
ASSET SIZE (As at 31/12/2012) 
Greater 
than 
$1 Billion 
More than 
$500m 
but less 
than $1B 
More than 
$400m 
but less 
than 
$500m 
More than 
$300m 
but less 
than 
$400m 
More 
than 
$200m 
but less 
than 
$300m 
More 
than 
$150m 
but less 
than 
$200m 
More 
than 
$100m 
but less 
than 
$150m 
Ecobank        
Bank of Africa        
Standard 
Chartered Bank        
Bank of Baroda        
KCB        
Fina Bank        
Table 1.3 
The table below shows the choices made by the respondent banks 
concerning the relevance of Basel 3. 
  Relevance of Basel 3 
Scale factor(s) 5 4 3 2 1 
Don’t 
Know 
No 
         
Number of 
respondent banks 
in Ghana 
7 3 1 1 2 1 1 
         
Number of 
respondent banks 
in Kenya 
1 3 1 - - 1 - 
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Appendix 2  
Table 2.1  
Ghana’s Real GDP Growth 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
  (Annual percentage change) % 
Real 
GDP 
5.9 6.4 5.7 7.3 4.1 5.0 
Source: Official data and IMF staff projections. 
Table 2.2 
Ghana: Sectoral NPLs 
(In percent of total sectoral loans) 
Source: See Ghana: 2009 Article IV Consultation and Request for a Three-Year Arrangement 
Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility – Staff Report p18. 
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Table 2.3  
Ghana: Financial Soundness Indicators, 2004-09 
(Percent, end-of-period, unless otherwise specified) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
March 
Capital adequacy:       
Regulatory capital ratio 13.9 16.2 15.8 14.8 13.8 14.6 
Regulatory tier1 capital ratio 64.2 71.6 15.0 13.6 12.8 13.3 
        
Asset quality:       
Nonperforming loans to total gross loans 16.3 13.0 7.9 6.4 7.7 9.6 
Credit to total assets 44.0 48.7 45.0 50.3 52.3 54.0 
Loan loss provision to total gross loans 13.8 8.5 7.4 5.5 6.3 7.6 
        
Earning and profitability:       
Return on assets before taxes (average) 5.8 4.6 4.8 3.7 3.2 3.4 
Return on equity before taxes (average) 33.7 32.6 39.6 35.8 23.7 21.6 
Interest margin to gross income 62.9 64.0 51.8 46.1 41.3 37.9 
Interest spread 20.3 19.3 18.3 18.3 20.8 23.9 
        
Liquidity:       
Core liquid assets to total assets ratio 25.4 20.7 23.5 23.4 25.2 22.6 
Broad liquid assets to total assets ratio 53.5 47.0 46.3 40.7 39.4 37.3 
Core liquid assets to short-term liabilities ratio 34.6 42.8 31.4 31.0 33.5 29.7 
Broad liquid assets to short-term liabilities ratio 72.8 97.4 61.9 54.1 52.4 49.1 
        
Exposure to foreign exchange risk:       
Share of foreign currency deposits in total 
deposits 
29.3 26.3 28.1 22.3 28.4 30.3 
Share of foreign liabilities in total liabilities 2.8 2.4 4.0 8.1 7.0 6.5 
Source: Bank of Ghana 
¹Average lending rate minus average (saving and demand) deposit rate. 
Table 2.4 
Selected African Markets: Losses in Market Capitalisation 
Source: Adapted from African Securities Exchange Association (ASEA) Yearbook 2008. 
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Table 2.5 
Kenya’s Real GDP Growth, 2002-2009 
Year  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 
Real GDP 
(Annual percentage change)% 
0.5 2.9 5.1 5.7 6.1 6.9 1.7 2.7 
Source: World Development Indicators - Banking Sector Stability, Efficiency and Outreach in 
Kenya. 
 
Table 2.6 
Net FDI flows to Kenya, 2000-2008 
Year 
Net FDI 
(US$m) 
FDI stock 
(US$m) 
Net FDI/GDP 
(%) 
Net FDI/gross 
fixed 
investment (%) 
FDI stock/GDP 
(%) 
2000 111 931 1.05 6.84 8.82 
2001 5 937 0.04 0.31 8.34 
2002 21 964 0.17 1.03 7.66 
2003 80 1046 0.58 3.27 7.54 
2004 42 1092 0.29 1.50 7.61 
2005 11 1113 0.07 0.33 6.86 
2006 27 1164 0.15 0.64 6.47 
2007 692 1892 2.34 12.70 6.4 
2008 52 1988 0.17 0.80 6.8 
Source: UNCTAD FDI database. 
 
Table 2.7  
Ratio of Kenya’s 
 NPLs to Kenya’s Assets, 1999–2008 in percentages 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
NPLs/total assets (%) 19.98 23.27 20.67 16.14 13.92 12.07 10.56 8.49 4.29 4.02 
Provisions and interest 
in suspense/NPLs (%) 
52.98 59.90 58.06 52.85 67.97 62.33 111.65 117.57 91.49 55.84 
Sources: Oloo (2007; 2008; 2009). 
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Table 2.8 
Kenya Financial Soundness Indicators of the Banking Sector 
  Dec-07 Dec-08 Jun-09 Dec-09 Jun-10 Sep-10 
 (Percent unless otherwise indicated) 
              
Capital adequacy:             
 Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets 18.0 18.9 19.8 19.5 19.6 20.6 
 Regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets 16.8 16.9 17.6 17.2 17.5 18.6 
 Total capital to total assets 12.0 12.6 13.0 12.7 14.0 12.8 
              
Asset quality:             
 Nonperforming loans to total gross loans 10.6 9.0 9.0 7.9 7.4 7.0 
 Nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital 12.8 11.3 12.4 12.6 10.0 8.0 
 Earning assets to total assets 79.4 88.6 88.1 85.0 85.1 88.7 
              
Earning and profitability:             
 Return on assets 3.0 2.8 3.1 2.9 3.5 3.4 
 Return on equity 27.5 25.2 28.5 24.8 31.4 31.3 
 Interest margin to gross income 34.6 34.9 35.6 35.6 33.2 33.7 
 Noninterest expenses to gross income 50.6 51.7 49.1 50.8 47.1 49.2 
              
Liquidity:             
 Liquid assets to total assets 37.5 36.4 35.0 35.9 39.7 39.9 
 Liquid assets to short-term liabilities 40.0 37.0 40.6 39.8 45.1 46.7 
 Liquid assets to total deposits 47.4 46.4 45.7 46.3 50.4 51.5 
 Total loans to total deposits 71.3 73.3 75.7 72.4 68.0 69.2 
              
Sensitivity to market risk             
 Net open position in foreign exchange to capital ... 5.6 6.1 4.9 4.9 4.8 
 Interest bearing assets to interest bearing 
liabilities 
100.5 113.0 114.4 113.2 111.6 114.4 
 FX currency denominated assets to total assets 8.7 9.7 9.9 8.1 10.1 9.7 
 FX currency denominated liabilities to total 
liabilities 
16.3 20.2 17.6 18.1 16.3 17.1 
 Spread between lending and deposit rate 7.5 7.8 8.8 8.7 9.4 9.3 
 Total expenses to gross income 68.9 72.0 70.0 71.4 65.6 66.1 
  
Source: Central Bank of Kenya: See IMF Article Request for a Three-Year Arrangement 
under the Extended Credit Facility p.30 Table 5. 
 
Table 2.9 
Total GDP figures for Nigeria from 2003 to 2009 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
  (Annualised percentage change) % 
Total 
GDP 
9.57% 6.58% 6.51% 6.03% 
(5.63%) 
6.22% 
(7.64%) 
   6.8% 
6.3 
?? 
3.0 
Source: CBN (2008a). 
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Table 2.10      Monthly Remittances to Nigeria, 2006-2008 (naira) 
 
Te Velde: The Global Financial Crisis and Developing Countries Working Paper 306 2009. 
Table 2.11 
NIGERIA NPLs, 2003-2008 
(% of commercial bank loans) 
 
Note: *Indicates estimated value based on the amount of margin loan swept by the crash in 
the capital market.  The total margin loan (N1 trillion), represents 20% of total credit.  If the 
crisis continues, most of the loans will enter the NPL profile. Source: CBN (2008a). 
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Table 2.12  
Nigeria Financial Soundness Indicators, 2006-09 
(In percent, unless otherwise indicated) 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
March
* 
  
Capital Adequacy: 
        
Regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets 22.6 21.0 21.9 21.5 
Regulatory Tier1 capital to risk-weighted assets 21.8 20.2 21.5 21.2 
Capital (net worth) to assets 14.7 16.3 18.0 18.4 
          
Asset quality and composition:         
Non-performing loans to total gross loans 8.8 8.4 6.3 6.6 
Non-performing loans net of loan-loss provision to capital 21.3 22.7 16.8 5.5 
Sectoral distribution of loans to total loans         
 Manufacturing 16.9 11.1 13.1 12.9 
 Trade and Services 22.0 15.3 16.6 22.4 
 Energy and Minerals 10.1 10.7 11.4 11.1 
 Agriculture 2.3 3.3 1.4 1.5 
 Construction and Property 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.9 
 Government 7.6 5.3 2.4 3.1 
 Other 35.0 48.2 48.7 34.4 
          
Earnings and profitability:         
Return on assets  1.6 2.1 4.0 1.8 
Return on equity 10.4 13.1 22.0 10.0 
Interest margin to gross income 39.6 40.8 39.4 39.8 
Non-interest expenses to gross income 52.7 46.0 43.1 45.5 
Personnel expenses to non-interest expenses 42.7 44.2 42.1 44.3 
Trading and fee income to total income 33.3 30.0 12.9 13.1 
          
Liquidity:         
Liquid assets to total assets  32.5 32.1 28.1 20.4 
Liquid assets to total deposits 63.7 62.6 54.2 38.4 
Liquid assets to short-term liabilities .. .. .. 36.8 
Customer deposit to total (non-interbank) loans 73.7 85.8 117.4 116.3 
Foreign currency denominated liabilities to total liabilities 12.5 5.7 6.6 7.1 
          
Source: CBN 2009. 
*/ Reflects bank data available prior to the special audits of bank balance sheets by the 
central bank. 
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Table 2.13  
Nigeria Stock Market Performance 2002-2009 
Source: See Figure 2 in Te Velde The global financial crisis and developing countries 
Working Paper 306 p3 June 2009 ODI. 
Table 2.14  
South Africa Growth Rates 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
  (Annualised percentage change) % 
Real  
GDP 
3.1 4.9 5.0 5.4 5.1 3.1 3.7 
Source: Extracted from: South African Reserve Bank (SARB): IMF, International Financial 
Statistics 
Table 2.15  
The losses of South African Stock Markets 
in comparison to the other Emerging Countries 
EMERGING 
COUNTRY INDEX NAME INDEX CODE 
BENCHMARK 
31/7/2008 
VALUE AT 
END WEEK 
12/2/2009 
LOSSES DURING 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
SOUTH AFRICA All Share Index JALSH 27552.65 20650.38 -25.05 
BRIC           
BRAZIL Bovespa Index IBOVESPA 59505.00 41674.00 -29.97 
RUSSIA RTS Index RTSI 1966.68 624.21 -68.26 
INDIA BSE SENSEX 30 BSESN 14355.75 9634.74 -32.89 
CHINA Shanghai 
Composite 
SHANGHAI 
COMPOSIT 
2775.72 2320.79 -16.39 
Source: ‘Financial Crisis: Implications for Africa’s Financial System’.  By Victor Murinde, 
Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham 2009, p22. Extracted from Table 4, 
p22. 
251 
Table 2.16 
South Africa’s Financial Soundness Indicators, 2002-2007 
  
  
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
  
  (Percent unless otherwise indicated) 
              
Capital adequacy:             
 Regulatory capital to risk assets(a) 12.6 12.4 14.0 12.7 12.3 12.8 
 Regulatory Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted 
assets(a) 
8.7 8.9 10.5 9.7 9.0 9.5 
              
Asset quality:             
 Non-performing loans to total gross loans(b) 2.9 2.4 1.8 1.5 1.1 1.4 
 Non-performing loans net of provisions to 
capital(b) 
13.2 8.5 6.2 6.4 5.6 8.2 
 Share of mortgage advances in domestic 
private 
 Credit(c) 
40.7 39.6 43.3 46.2 47.7 48.9 
              
Earning and profitability:             
 Return on assets (average) 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.4 
 Return on equity (average) 5.4 11.6 16.2 15.2 18.3 18.1 
 Interest margin to gross income 52.3 38.3 41.6 38.2 43.8 58.5 
 Non-interest expenses to gross income 60.4 74.8 68.5 61.5 48.5 48.9 
              
Liquidity:             
 Liquid assets to total assets 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.6 4.6 
 Share of short-term deposits in total deposits 47.9 45.7 43.7 43.5 42.8 42.5 
              
Exposure to FX risk:             
 Maximum effective net open FX position to 
capital 
3.6 1.3 0.8 1.9 1.4 0.7 
 Share of foreign currency loans in total lending 13.6 11.9 10.9 11.1 11.4 9.3 
 Share of foreign currency deposits in total deposits(d) 4.4 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.3 3.0 
 Share of foreign liabilities in total liabilities(e) 6.3 3.8 4.0 4.2 5.3 6.0 
South African Reserve Bank. 
Taken and replicated from FSAP Report Oct 2008. IMF Country Report No: 08/349. 
a. Total (banking and trading book). 
b. The official definition of non-performing loans comprises doubtful and loss loans.  
Doubtful loans are loans overdue for 180 days unless well secured, or with a timely 
realisation of collateral. 
c. Domestic private credit not seasonally adjusted. 
d. Foreign funding to total funding. 
e. Foreign funding to total liabilities. 
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Appendix 3 
Table 3.1 
Extent of Basel 2 implementation in respondent banks 
 Full Implementation 
Partial 
Implementation No Implementation 
Ghana 3 7 6 
Kenya 0 4 2 
Source: Author’s analysis of questionnaire. 
Table 3.2 
Type of risk methodology used by respondent banks 
 
Standardised 
Approach (SA) 
Internal Ratings 
Based Approach 
(IRB) 
Not Applicable 
(N/A)/No Response 
Ghana 13 2 1 
Kenya 3 3 0 
Source: Author’s analysis of questionnaire. 
Table 3.3 
Accounting methods used by respondent banks 
 IFRS GAAP OTHER 
Ghana 16 0 0 
Kenya 4 1 1 
Source: Author’s analysis of questionnaire. 
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Appendix 4  
Table 4.1 
Risk weights by category of on-balance sheet asset 
0% (i) Cash(a). 
(ii) Claims on central governments and central banks 
in national currency and funded in that currency. 
(iii) Other claims on OECD(b) central governments(c) 
and central banks. 
(iv) Claims collateralised by each of OECD central 
government, securities(c) or guaranteed by OECD 
central governments.(d) 
  
0, 10, 20, or 50% 
  
  
  
 
(at national 
discretion) 20% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
50% 
(i) Claims on domestic public-sector entities, 
excluding central government, and loans 
guaranteed by or collateralised by securities issued 
by such entities(d). 
  
(i) Claims on multilateral development banks (IBRD, 
IADB, AsDB, AfDB, EIB, EBRD) (e). 
(ii) Claims on banks incorporated in the OECD and 
claims guaranteed(d) by OECD incorporated banks. 
(iii) Claims on securities firms incorporated in the 
OECD subject to comparable supervisory and 
regulatory arrangements, including in particular 
risk-based capital requirements(f), and claims 
guaranteed by these securities firms. 
(iv) Claims on banks incorporated in countries outside 
the OECD with a residual maturity of up to one 
year and claims with a residual maturity of up to 
one year guaranteed by banks incorporated in 
countries outside the OECD. 
(v) Claims on non-domestic OECD public-sector 
entities, excluding central government, and claims 
guaranteed by or collateralised by securities issued 
by such entities(d). 
(vi) Cash items in process of collection. 
  
(i) Loans fully secured by mortgage on residential 
property that is or will be occupied by the borrower 
or that is rented. 
  
*Taken from the 1988 Basel Capital Accord i.e. International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards, Annex 2 [p17-18] (July 1988, updated to April 1998). 
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Table 4.1 continued 
Risk weights by category of on-balance sheet asset 
100% 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
100% 
(i) Claims on the private sector. 
(ii) Claims on banks incorporated outside the OECD 
with a residual maturity of over one year. 
(iii) Claims on central governments outside the OECD 
(unless denominated in national currency – and 
funded in that currency – see above). 
(iv) Claims on commercial companies owned by the 
public sector. 
(v) Premises, plant and equipment and other fixed 
assets. 
(vi) Real estate and other investments (including non-
consolidated investment participations in other 
companies). 
(vii) Capital instruments issued by other banks (unless 
deducted from capital). 
(viii) All other assets. 
  
a. Includes (at national discretion) gold bullion held in own vaults or on an allocated 
basis to the extent backed by bullion liabilities. 
b. For the purpose of this exercise, the OECD group comprises countries which are full 
members of the OECD (or which have concluded special lending arrangements with 
the IMF associated with the Fund’s  General Arrangements to Borrow), but excludes 
any country within this group which has rescheduled its external sovereign debt in the 
previous five years. 
c. Some member countries intend to apply weights to securities issued by OECD central 
governments to take account of investment risk.  These weights would, for example, 
be 10% for all securities or 10% for those maturing in up to one year and 20% for 
those maturing in over one year. 
d. Commercial claims partially guaranteed by these bodies will attract equivalent low 
weights on that part of the loan which is fully covered.  Similarly, claims partially 
collateralised by cash, or by securities issued by OECD central governments, OECD 
non-central government public-sector entities, or multilateral development banks will 
attract low weights on that part of the loan which is fully covered. 
e. Claims on other multilateral development banks in which G-10 countries are 
shareholding members may, at national discretion, also attract a 20% weight. 
f. i.e. Capital requirements that are comparable to those applied to banks in this Accord 
and its Amendment to incorporate market risks.  Implicit in the meaning of the word 
“comparable” is that the securities firm (but not necessarily its parent) is subject to 
consolidated regulation and supervision with respect to any downstream affiliates. 
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Table 4.2824  TYPES OF INSTRUMENTS AND CCF  
Instruments Credit conversion 
factors (CCF) 
(1) Direct credit substitutes, e.g. general guarantees 
of indebtedness (including standby letters of 
credit) and acceptances. 100% 
(2) Transaction – related contingent items (e.g. 
performance bonds, bid bonds, warranties and 
standby letters of credit related to particular 
transactions). 50% 
(3) Short-term self-liquidating trade-related 
contingencies (i.e. documentary credits). 20% 
(4) Sale and repurchase agreements and asset 
sales where the credit risk remains with the bank. 100% 
(5) Forward asset purchases, forward deposits and 
partly-paid shares and securities. 100% 
(6) Note issuance facilities and revolving 
underwriting facilities. 50% 
(7) Other commitments (e.g. formal standby facilities 
and credit lines) with an original maturity of over 
one year. 50% 
(8) Similar commitments with an original maturity of 
up to one year, or which can be unconditionally 
cancelled at any time. 0% 
 
                                                 
824
 Taken from the 1988 Basel Capital Accord International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards Annex 3 [p19-20] (July 1988, updated to April 1998). 
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Table 4.3 
CHARACTERISTICS OF BASEL 2 BANK REGULATORY CAPITAL825 
  TIER 1 
(50% of Regulatory 
Capital) 
(Core Capital) 
TIER 2 
(Supplementary Capital) 
TIER 3 
(Ancillary Capital) 
Components: Capital or Hybrid Capital 
Instruments. 
Upper Tier 2 
(At least 50% of Tier 2 
capital). 
e.g. Quasi-capital or Hybrid 
capital. 
(Applicable for Trading 
Book only) 
e.g. Repayable 
subordinated debt of 
more than 2 years. 
Characteristics: Subordinated, Perpetual 
and Non-cumulative. 
Subordinated, Perpetual 
and cumulative. 
  
  
Examples: (i) Ordinary Share 
Capital; 
(ii) Perpetual non-
cumulative 
preference shares; 
and 
(iii) Retained Earnings. 
(i) Cumulative 
subordinated debt 
instrument (perpetual in 
nature); 
(ii) Cumulative preference 
shares (perpetual in 
nature); and 
(iii) General 
provisions/Revaluation 
reserves. 
  
  
Lower Tier 2 
(Subject to a maximum of 
50% of Tier 2 capital).  
Components:   (i) Quasi-capital or Hybrid 
capital. 
  
Characteristics:   Redeemable capital 
instruments. 
  
Example:   (i) Dated cumulative 
preference shares; and 
(ii) Repayable 
subordinated debt of 
more than 5 years. 
  
 
                                                 
825
 Extracted from Table 1 of Andrew McKnight, ‘Basel 2: the implementation in the UK of its 
capital requirement for banks’ (2007) Law and Financial Markets Review Vol 1(4): 327, 329.  
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Table 4.4             CAPITAL ALLOCATION UNDR BASEL 2 
TIER 1 CAPITAL TIER 2 CAPITAL TIER 3 CAPITAL 
15% INNOVATIVE TIER 
CAPITAL* 
50% UPPER TIER 2 
 CAPITAL 
TIER 3 
CAPITAL 
CORE TIER 1 
  
  
ADDITIONAL TIER 1 
 CAPITAL 
  
  
50% LOWER TIER 2 
 CAPITAL 
* Allocation of capital towards innovative tier 1 capital amounted to 15% of the entire Tier 1 
capital. Source: Author’s deductions. 
 
Table 4.5   RISK WEIGHTS AND CORRESPONDING CREDIT   
ASSESSMENTS FOR SOVEREIGN EXPOSURE 
Credit assessment 
AAA to 
AA- 
A+ to 
A- 
BBB+ 
to BBB- 
BB+ to 
B- 
Below 
B- 
Unrated 
Risk Weight 0% 20% 50% 100% 150% 100% 
See The New Basel Capital Accord: A Guide to the Main Provisions p12 3
rd
 Edition 
September 2004, Slaughter & May LLP. 
 
Table 4.6   RISK WEIGHTS AND CORRESPONDING EXPORT CREDIT 
AGENCY RISK SCORE 
ECA risk score 0-1 2 3 4 to 6 7 
Risk Weight 0% 20% 50% 100% 150% 
See The New Basel Capital Accord: A Guide to the Main Provisions p13 3
rd
 Edition 
September 2004, Slaughter & May LLP. 
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Table 4.7  RISK WEIGHTS AND CORRESPONDING SOVEREIGN CREDIT   
ASSESSMENT 
Credit assessment 
of Sovereign 
AAA to 
AA- 
A+ to 
A- 
BBB+ 
to BBB- 
BB+ to 
B- 
Below 
B- 
Unrated 
Risk Weight 20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 100% 
See The New Basel Capital Accord: A Guide to the Main Provisions p13, 3
rd
 Edition 
September 2004, Slaughter & May LLP. 
 
Table 4.8  PREFERENTIAL RISK WEIGHTS ACCORDED TO INDIVIDUAL 
BANKS WHERE A SHORT-TERM CLAIM EXISTS 
Credit assessment of 
banks 
AAA to 
AA- 
A+ to 
A- 
BBB+ 
to BBB- 
BB+ to 
B- 
Below 
B- 
Unrated 
Risk Weight 20% 50% 50% 100% 150% 50% 
Short-term claims 20% 20% 20% 50% 150% 20% 
See The New Basel Capital Accord: A Guide to the Main Provisions p14, 3
rd
 Edition 
September 2004, Slaughter & May LLP. 
  
Table 4.9  RISK WEIGHTS AND CORRESPONDING CREDIT 
ASSESSMENT FOR CORPORATES 
Credit assessment 
AAA+ to 
AA- 
A+ to A- 
BBB+ to 
BB- 
Below 
BB- 
Unrated 
Risk Weight 20% 50% 100% 150% 
100% unless 
the home 
country’s 
rating is 
worse 
See The New Basel Capital Accord: A Guide to the Main Provisions p14 3
rd
 Edition 
September 2004, Slaughter & May LLP. 
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Appendix 5  
Transition Period – Phase-in Arrangements 
(shading indicates transition periods – all dates are as of 1 January) 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
As of 1 
January 
2019 
Leverage Ratio Supervisory monitoring 
Parallel run 
1 Jan 2013 – 1 Jan 2017 
Disclosure starts 1 Jan 2015 
Migration to 
Pillar 1 
 
Minimum Common Equity Capital Ratio   3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 4.5%    4.5%   4.5%    4.5 % 
Capital Conservation Buffer      0.625% 1.25% 1.875% 2.50% 
Minimum common equity plus capital 
conservation buffer 
  3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.125% 5.75% 6.375% 7.0%  
Phase-in of deductions from CET 1 
(including amounts exceeding the limit for 
DTAs, MSRs and financials) 
   20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 100% 
Minimum Tier 1 Capital   4.5% 5.5% 6.0% 6.0%     6.0%   6.0%    6.0%  
Minimum Total Capital   8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0%     8.0%   8.0%    8.0%  
Minimum Total Capital plus conservation 
buffer 
  8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.625% 9.25%  9.875% 10.5%  
Capital instruments that no longer qualify 
as non-core Tier 1 capital or Tier 2 capital 
  
          
Liquidity coverage ratio Observation 
period 
begins 
   Introduce 
minimum 
standard 
    
Net stable funding ratio Observation 
period 
begins 
      Introduce 
minimum 
standard 
 
Source:  Taken from Basel 3:  A Global Regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems Annex 4 p69, (December 2010 (rev June 2011)). 
 
Table 5.1 
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Appendix 6  
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. Please tick the appropriate range below that best describes your 
bank’s total assets. (i.e. individual assets and not group assets). 
 
 ● Less than $100 million dollars  
 ● Between $101 million dollars and $150 million dollars  
 ● Between $151 million dollars and $200 million dollars  
 ● Between $201 million dollars and $300 million dollars  
 ● Between $301 million dollars and $400 million dollars  
 ● Between $401 million dollars and $500 million dollars  
 ● More than $500 million dollars but less than $1 billion 
dollars 
 
 ● More than $1 billion dollars  
 
2. Does your bank have any investments in 
another ‘entity’826? If the answer is ‘no’, go 
straight to question 5. 
 
Yes 
 
No 
3. If you have ticked ‘yes’ to question 2, is the 
investment more or less than 10% of the 
common shares in that entity? 
 
More 
 
Less 
4. If you have ticked ‘yes’ to the question 
above, were the common shares in that 
entity issued by your bank? 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
                                                 
826
 Entity refers to another financial institution or insurance company. 
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5. What is the minimum capital adequacy ratio for banks in your 
jurisdiction, i.e. as stated by the Central Bank in the jurisdiction in 
which your bank is located? 
 ………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………. 
6. What is the actual capital adequacy ratio of your bank? 
 ………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………. 
7. Please number the following according to what you consider to be 
potential threats to the financial stability of banks in your jurisdiction, 
starting with the one that poses the most significant risk as ‘1’, to the 
one that poses the least significant risk to your bank as ‘10’. 
 
Market Risk Credit Risk 
Liquidity Risk Operational Risk 
Non-performing Loans Inflation 
Foreign Exchange Fluctuations Political Instability 
Lack of Corporate Governance Other – [Please state] 
 
8. What proportion of the capital does your bank allocate to each of the 
risks listed in Question 10 in a financial year (Nearest estimate if 
possible). 
 
Type of Risk Percentage of Capital 
allocation % 
Credit Risk   
Market Risk   
Liquidity Risk   
Operational Risk   
Non-Performing Loans   
Inflation   
Foreign Exchange Fluctuation   
Lack of Corporate Governance   
Political Instability   
Other   
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9. Which of the following risk methodologies below does your bank use 
in assessing Risk? (Please tick more than one if applicable). 
 
Risk Methodology  
Standardised Approach (SA)  
Internal Ratings-Based (IRB)  
Advanced (IRB)  
 
10. Does your bank engage in Universal 
Banking? i.e. provides other services other 
than retail banking  such as insurance 
services and investment services? 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
11. Which items does your bank class as ‘capital’ for the purposes of 
calculation of capital adequacy ratio? 
 ……………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
12. What accounting method does your bank use in the reporting of its 
financial statements?  Please tick below. 
 
GAAP IFRS OTHER    (Please Specify) 
 
13. Apart from allocation of capital by your 
bank to identifiable or foreseeable and 
probably unforeseen risks, are there other 
means by which your bank absorbs very 
large losses? 
 
Yes 
 
No 
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 If yes, please explain how your bank absorbs large losses: 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
14. Are there any bank insolvency regulations 
or procedures that your bank and other 
banks in your jurisdiction are subject to 
should your bank fail? 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 ………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
15. If yes, please name the regulation(s).   
 ………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
16. Please provide in monetary terms the value of cross-border 
transactions undertaken by your bank with other African banks other 
than branches/subsidiaries from 2005 till 2012. 
 
Year Value of Transactions ($US millions) 
2005   
2006   
2007   
2008   
2009   
2010   
2011   
2012   
 
17. Banking today has become a global 
phenomenon, but are the various attempts 
by global banking regulatory bodies such 
as Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) towards the 
international convergence of capital 
adequacy requirements desirable? 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
No 
 Please explain: 
……………………………………………………………………………….
……………………………………………………………………………….
……………………………………………………………………………….
………………………………………………………………………………. 
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18. Has your bank already implemented BASEL 2? 
 Yes (In full)  Yes (In part)   No 
 If you have selected the second or third option as your answer, 
could you please explain? 
……………………………………………………………………………….
……………………………………………………………………………….
……………………………………………………………………………….
………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
19. What is your rating of the level of awareness low; medium; high; of 
BASEL 3 within your bank prior to the receipt of this Questionnaire 
and its accompanying documents? 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
20. Using a 5-point scale, where ‘5’ means you ‘strongly agree’ and ‘1’ 
means you ‘strongly disagree’, please indicate your level of 
agreement in the statement: ‘BASEL 3 is and will be relevant to/for 
African Banks’? 
 [Strongly Agree] [Strongly Disagree]  [Don’t Know] 
 5 4 3 2 1         Don’t know 
 (Please circle the number most appropriate to you.  If you don’t 
know, please tick the box provided.) 
 Please explain your choice as best you can ……………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………………….
……………………………………………………………………………….
……………………………………………………………………………….
………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
21. BASEL 3 introduces an increased capital 
adequacy requirement.  Do you think your 
bank would benefit from this new capital 
adequacy requirement? 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 Please explain: 
……………………………………………………………………………….
……………………………………………………………………………….
……………………………………………………………………………….
………………………………………………………………………………. 
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22. Are you in favour of an implementation of 
BASEL 3 in your jurisdiction? 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 Please explain: 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
23. In your opinion will BASEL 3 prevent a 
future global financial crisis? 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 Please state your reason: 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
24. With the exception of banks in South Africa 
(that begin the implementation of BASEL 3) 
from January 1 2013, in accordance to the 
timetable set by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, do you think that a 
future implementation of BASEL 3 in your 
jurisdiction is inevitable? 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
No 
 Please explain: 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
25. Which implications do you think the 
implementation of BASEL 3 by the 
members of the G20 and in Europe will 
have on large banks (or banks) in your 
jurisdiction regardless of whether or not the 
central bank in your jurisdiction implement 
it or makes it a requirement for your bank 
to implement it? 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
No 
 Please explain: 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………. 
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